

Citas para “Una división (robusta) del trabajo epistémico para el conocimiento perceptivo” – 27/03/2019 – Seminario de Investigadores (IIF)

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Caracterización general de la división

La división del trabajo epistémico sostiene que la adquisición de conocimiento perceptivo depende de la contribución de dos fuentes distintas: primero, las experiencias perceptivas exitosas (o genuinas) nos dan respaldo epistémico a favor ciertos juicios sobre el mundo externo; segundo, el sujeto debe de llevar a cabo ciertas acciones para tener derecho (estar autorizado) de explotar el respaldo en un juicio correspondiente.

Austin sobre la mejor posición posible para aseverar

“If I watch for some time an animal a few feet in front of me, in a good light, if I prod perhaps, sniff, and take note of the noises it makes, I may say, ‘That’s a pig’; and this too will be ‘incorrigible’, nothing could be produced that would show that I had made a mistake” (Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*: 114).

Veredictos de McDowell Sobre O₁ y O₂:

Veredicto O₁: “Suppose someone has an experience that makes a certain environmental reality perceptually present to her, but she is dissuaded by misleading evidence from taking that to be so. In that case, her perceptual state leaves open no possibility that a suitably related belief is false, but she is deprived of awareness that she is in such a position ... But that leaves unchallenged the claim that the warrant her experience gives her ... is conclusive (McDowell, “Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism (II)”): 269).

Veredicto O₂: “An experience had in circumstances in which there is good reason to believe apparent perceptions are untrustworthy is not an experience of perceiving, even if it happens to be veridical. So if our subject had been in such a situation, her experience would not have been an experience of perceiving, and it would not have provided her with conclusive warrant for the belief.” (Idem: 269).

Sosa sobre las competencias epistémicas auxiliares

“Other epistemically important traits [e.g. open-mindedness and intellectual courage] are indeed of interest to a broader epistemology. They are of course worthy of serious study. But they are not in the charmed inner circle for traditional epistemology. They are only “auxiliary” intellectual virtues, by contrast with the “constitutive” intellectual virtues of central interest to virtue reliabilism” (Sosa, *Judgement and Agency*: 42).

“Someone lazy could have as much knowledge in a given domain as would someone industrious. The lazy knower could just by luck be placed in the position to know, a position that the industrious knower would need to win with much effort and persistence.” (Idem: 45).

Once we manage to open the lid and look inside a box, “now we may *immediately* know the answer to our question, with a perceptual belief – say, that there is a necklace in the box – which manifest certain cognitive competences for gaining visual experience and belief. Perhaps this complex, knowledge-constitutive competence first leads to things seeming perceptually a certain way, and eventually to the belief that things are indeed that way, absent contrary indications.” (Idem: 42)