

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS



Outlines of Scepticism

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Outlines of Scepticism

BOOK I



Outlines of Scepticism

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i The most fundamental difference among philosophies

[1] When people are investigating any subject, the likely result is either a discovery, or a denial of discovery and a confession of inapprehensibility, or else a continuation of the investigation. [2] This, no doubt, is why in the case of philosophical investigations, too, some have said that they have discovered the truth, some have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, and others are still investigating.

[3] Those who are called Dogmatists in the proper sense of the word think that they have discovered the truth – for example, the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics, and some others. The schools of Clitomachus and Carneades, and other Academics, have asserted that things cannot be apprehended.¹ And the Sceptics are still investigating. [4] Hence the most fundamental kinds of philosophy are reasonably thought to be three: the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptical. The former two it will be appropriate for others to describe: in the present work we shall discuss in outline² the Sceptical persuasion. By way of preface let us say that on none of the matters to be discussed do we affirm that things certainly are just as we say they are: rather, we report³ descriptively on each item according to how it appears to us at the time.⁴

ii The accounts constitutive of Scepticism

[5] The Sceptical philosophy contains both a general and a specific account.⁵ In the general account we set out the distinctive character of Scepticism, saying what the concept of it is, what are its principles and

¹ The same is said of the Cyrenaics at I 215. For the New Academy see I 220–31; and note that other sources expressly say that the Academics did *not* ‘assert that things cannot be apprehended’.

² ὑποτυπωτικῶς: the work is an outline or ὑποτύπωσις, and Sextus frequently reminds us of the fact: I 206, 222, 239; II 1, 79, 185, 194; III 1, 114, 167, 279. Note also his assurances that he is only offering ‘few out of many’ examples (I 58, note) and that he is concerned to be brief (I 163, note); and see I 94; II 84, 212; III 56, 71, 135, 168.

³ For this use of the term ‘report’ see I 15, 197, 203.

⁴ Cf. e.g. I 191; II 187.

⁵ Cf. *M* VII 1.

what its arguments, what is its standard and what its aim, what are the modes of suspension of judgement, how we understand sceptical assertions, and what distinguishes Scepticism from neighbouring philosophies.⁶ [6] The specific account is the one in which we argue against each of the parts of what they call philosophy.

Let us first deal with the general account, beginning our sketch with the names given to the Sceptical persuasion.

iii The nomenclature of Scepticism

[7]⁷ The Sceptical persuasion, then, is also called Investigative, from its activity in investigating and inquiring;⁸ Suspensive, from the feeling that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation; Aporetic, either (as some say) from the fact that it puzzles over⁹ and investigates everything, or else from its being at a loss whether to assent or deny; and Pyrrhonian, from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have attached himself to Scepticism more systematically and conspicuously than anyone before him.¹⁰

iv What is Scepticism?

[8] Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all,¹¹ an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity.

[9] We call it an ability not in any fancy sense, but simply in the sense of 'to be able to'. Things which appear we take in the present context to be objects of perception, which is why we contrast them with objects of thought. 'In any way at all' can be taken either with 'an ability' (to show that we are to understand the word 'ability' in its straightforward sense, as we said), or else with 'to set out oppositions

⁶ The programme (with which compare the resumé at I 209) corresponds well to the contents of *PH I* – except that I 13–20 do not appear to be covered.

⁷ With I 7 cf. Diogenes Laertius IX 69–70.

⁸ The verb translated 'inquire' is σκέπτεσθαι, cognate with σκεπτικός ('sceptical').

⁹ 'Puzzle over' renders ἀπορεῖν, from which 'aporetic' derives.

¹⁰ On this explanation of the name 'Pyrrhonism' see BARNES [1992], pp. 4284–6.

¹¹ See Diogenes Laertius IX 78 (reporting Aenesidemus).

among the things which appear and are thought of': we say 'in any way at all' because we set up oppositions in a variety of ways – opposing what appears to what appears, what is thought of to what is thought of, and crosswise, so as to include all the oppositions.¹² Or else we take the phrase with^a 'the things which appear and are thought of', to show that we are not to investigate how what appears appears or how what is thought of is thought of, but are simply to take them for granted.¹³

[10] By 'opposed accounts' we do not necessarily have in mind affirmation and negation, but take the phrase simply in the sense of 'conflicting accounts'.¹⁴ By 'equipollence' we mean equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing: none of the conflicting accounts takes precedence over any other as being more convincing.¹⁵ Suspension of judgement is a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything.¹⁶ Tranquillity¹⁷ is freedom from disturbance or calmness of soul. We shall suggest in the chapter on the aim of scepticism how tranquillity accompanies suspension of judgement.¹⁸

v The Sceptic

[11] The Pyrrhonian philosopher has been implicitly defined in our account of the concept of the Sceptical persuasion: a Pyrrhonian is someone who possesses this ability.

vi The principles of Scepticism

[12] The causal principle of scepticism we say is the hope of becoming tranquil.¹⁹ Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly in things and

^a Reading $\eta\ \tau\omega$ in place of $\eta\ \kappa\alpha\theta'\ \omicron\iota\omicron\nu\delta\eta\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\ \tau\rho\acute{o}\pi\omicron\nu$, as Mau suggests. The sense is not in doubt, and Mau's emendation makes it clear.

¹² See I 31–2; *M* VIII 46.

¹³ Cf. I 19.

¹⁴ Cf. I, 190, 198, 202.

¹⁵ See I 190; cf. 196, 198, 202.

¹⁶ See I 196 (and cf. I 192, on non-assertion); and note esp. COUJSSIN [1929].

¹⁷ ἀταραξία: 'untroubledness' – the word is formed from an alpha privative and ταραττείν, 'to trouble'.

¹⁸ I 25–32 (cf. 232).

¹⁹ Cf. I 26; see STRIKER [1990a]; ANNAS [1993a], ch. 8.

puzzled as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things is true and what false, thinking that by deciding these issues they would become tranquil.

The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed;²⁰ for it is from this, we think, that we come to hold no beliefs.

vii Do Sceptics hold beliefs?²¹

[13] When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take 'belief' in the sense in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances²² – for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, 'I think I am not heated (or: chilled)'. Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences;²³ for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear.

[14] Not even in uttering the Sceptical phrases about unclear matters – for example, 'In no way more', or 'I determine nothing', or one of the other phrases which we shall later discuss²⁴ – do they hold beliefs. For if you hold beliefs, then you posit as real the things you are said to hold beliefs about; but Sceptics posit these phrases not as necessarily being real. For they suppose that, just as the phrase 'Everything is false' says that it too, along with everything else, is false (and similarly for 'Nothing is true'), so also 'In no way more' says that it too, along with everything else, is no more so than not so, and hence it cancels itself along with everything else. And we say the same of the other Sceptical phrases. [15] Thus, if people who hold beliefs posit as real the things they hold beliefs about, while Sceptics utter their own phrases in such a way that they are implicitly cancelled by

²⁰ See I 202–5 (cf. I 18).

²¹ The Dogmatists alleged that the Sceptics did in fact hold beliefs: see e.g. Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 9–12; Diogenes Laertius IX 102–4 (cf. IX 68). – On the controversy surrounding the issues raised by this chapter see FREDE [1979]; BURNYEAT [1980a], [1984]; BARNES [1988], [1990a], pp. 2617–49.

²² Cf. I 29, 193, 229–30; II 10.

²³ Cf. I 16, 193, 197.

²⁴ See I 187–208.

themselves, then they cannot be said to hold beliefs in uttering them.²⁵

But the main point is this: in uttering these phrases they say what is apparent to themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming nothing about external objects.²⁶

viii Do Sceptics belong to a school?²⁷

[16] We take the same attitude to the question: Do Sceptics belong to a school? If you say that a school involves adherence to a number of beliefs which cohere both with one another and with what is apparent,²⁸ and if you say that belief is assent to something unclear, then we shall say that Sceptics do not belong to any school. [17] But if you count as a school a persuasion which, to all appearances, coheres with some account, the account showing how it is possible to live^b correctly (where 'correctly' is taken not only with reference to virtue, but more loosely, and extends to the ability to suspend judgement^c) – in that case we say that Sceptics do belong to a school. For we coherently follow, to all appearances, an account which shows us a life in conformity with traditional customs and the law and persuasions and our own feelings.

ix Do Sceptics study natural science?

[18] We say something similar again when investigating the question of whether Sceptics should study natural science. We do not study

^b Deleting *δοκεῖν*, as Mutschmann suggested.

^c We close the parenthesis after *διατείνοντος* rather than after *ἀφελέστερον*: the clause *καὶ ... διατείνοντος* is part of the gloss on *ὁρθῶς* and not explanatory of *τοῦ λόγου*.

²⁵ Cf. I 206.

²⁶ Cf. I 208.

²⁷ Some denied that Pyrrhonism constituted a school of philosophy: see Diogenes Laertius I 20; cf. Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 30; Clement, *strom* VIII iv 16.2. On the concept of a school see GLUCKER [1978].

²⁸ 'Cohere with' etc., here and in the section, translate *ἀκολουθεῖν* and its cognate noun. The verb literally means 'follow', and so we normally translate it (we also use 'follow' for the compounds *κατακολουθεῖν* and *παρακολουθεῖν* and for *ἔπεισθαι*); but, for the noun, 'implication' and 'validity' have sometimes been preferred, and the adjective *ἀκόλουθος* comes out as 'apposite'.

natural science in order to make assertions with firm conviction about any of the matters on which scientific beliefs are held. But we do touch on natural science in order to be able to oppose to every account an equal account,²⁹ and for the sake of tranquillity.³⁰ This is also the spirit in which we approach the logical and ethical parts of what they call philosophy.³¹

x Do Sceptics reject what is apparent?³²

[19] Those who say that the Sceptics reject what is apparent have not, I think, listened to what we say.³³ As we said before,³⁴ we do not overturn anything which leads us, without our willing it, to assent in accordance with a passive appearance – and these things are precisely what is apparent. When we investigate whether existing things are such as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we investigate is not what is apparent but what is said about what is apparent – and this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. [20] For example,^d it appears to us that honey sweetens (we concede this inasmuch as we are sweetened in a perceptual way); but whether (as far as the argument goes³⁵) it is actually sweet is something we investigate – and this is not what is apparent but something said about what is apparent.³⁶

And if we do propound arguments directly against what is apparent, it is not because we want to reject what is apparent that we set them out, but rather to display the rashness of the Dogmatists; for reasoning is such a deceiver that it all but snatches even what is apparent from under our very eyes, surely we should keep watch on it in unclear matters, to avoid being led into rashness by following it?

^d Retaining the MSS text: Mutschmann–Mau follow Heintz in adding <ὅτι μὲν>.

²⁹ See I 12.

³⁰ See I 10, 25–30.

³¹ For the three parts of philosophy see II 12–13.

³² See Diogenes Laertius IX 103–4.

³³ For other complaints of misrepresentation see I 200, 208.

³⁴ See I 13, 17.

³⁵ The same Greek phrase occurs frequently elsewhere, and its meaning is usually plain; but here its import is obscure and different scholars have construed it in different ways: see BRUNDSCHWIG [1990].

³⁶ Cf. II 72 (and on honey see I 101).

xi The standard of Scepticism³⁷

[21]³⁸ That we attend to what is apparent is clear from what we say about the standard of the Sceptical persuasion. 'Standard' has two senses: there are standards adopted to provide conviction about the reality or unreality of something (we shall talk about these standards when we turn to attack them³⁹); and there are standards of action, attending to which in everyday life we perform some actions and not others – and it is these standards which are our present subject.

[22] We say, then, that the standard of the Sceptical persuasion is what is apparent,⁴⁰ implicitly meaning by this the appearances; for they depend on passive and unwilling feelings and are not objects of investigation. (Hence no-one, presumably, will raise a controversy over whether an existing thing appears this way or that; rather, they investigate whether it is such as it appears.)

[23]⁴¹ Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding opinions – for we are not able to be utterly inactive.⁴² These everyday observances seem to be fourfold, and to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. [24] By nature's guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking.⁴³ By the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst to drink. By the handing down of customs and laws, we accept, from an everyday point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad.⁴⁴ By teaching of kinds of expertise we are not inactive in those which we accept.⁴⁵

And we say all this without holding any opinions.

³⁷ On the notion of a standard or κριτήριον see STRIKER [1974], [1990b]; HUBY and NEAL [1989].

³⁸ Cf. *M* VII 29–31.

³⁹ See II 14–17.

⁴⁰ See Diogenes Laertius IX 106, reporting the view of Aenesidemus.

⁴¹ With I 23–4 compare I 237–9 (cf. I 226, 231; II 102, 246, 254; III 2, 119, 151, 235); see e.g. BARNES [1990a], pp. 2641–9; ANNAS [1993a], ch. 8.

⁴² On the question, Can the Sceptic Live? see *M* XI 162–166; Diogenes Laertius IX 104–105; Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 25–6; see e.g. BURNYEAT [1980a]; BARNES [1988a], [1990b].

⁴³ See e.g. *M* VIII 203.

⁴⁴ Cf. III 2; *M* IX 49.

⁴⁵ For types of expertise allegedly acceptable to Sceptics see *M* I 99; V 1–3.

xii What is the aim of Scepticism?

[25]⁴⁶ It will be apposite to consider next the aim of the Sceptical persuasion. Now an aim is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it is not itself done or considered for the sake of anything else.⁴⁷ Or: an aim is the final object of desire.⁴⁸ Up to now we say the aim of the Sceptic is tranquillity in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us. [26] For Sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are true and which false, so as to become tranquil;⁴⁹ but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable to decide this they suspended judgement. And when they suspended judgement, tranquillity in matters of opinion followed fortuitously.

[27]⁵⁰ For those who hold the opinion that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believe to be good, they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue what (so they think) is good. And when they have acquired these things, they experience more troubles; for they are elated beyond reason and measure, and in fear of change they do anything so as not to lose what they believe to be good. [28] But those who make no determination about what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are tranquil.

A story told of the painter Apelles applies to the Sceptics.⁵¹ They say that he was painting a horse and wanted to represent in his picture the lather on the horse's mouth; but he was so unsuccessful that he gave up, took the sponge on which he had been wiping off the colours from his brush, and flung it at the picture. And when it hit the

⁴⁶ With I 25-30 cf. III 235-8, *M* XI 110-67; Timon, frag. 841 Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (see BURNYEAT [1980b]); Diogenes Laertius IX 107-8. See esp. STRIKER [1990a]; ANNAS [1993a], chh. 1, 17.

⁴⁷ A standard definition: e.g. Cicero, *fin* I xii 42 (Epicureans); Arius ap. Stobaeus, *ed* II 77.16-17 (Stoics), 131.2-4 (Peripatetics).

⁴⁸ Again, a standard definition; see e.g. Arius ap. Stobaeus, *ed* II 76.21-4 (Stoics), 131.4 (Peripatetics); Alexander, *an mant* 150.20-1, 162.34.

⁴⁹ See I 12.

⁵⁰ Cf. III 237-8; *M* XI 112-18, 145-6 (and below, I 215).

⁵¹ On this paragraph see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 167-171.

picture, it produced a representation of the horse's lather. [29] Now the Sceptics were hoping to acquire tranquillity by deciding the anomalies in what appears and is thought of, and being unable to do this they suspended judgement. But when they suspended judgement, tranquillity followed as it were fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body.⁵²

We do not, however, take Sceptics to be undisturbed in every way⁵³ – we say that they are disturbed by things which are forced upon them; for we agree that at times they shiver and are thirsty and have other feelings of this kind.⁵⁴ [30] But in these cases ordinary people are afflicted by two sets of circumstances: by the feelings themselves, and no less by believing that these circumstances are bad by nature. Sceptics, who shed the additional opinion that each of these things is bad in its nature, come off more moderately even in these cases.

This, then, is why we say that the aim of Sceptics is tranquillity in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us. (Some eminent Sceptics have added as a further aim suspension of judgement in investigations.⁵⁵)

xiii The general modes of suspension of judgement

[31] Since we have been saying that tranquillity follows suspension of judgement about everything, it will be apposite here to say how suspension of judgement comes about for us.

It comes about – to put it rather generally – through the opposition of things. We oppose what appears to what appears, or what is thought of to what is thought of, or crosswise.⁵⁶ [32] For example, we oppose what appears to what appears when we say: 'The same tower appears round from a distance and square from nearby'.⁵⁷ We oppose

⁵² See Diogenes Laertius IX 107 (referring the image to Timon and Aenesidemus); below, I 205.

⁵³ Cf III 235–6; *M* XI 141–60.

⁵⁴ See I 13.

⁵⁵ So Timon and Aenesidemus, according to Diogenes Laertius IX 107.

⁵⁶ See I 8–9.

⁵⁷ A standard example: e.g. I 118; II 55; *M* VII 208, 414; Lucretius IV 353–63; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 104–6.

what is thought of to what is thought of when, against those who seek to establish that there is Providence from the orderliness of the heavenly bodies, we oppose the view that often the good do badly while the bad do well and conclude from this that there is no Providence.⁵⁸ [33] We oppose what is thought of to what appears, as Anaxagoras did when to the view that snow is white,^c he opposed the thought that snow is frozen water and water is black and snow is therefore black.⁵⁹

In another sense we sometimes oppose present things to present things (as in the above examples) and sometimes present to past or future things. For example, when someone propounds to us an argument we cannot refute, [34] we say to him: 'Before the founder of the school to which you adhere was born, the argument of the school, which is no doubt sound, was not yet apparent, although it was really there in nature. In the same way, it is possible that the argument opposing the one you have just propounded is really there in nature but is not yet apparent to us; so we should not yet assent to what is now thought to be a powerful argument'.⁶⁰

xiv The Ten Modes⁶¹

[35] So that we may get a more accurate impression of these oppositions, I shall set down the modes through which we conclude to suspension of judgement. But I make no affirmation either about their number or about their power – they may be unsound, and there may be more than those I shall describe.

[36] The older sceptics⁶² normally offer ten modes in number through which we are thought to conclude to suspension of judge-

^c Like Mau, we reject Mutschmann's insertion of *κατασκευάζοντι*.

⁵⁸ Cf. I 151.

⁵⁹ Cf. II 244.

⁶⁰ With this compare the occasional appeal to merely possible examples: I 89, 96, 143; II 40; III 233–4.

⁶¹ On this chapter see ANNAS and BARNES [1985]; and for the comparison between Sextus and Diogenes Laertius see BARNES [1992], pp. 4273–9 (with bibliography).

⁶² They contrast with the more recent sceptics of I 164; at *M* VII 345 Sextus refers to Aenesidemus as author of the Ten Modes (but it is not clear how closely he is following Aenesidemus here in *PH*).

ment. (They use 'arguments' and 'schemata' as synonyms for 'modes'.) They are:⁶³ first, the mode depending on the variations among animals; second, that depending on the differences among humans; third, that depending on the differing constitutions of the sense-organs; fourth, that depending on circumstances; fifth, that depending on positions and intervals and places; sixth, that depending on admixtures; [37] seventh, that depending on the quantities and preparations of existing things; eighth, that deriving from relativity; ninth, that depending on frequent or rare encounters; tenth, that depending on persuasions and customs and laws and belief in myths and dogmatic suppositions. [38] (We use this order for the sake of argument.⁶⁴)

Superordinate to these are three modes: that deriving from the subject judging; that deriving from the object judged; that combined from both. For under the mode deriving from the subject judging are ranged the first four, since what judges is either an animal or a human or a sense, and^f is in some circumstance. The seventh and tenth are referred to the mode deriving from the object judged. The fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth are referred to the mode combined from both. [39] These three are in turn referred to the relativity mode. So we have as most generic relativity, as specific the three, as subordinate the ten.⁶⁵

So much by way of a plausible account of their number: now for their power.

[40]⁶⁶ First, we said, is the argument according to which animals, depending on the differences among them, do not receive the same appearances from the same things. This we deduce both from the differences in the ways in which they are produced and from the variation in the composition of their bodies.⁶⁷

[41] In the case of the ways in which they are produced, this is because some animals are produced without copulation and some as a

^f Reading καί with the MSS: Mutschmann–Mau emend to ἦ ('or').

⁶³ Cf. Diogenes Laertius XI 78–9; Philo, *abr* 169–70; Aristocles, *apud* Eusebius, *PE*, XIV xviii 11–12.

⁶⁴ For alternative orderings of the modes see Diogenes Laertius IX 87: cf. ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 26–30; BARNES [1992], pp. 4278–9.

⁶⁵ Compare the taxonomy at I 136; cf. ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 141–2.

⁶⁶ With I 40–79 cf. Diogenes Laertius IX 79–80; Philo, *abr* 171–5; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 39–53.

⁶⁷ On the structure of this argument see BARNES [1992], pp. 4276–7.

result of intercourse. Of those produced without copulation, some are produced from fire, like the little creatures which appear in ovens, some from stagnant water, like mosquitoes, some from wine turning sour, like gnats, some from earth, <like . . .>,⁶⁸ some from slime, like frogs, some from mud, like maggots, some from donkeys,⁸ like dung-beetles, some from fruit, like the gall-insects which come from wild figs, some from rotting animals, like bees which come from bulls and wasps which come from horses. [42] Of animals produced as a result of intercourse, some are bred from the same species, like the majority, some from different species, like mules. Again, in general, some animals are produced viviparously, like humans, some oviparously, like birds, and some carniparously, like bears.⁶⁹

[43] It is likely, then, that the dissimilarities in the ways in which they are produced should lead to large differences in the ways in which they are affected, thence giving rise to imbalance, disharmony and conflict.

[44] But it is the differences among the most important parts of the body, especially those which are naturally fitted for deciding and perceiving, which can produce the greatest conflict of appearances. For instance, people with jaundice say that what appears white to us is yellow, and people with a blood-suffusion in the eye say that such things are blood-red.⁷⁰ Since, then, the eyes of some animals are yellow, of others blood-shot or white or some other colour, it is likely, I think, that their grasp of colours is different.

[45] Further, when we have stared for a long time at the sun and then bend over a book, we think that the letters are golden and moving around. Since, then, some animals have a natural brilliance in their eyes and give off a fine mobile light from them so that they can see even at night, we shall rightly deem that the external objects do not give us and them similar impressions.

[46] Further, magicians, by smearing lamp-wicks with bronze-rust

⁸ Perhaps read ἐξ ὄνων <κοπρού> ('from the dung of donkeys'): see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 184.

⁶⁸ A word has apparently dropped out of the text: earthworms, grasshoppers and mice have been suggested.

⁶⁹ A semi-jocular allusion to the vulgar belief that bears are born as lumps of flesh.

⁷⁰ Cf. I 101, 126; II 51. The remark about jaundice is repeated in modern texts; but it is apparently quite false.

or cuttlefish-ink, make the by-standers appear bronze-coloured or black, all through a slight sprinkling of the mixture. It is surely far more reasonable, given that animals' eyes contain mixtures of different humours,⁷¹ that they should also get different appearances from existing objects.

[47] When we press one of our eyes from the side, the forms and shapes and sizes of the objects we see appear elongated and narrow. It is likely, then, that those animals (such as goats, cats and the like) which have slanting and elongated pupils, should view existing objects differently and not in the same way as animals with round pupils suppose them to be.

[48] Mirrors, depending on their differing constructions, sometimes show external objects as minute (e.g. concave mirrors), sometimes as elongated and narrow (convex mirrors); and some of them show the head of the person reflected at the bottom and their feet at the top. [49] Since, then, some of the vessels of sight protrude and project beyond the body because of their convexity, while others are more concave and others are set level, it is likely that the appearances are altered by this too, and that dogs, fish, lions, humans and locusts do not see the same things as equal in size or similar in shape; rather, what they see depends upon the kind of imprinting produced in each case by the eye which receives what is apparent.

[50] The same account holds for the other senses too. How could it be said that touch produces similar effects in animals with shells, animals with fleshy exteriors, animals with prickles, and animals with feathers or scales? How can there be a similar grasp of sound in animals with a very narrow auditory channel and those with a very broad one? or in animals with hairy ears and those with ears which are bare? After all, we too hear things differently when we stop up our ears and when we use them in the ordinary way.

[51] Smell too will differ depending on the variation among animals. For we too are affected in one way when we are chilled and

⁷¹ Sextus alludes to the theory of the four 'humours' or juices – blood, phlegm, bile and black bile – which, according to normal medical theory, constitute the most important stuffs in the body and determine the physical and psychological state of its owner (see esp. Galen, *On Temperaments*). See also I 51, 52, 71, 80, 102, 128.

there is an excess of phlegm in us,⁷² and in another way when the region of the head collects an excess of blood, rejecting what others think fragrant and deeming ourselves as it were battered by it. So, since some animals are naturally flabby and full of phlegm while others are extremely rich in blood and in others yellow or black bile is dominant, it is reasonable on this account that what they smell should appear different to each of them.

[52] Similarly with objects of taste, since the tongues of some animals are rough and dry while those of others are very moist. For we too, when in fevers our tongue is drier than usual, deem that what we are offered is earthy and unpalatable, or bitter – and we are also affected in one way or another depending on the different dominance in us of the so-called humours.⁷³ Since, then, animals have organs of taste which differ and in which different humours are excessive, they will receive different appearances of existing objects with regard to taste too.

[53] Just as the same nourishment when dispersed becomes in one place veins, in another arteries, in another bone, in another sinew, and so on, displaying different powers depending on the differences among the parts receiving it; and just as the same undifferentiated water when dispersed in trees becomes in one place bark, in another a branch, in another fruit – and hence figs and pomegranates and so on; [54] and just as one and the same breath breathed by a musician into his flute is now high and now low; and just as the same pressure of the hand on a lyre produces in one place a low sound and in another a high one:⁷⁴ in the same way it is reasonable that external existing objects should be observed as different depending on the different constitutions of the animals receiving the appearances.

[55] One can learn this with greater evidence from the things which animals choose and avoid. For instance, perfume appears very pleasant to humans but intolerable to dung-beetles and bees. Olive oil benefits humans but when sprayed over wasps and bees it destroys them. Sea-water is unpleasant to humans when they drink it, and poisonous, but it is very pleasant and drinkable to fish. [56] Pigs find it more pleasant to wash in the most foul-smelling mud than in clear,

⁷² A reference to the four humours: see I 46.

⁷³ See I 46.

⁷⁴ Cf. I 95.

pure water. Among animals, some feed on grass, some on shrubs, some in forests,^h some on seeds, some on flesh, some on milk. Some enjoy their food rotten and others fresh, some enjoy it raw and others prepared by cooking. And in general, what is pleasant to some is to others unpleasant and to be avoided – or evenⁱ fatal. [57] For instance, hemlock fattens quails and henbane fattens pigs – which indeed enjoy eating salamanders, just as deer enjoy eating venomous animals and swallows enjoy eating blister-beetles. Ants and mosquitoes, if swallowed by humans, cause displeasure and griping; but if she-bears feel weak in some way they lick them up and so recover their strength. [58] Vipers are numbed by the mere touch of an oak-branch, just as bats are by the touch of a plane-leaf. Elephants avoid rams, lions avoid cocks, sea-beasts avoid the crackling of beans as they are pounded, tigers avoid the noise of drums.

More cases than these can be given;⁷⁵ but let us not be thought to waste time unnecessarily – if the same things are unpleasant to some animals and pleasant to others, and if the pleasant and unpleasant lie in appearances,⁷⁶ then appearances produced in animals from existing objects are different.

[59]⁷⁷ But if the same objects appear dissimilar depending on the variation among animals, then we shall be able to say what the existing objects are like as observed by us, but as to what they are like in their nature we shall suspend judgement. For we shall not be able ourselves to decide between our own appearances and those of other animals, being ourselves a part of the dispute and for that reason more in need of someone to decide than ourselves able to judge.⁷⁸

[60] And besides, we shall not be able to prefer our own appearances to those produced in the irrational animals either without giving a proof or by giving a proof. For quite apart from the fact that there is no doubt no such thing as proof, as we shall suggest,⁷⁹ the

^h Perhaps read ὑληφάγα ('feeding on wood') for ὑληνόμα, to preserve the symmetry of the examples.

ⁱ Reading ἢ καί, after the Latin translation: Mutschmann–Mau follow the MSS and print καί.

⁷⁵ For this refrain, 'a few out of many', see I 85; II 130; III 20, 245, 273; cf. I 4, note.

⁷⁶ Cf. I 87: see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 59–60.

⁷⁷ With I 59–61 compare II 34–6.

⁷⁸ On this argument see BARNES [1990c].

⁷⁹ See II 134–92.

so-called proof will itself be either apparent to us or not apparent. If it is not apparent, then we shall not bring it forward with confidence. But if it is apparent to us, then since what is being investigated is what is apparent to animals, and the proof is apparent to us, and we are animals, then the proof itself will be under investigation to see whether it is true as well as apparent. [61] But it is absurd to try to establish the matter under investigation through the matter under investigation, since the same thing will then be both convincing and unconvincing (convincing insofar as it aims to offer a proof, unconvincing insofar as it is being proved), which is impossible. We shall not, therefore, have a proof through which to prefer our own appearances to those produced in the so-called irrational animals. If, therefore, appearances are different depending on the variations among animals, and it is impossible to decide among them, then it is necessary to suspend judgement about external existing objects.

[62] But for good measure⁸⁰ we do compare the so-called irrational animals with humans in respect of appearances. For after the substantial arguments we do not rule out a little ridicule of the deluded and self-satisfied Dogmatists.⁸¹ Now we Sceptics are accustomed straightforwardly to compare the irrational animals *en masse* with humans; [63] but since the Dogmatists with their subtleties say that the comparison is unequal, we – for extra good measure – will carry the ridicule further and rest the argument on one animal, for example, on the dog, if you like, which is thought to be the lowest animal of all. We shall find even so that the animals which the argument concerns do not fall short of us as regards the convincingness of what appears to them.

[64] That this animal excels us in its perception the Dogmatists agree. By its sense of smell it grasps more than we do, tracking down by its means wild beasts it cannot see – and with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do; and with its sense of hearing it perceives more acutely.

[65] Let us turn to reasoning. Of this, one kind is internal and the

⁸⁰ Cf. I 63, 76; II 47, 96, 192, 193; III 273.

⁸¹ Cf. II 211.

other expressed.⁸² So let us first look at the internal kind. This (according to those Dogmatists who are our chief opponents here, namely the Stoics⁸³) seems to be anchored in the following things: choice of what is appropriate⁸⁴ and avoidance of what is alien to you; knowledge of the kinds of expertise contributing towards this; grasping and relieving your own feelings; acquisition of the virtues relevant to your own nature.^j

[66] Now the dog, on which we thought we would rest our argument for the sake of an example, does choose what is appropriate and avoid what is harmful to himself: he pursues food and retreats from a raised whip.

Further, he has an expertise which provides what is appropriate to him: hunting.

[67] Nor is he outside the scope of virtue. At least if justice is a matter of distributing to each according to his value, the dog, which fawns on and guards his friends and benefactors but frightens off enemies and offenders, will not be outside the scope of justice. [68] But if he has this, then, since the virtues follow from one another,⁸⁵ he has the other virtues too – which wise men deny to most humans. He is courageous, as we see when he frightens off enemies; he is clever, as Homer witnessed when he portrayed Odysseus as unknown by all the people in his household and recognized only by Argus⁸⁶ – the dog was not deceived by the alteration to the man's body and did not

^j The text offered by the MSS is certainly corrupt; and the version suggested by the Latin translation and printed by Mutschmann–Mau is no good. We now opt, *pace* ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 185, for the drastic remedy proposed by HEINTZ [1932], pp. 11–13: ... τῆ ἀντιλήψει <καὶ παραμυθία τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν, τῆ δὲ ἀναλήψει> τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀρετῶν [τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη].

⁸² I.e. there is thought ('internal reasoning') and speech ('external reasoning'); see e.g. *M* VIII 275.

⁸³ For specifically Stoic allusions in what follows see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 47.

⁸⁴ 'Appropriate' renders οἰκείος: the word, which originally meant 'to do with one's household', was used by the Stoics to characterize what we naturally tend to in our rational and moral development. Sextus plays on the different uses of the word in this passage: 'friends' in I 67 is οἰκείοι (and 'enemies' is ἀνοίκείοι); similarly, 'people in his household' (68).

⁸⁵ A Stoic doctrine: e.g. Diogenes Laertius VII 125; Plutarch, *Stoic rep* 1046E.

⁸⁶ See Homer, *Odyssey* XVII 300.

abandon his apprehensive appearance,⁸⁷ which he appears to have kept better than the humans. [69] According to Chrysippus, who is particularly hostile^k to the irrational animals,⁸⁸ the dog even shares in their celebrated dialectic.⁸⁹ Thus our author says that the dog focusses on the fifth unprovable with several disjuncts when he comes to a crossroads and, having tracked down the two roads along which the wild animal did not go, starts off at once along the third without tracking down it. For, our early author says, he is implicitly reasoning as follows: 'The animal went either this way or this or this; but neither this way nor this: therefore this way.'⁹⁰

[70] Further, he can both grasp and relieve his own feelings. When a thorn has got stuck in him he tries to remove it by rubbing his paw along the ground and by using his teeth.⁹¹ And if he has a wound anywhere, then, since dirty wounds heal with difficulty while clean ones are easily cured, he gently wipes away the pus which gathers. [71] Indeed, he keeps to Hippocratic practice extremely well. Since the way to cure a foot is to rest it, if he ever gets a wound in his foot he lifts it up and favours it as far as he can. And when he is disturbed by inappropriate humours,⁹² he eats grass, with the help of which he vomits up what was inappropriate and gets well again.

[72] If, then, it has appeared that the animal on which we have rested our argument for the sake of an example chooses what is appropriate and avoids what is disturbing, has an expertise which provides what is appropriate, can grasp and relieve his own feelings, and is not outside the scope of virtue, then, since in these things lies

^k Reading *πολεμοῦντα*, with the MSS: Mutschmann–Mau print *συμπολεμοῦντα*, which gives exactly the opposite sense.

⁸⁷ Cf. II 4, note.

⁸⁸ Hostile both theoretically, in that he denied animals reason and virtue and other honourable attributes (e.g. Porphyry, *abstin* III xii 5), and also practically, in that he held that animals might be treated in any way conducive to human utility (see Cicero, *fin* III xx 67).

⁸⁹ Dialectic is a virtue, according to the Stoics (see e.g. Diogenes Laertius VII 46): I 69 is thus continuous with I 67–8.

⁹⁰ The doggy syllogism is often reported; see especially Philo, *On Animals* 45–6, 84; Plutarch, *de sollertia animalium* 968F–969B; Aelian, *On the Nature of Animals* VI 59; Porphyry, *abstin* III xxii 6. On the Stoic 'unprovables' see below, II 157–8.

⁹¹ Cf. I 238.

⁹² See I 46.

the perfection of internal reasoning, the dog will be, in this respect,¹ perfect. This is, I think the reason why some philosophers have glorified themselves with the name of this animal.⁹³

[73] As for expressed reasoning, first it is not necessary to investigate it; for some of the Dogmatists themselves have deprecated it as working against the acquisition of virtue, which is why during their time of learning they practised silence.⁹⁴ And again, let us suppose that a man is mute: no-one will say that he is irrational.

But to pass over these matters, note in particular that we observe the animals which we are now discussing uttering sounds which are actually human – animals such as jays and some others.

[74] But to leave this aside too, even if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational animals, it is nevertheless^m not unlikely that they do converse and we do not understand them. For when we are listening to the sounds made by foreigners we do not understand them but believe that they are undifferentiated. [75] And we hear dogs producing one sound when frightening people off, another when howling, another when they are beaten, and a different one when fawning. Generally, if someone were to study this matter, he would find that there is much variation of sound (in the case of this animal and of others) in different circumstances; so for this reason it could be said with some likelihood that the so-called irrational animals share in expressed reasoning too.

[76] But if they fall short of humans neither in the accuracy of their senses nor in internal reasoning nor (saying this for good measure⁹⁵) in expressed reasoning, they will be no less convincing in respect of the appearances than we are. [77] It is no doubt possible to rest the case on any one of the irrational animals and showⁿ the same thing. For instance, who would deny that birds stand out in shrewdness and have the use of expressed reasoning? They have a knowledge not only

¹ Reading τοῦτο, with two MSS and the Latin translation: Mutschmann–Mau print τοῦτον (Heintz).

^m Reading δμως (Wendland) for ὅλως (MSS, Mutschmann–Mau).

ⁿ Reading ὑποδεικνύειν with the MSS: Mutschmann–Mau print ἀποδεικνύειν, 'prove'.

⁹³ I.e. the Cynics, οἱ κυνικοί, from κύων, 'dog' (see e.g. Diogenes Laertius VI 13).

⁹⁴ Sextus alludes to the celebrated Pythagorean rule of silence, for which see e.g. Porphyry, *On the Pythagorean Way of Life* 19.

⁹⁵ Cf. I 62.

of the present but also of the future, and they make this clear to those who can understand them, giving various signs and in particular foretelling things by their cries.

[78] I have made this comparison, as I noted before,⁹⁶ for good measure, having before^o shown adequately, I think, that we are not able to prefer our own appearances to those produced in the irrational animals.

So, if the irrational animals are no more convincing than we are when it comes to judging appearances, and if different appearances are produced depending on the variations among animals, then I shall be able to say how each existing object appears to me, but for these reasons I shall be forced to suspend judgement on how it is by nature.

[79]⁹⁷ Such is the first mode of suspension of judgement. The second, we said, was the mode deriving from the differences among humans. For even were one to concede by way of hypothesis that humans are more convincing than the irrational animals, we shall find that suspension of judgement is brought in insofar as our own differences go.

There are two things from which humans are said to be composed, soul and body, and in both these we differ from one another. For example, in body we differ in our shapes and our individual peculiarities.⁹⁸ [80] There is a difference in shape between the body of a Scythian and an Indian's body, and what produces the variation, so they say, is the different dominance of the humours. Depending on the different dominance of the humours, the appearances too become different, as we established in our first argument.⁹⁹ Further, in virtue of these humours there are many differences in our choice and avoidance of external things; for Indians enjoy different things from us, and enjoying different things shows that varying appearances come from existing objects.

^o Retaining the second, inelegant ἐμπροσθεν, which Mutschmann–Mau excise.

⁹⁶ I.e. at I 62.

⁹⁷ With I 79–90 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 80–1; Philo, *ebv* 176–7; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 57–65.

⁹⁸ Or idiosyncrasies, ἰδιοσυγκρασίαι ('individual commixtures <of the humours>'): 'Most doctors, I think, name these things idiosyncrasies – and they all agree that they are inapprehensible' (Galen, *On the Therapeutic Method* x 209 Kühn).

⁹⁹ See I 52 (cf. I 46).

[81] In our individual peculiarities we differ in such a way that some people digest beef more easily than rock-fish, and get diarrhoea from weak Lesbian wine. There was (so they say) an old woman in Attica who consumed four ounces of hemlock without harm. Lysis actually took half an ounce of opium without distress. [82] Demophon, Alexander's waiter, used to shiver when he was in the sun or the baths and felt warm in the shade. When Athenagoras of Argos was stung by scorpions or poisonous spiders he was not hurt. The Psyllaeans, as they are called, are not harmed when bitten by snakes or asps, [83] and the Tentyritae in Egypt are not harmed by crocodiles. Further, the Ethiopians who live by the river Astapus on the other side of Meroe eat scorpions and snakes without harm. When Rufinus – the one from Chalcis – drank hellebore he neither vomited nor suffered any other purgative effects, but consumed and digested it as though it were something normal. [84] If Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor ever consumed pepper he suffered a heart attack. If Soterichus the surgeon ever smelt sheathfish cooking he was seized by diarrhoea. Andron of Argos was so free from thirst that he travelled through waterless Libya without seeking drink. The Emperor Tiberius could see in the dark. Aristotle describes a Thasian who thought that the image of a man was always preceding him.¹⁰⁰

[85] Since there is such variation among humans in body (to be satisfied with a few examples out of the many¹⁰¹ which the Dogmatists provide^P), it is likely that humans differ from one another in their souls too; for, as the science of physiognomy shows, the body is a kind of picture of the soul.¹⁰²

The chief indication of the great – indeed infinite – differences among humans with regard to their intellect is the dispute among the Dogmatists about various matters and in particular about what we should choose and what reject. [86] The poets have got it right here. Pindar says:

^P Retaining τῶν παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς κειμένων, which Mutschmann–Mau follow Heintz in deleting.

¹⁰⁰ See Aristotle, *Meteorology* 373a35–b10; cf. ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 61.

¹⁰¹ Cf. I 58.

¹⁰² Cf. II 101; *M* VIII 155, 173.

One man is gladdened by the honours and garlands of his
storm-footed horses,
another by life in gilded palaces;
another rejoices as he crosses the swell of the sea in a swift ship.¹⁰³

And Homer says:

.Different men rejoice in different deeds.¹⁰⁴

Tragedy too is full of such things:

If nature had made the same things fine and wise for all alike,
there would be no disputatious strife among human kind.¹⁰⁵

And again:

Strange that the same thing should please some mortals
but by others be hated.¹⁰⁶

[87] Since, therefore, choice and avoidance are located in pleasure and displeasure, and pleasure and displeasure lie in perception and appearance, then when some choose and others avoid the same things, it is apposite for us to deduce that they are not similarly affected by the same things, since otherwise they would have chosen and rejected the same things in similar ways.¹⁰⁷ But if the same things affect humans differently depending on the differences among them, then it is likely that suspension of judgement will be introduced in this way too, since we are no doubt able to say how each existing thing appears, with reference to each difference, but are not able to assert what it is in its nature.

[88] For we shall be convinced either by all humans or by some. If by all, we shall be attempting the impossible and accepting opposed views. But if by some, then let them say to whom we should assent. The Platonist will say 'to Plato', the Epicurean 'to Epicurus', and the others analogously, and so by their undecidable dissensions¹⁰⁸ they will bring us round again to suspension of judgement.

¹⁰³ frag. 221 Snell.

¹⁰⁴ *Odyssey* XIV 228.

¹⁰⁵ Euripides, *Phoenissae* 499–500.

¹⁰⁶ Unknown, frag. 462 Kannicht/Snell.

¹⁰⁷ See I 57.

¹⁰⁸ 'Undecidable' translates ἀνεπίκριτος – but see BARNES [1990d], pp. 17–19.

[89] Anyone who says that we should assent to the majority view is making a puerile suggestion. Nobody can canvass all mankind and work out what is the preference of the majority,¹⁰⁹ it being possible¹¹⁰ that among some nations of which we have no knowledge what is rare with us is true of the majority and what is true of most of us is there rare – for example, that most people when bitten by poisonous spiders do not suffer though some occasionally do suffer, and analogously with the other individual peculiarities I mentioned earlier. So suspension of judgement is necessarily introduced by way of the differences among humans too.

[90] When the self-satisfied Dogmatists say that they themselves should be preferred to other humans in judging things, we know that their claim is absurd. For they are themselves a part of the dispute, and if it is by preferring themselves that they judge what is apparent, then by entrusting the judging to themselves they are taking for granted the matter being investigated before beginning the judging.

[91]¹¹¹ Nonetheless, so as to arrive at suspension of judgement even when resting the argument on a single person, such as the Sage they dream up,¹¹² we bring out the mode which is third in order. This, we said, is the one deriving from the differences among the senses.

Now, that the senses disagree with one another is clear. [92] For instance, paintings seem to sight to have recesses and projections, but not to touch.¹¹³ Honey appears pleasant to the tongue (for some people) but unpleasant to the eyes; it is impossible, therefore, to say whether it is purely pleasant or unpleasant. Similarly with perfume: it gratifies the sense of smell but displeases the sense of taste. [93] Again, since spurge-juice is painful to the eyes but painless to the rest of the body, we will not be able to say whether, so far as its own nature goes, it is purely painless to bodies or painful. Rainwater is beneficial to the

¹⁰⁹ Cf. II 45 (and also e.g. Cicero, *nat. deorum* I xxiii 62).

¹¹⁰ Cf. I 34.

¹¹¹ With I 91–9 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 81; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 68–77.

¹¹² For the Dogmatic, and especially Stoic, notion of the Sage see II 38, 83; III 240. The Sage, who is also virtuous and embodies all human perfection, is an ideal, a logical construction put together for philosophical purposes. The numerous texts on the Stoic Sage are collected in VON ARNIM [1903–5] III 544–684.

¹¹³ Cf. I 120 (and note Plato, *Republic* 602C–603B).

eyes, but is rough on the windpipe and lungs – so too is olive oil, though it comforts the skin. The sea-ray, when applied to the extremities, paralyses them, but can be put on the rest of the body harmlessly. Hence we will not be able to say what each of these things is like in its nature, although it is possible to say what they appear to be like on any given occasion.

[94] More cases than these can be given; but so as not to waste time, given the purpose⁹ of our essay,¹¹⁴ we should say this. Each of the objects of perception which appears to us seems to impress us in a variety of ways – for example, an apple is smooth, fragrant, sweet, and yellow.¹¹⁵ It is unclear, then, whether in reality it has these qualities alone, or has only one quality but appears different depending on the different constitution of the sense-organs, or actually has more qualities than those which are apparent, some of them not making an impression on us.

[95] That it has only one quality can be argued from what we said before¹¹⁶ about the nourishment dispersed in our bodies and the water dispersed in trees and the breath in^f flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple can be undifferentiated but observed as different depending on the differences among the sense-organs by which it is grasped.

[96] That the apple may have more qualities than those apparent to us we deduce as follows. Let us conceive of¹¹⁷ someone who from birth has touch, smell and taste, but who hears and sees nothing. He will suppose that there is absolutely nothing visible or audible, and that there exist only those three kinds of quality which he is able to grasp. [97] So it is possible that we too, having only the five senses, grasp from among the qualities of the apple^s only those we are capable of grasping, although other qualities can exist, impressing other

⁹ Deleting τοῦ τρόπου (Mutschmann).

^r We follow the MSS text: Mutschmann–Mau excise ἐν before αὐλοῖς and add ἐμπνεομένου after ὄργανοις.

^s Retaining ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ μῆλον ποιότητων, deleted by Mutschmann–Mau after Heintz.

¹¹⁴ See I 4, note.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *M* VII 103.

¹¹⁶ I 53–4.

¹¹⁷ Cf. I 34, note.

sense-organs in which we have no share, so that we do not grasp the objects perceptible by them.[†]

[98] But nature, someone will say, has made the senses commensurate with their objects.¹¹⁸ What nature? – given that there is so much undecidable dispute among the Dogmatists about the reality of what is according to nature. For if someone decides this question (namely, whether there is such a thing as nature), then if he is a layman he will not be convincing according to them, while if he is a philosopher he will be part of the dispute and under judgement himself rather than a judge.

[99] So if it is possible[‡] that only those qualities exist in the apple which we think we grasp, and that there are more than them, and again that there are not even those which make an impression on us, then it will be unclear to us what the apple is like.

The same argument applies to the other objects of perception too. But if the senses do not apprehend external objects, the intellect is not able to apprehend them either (since its guides fail it¹¹⁹), so by means of this argument too we shall be thought to conclude to suspension of judgement about external existing objects.

[100]¹²⁰ In order to end up with suspension of judgement even if we rest the argument on any single sense or actually leave the senses aside, we also adopt the fourth mode of suspension. This is the mode which gets its name from circumstances, where by ‘circumstances’ we mean conditions. It is observed, we say, in natural or unnatural states, in waking or sleeping, depending on age, on moving or being at rest, on hating or loving, on being in need or sated, on being drunk or sober, on anterior conditions, on being confident or fearful, on being in distress or in a state of enjoyment.¹²¹

[†] Reading κατ’ αὐτά for κατ’ αὐτάς (MSS, Mutschmann–Mau). See ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 185.

[‡] Reading εἰ ἐγγώρει (Heintz): ἐνεχώρει (MSS ungrammatically), <εἰ> ἐνεχώρει (Mutschmann–Mau).

¹¹⁸ Cf. *M* IX 94, citing Xenophon, *Memorabilia* I iv 2; and see e.g. Apuleius, *dog Plat* I xiv 209.

¹¹⁹ See I 128 (cf. II 63); and compare Democritus, frag. 125 Diels–Kranz.

¹²⁰ With I 100–17 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 82; Philo, *ebr* 178–80; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 82–98.

¹²¹ Cf. II 51–6 for a reprise, and I 218–19 (with *M* VII 61–4) where the same material is used in Sextus’ account of Protagoreanism.

[101] For example, objects produce dissimilar impressions on us depending on our being in a natural or an unnatural state, since people who are delirious or divinely possessed believe that they hear spirits, while we do not; and similarly they often say that they grasp an exhalation of storax or frankincense or the like, and many other things, while we do not perceive them. The same water seems to be boiling when poured on to inflamed places, but to us to be lukewarm. The same cloak appears orange to people with a blood-suffusion in the eye, but not to me; and the same honey appears sweet to me, but bitter to people with jaundice.¹²²

[102] If anyone says that it is the mixing of certain humours¹²³ which produces inappropriate appearances from existing objects in people who are in an unnatural state,¹²⁴ we should say that, since healthy people too have mixed humours, it is possible that these humours make the external existing objects appear different to the healthy, while they are by nature the way they appear to those who are said to be in an unnatural state. [103] For to grant one lot of humours but not the other the power of changing external objects has an air of fiction. Again, just as healthy people are in a state natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, so the sick are in a state unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that they too are in a state which is, relatively speaking, natural, and they too should be found convincing.

[104] Different appearances come about depending on sleeping or waking. When we are awake we view things differently from the way we do when we are asleep, and when asleep differently from the way we do when awake; so the existence or non-existence of the objects^v becomes not absolute but relative – relative to being asleep or awake. It is likely, then, that when asleep we will see things which are unreal in waking life, not unreal once and for all.^w For they exist in sleep, just as the contents of waking life exist even though they do not exist in sleep.

^v Retaining αὐτοῖς with the MSS: Mutschmann–Mau print αὐταῖς (Apelt).

^w Retaining, after Heintz, the words ἐν τῷ which Mutschmann–Mau delete.

¹²² Cf. I 44, 211, 213; II 51–2, 63.

¹²³ See I 46.

¹²⁴ For the idea that something is F if it appears F to those in a natural state see II 54–6; *M* VII 62–3.

[105] Appearances differ depending on age. The same air seems cold to old men but mild to the young, the same colour appears faint to the elderly but intense to the young, and similarly the same sound seems to the former dim but to the latter clearly audible. [106] Those who differ in age are also affected dissimilarly depending on their choices and avoidances. Children, for example, are serious about balls and hoops, while the young choose other things, and old men yet others. From this it is concluded that different appearances come about from the same existing objects depending on differences in age too.

[107] Objects appear dissimilar depending on moving or being at rest. Things which we see as still when we are stationary seem to us to move when we sail past them. [108] Depending on loving and hating: some people have an excessive revulsion against pork, while others consume it with great pleasure. Menander said:

How foul he appears even in his looks
 since he has become like this! What an animal!
 Doing no wrong actually makes us beautiful.¹²⁵

And many men who have ugly girl-friends think them most attractive. [109] Depending on being hungry or sated: the same food seems most pleasant to people who are hungry but unpleasant to the sated. Depending on being drunk or sober: things which we think shameful when sober do not appear shameful to us when we are drunk. [110] Depending on anterior conditions: the same wine appears sour to people who have just eaten dates or figs, but it seems to be sweet to people who have consumed nuts or chickpeas. And the bathhouse vestibule warms people entering from outside but chills people leaving if they spend any time there. [111] Depending on being afraid or confident: the same object seems fearful and dreadful to the coward but not so at all to someone bolder. Depending on being in distress or in a state of enjoyment: the same objects are annoying to people in distress and pleasant to people who are enjoying themselves.

[112] Since, therefore, there are so many anomalies depending on conditions, and since at different times people come to be in different

¹²⁵ Frag. 568 Kock.

conditions, it is no doubt easy to say what each existing object appears to be like to each person, but not to say what it *is* like, since the anomalies are in fact undecidable.

For anyone who decides them is either in some of these conditions or in absolutely no condition at all. But to say that he is in no condition whatsoever (i.e. neither healthy nor sick, neither moving nor at rest, of no particular age, and free from the other conditions) is perfectly incongruous. But if he is in some condition as he judges the appearances, he will be a part of the dispute. [113] And again, he will not be an unbiassed judge of external existing objects because he will have been contaminated by the conditions he is in. So a waking person cannot compare the appearances of sleepers with those of people who are awake, or a healthy person those of the sick with those of the healthy; for we assent to what is present and affects us in the present rather than to what is not present.

[114] And there is another reason why the anomalies among the appearances are undecidable. Anyone who prefers one appearance to another and one circumstance to another does so either without making a judgement and without proof or making a judgement and offering a proof. But he can do so neither without these (for he will be unconvincing) nor yet with them. For if he judges the appearances he will certainly judge them by means of a standard. [115] Now he will say of this standard either that it is true or that it is false. If false, he will be unconvincing. But if he says that it is true, then he will say that the standard is true either without proof or with proof. If without proof he will be unconvincing. But if with proof, he will certainly need the proof to be true – otherwise he will be unconvincing. Then when he says that the proof which he adopts to make the standard convincing is true, will he do so after judging it or without judging it? [116] If he has not judged it he will be unconvincing. But if he has judged it, then clearly he will say that he has judged it by means of a standard – but we shall demand a proof of that standard, and then a standard for that proof. For a proof always requires a standard in order to be confirmed, and a standard always requires a proof in order to be shown to be true. A proof cannot be sound if there is no standard there already, nor can a standard be true if a proof has not already been made convincing. [117] In this way standards and proofs fall into the

reciprocal mode, by which both of them are found to be unconvincing: each waits to be made convincing by the other,^x and so each is as unconvincing as the other.¹²⁶

If, then, one cannot prefer one appearance to another either without a proof and a standard or with them, the different appearances which come about depending on different conditions will be undecidable. Hence so far as this mode too goes suspension of judgement about external existing objects is introduced.

[118]¹²⁷ The fifth argument is the one depending on positions and intervals and places – for depending on each of these the same objects appear different.

For example, the same colonnade appears foreshortened when seen from one end, but completely symmetrical when seen from the middle. The same boat appears from a distance small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion. The same tower appears from a distance round, but from close at hand square.¹²⁸ [119] These depend on intervals.

Depending on places: lamplight appears dim in sunlight but bright in the dark. The same oar appears bent in water but straight when out of it. Eggs appear soft in the bird but hard in the air. Lyngurion¹²⁹ appears liquid inside the lynx but hard in the air. Coral appears soft in the sea but hard in the air. And sound appears different when produced in a pipe, in a flute, or simply in the air.

[120] Depending on positions: the same picture when laid down appears flat, but when put at a certain angle seems to have recesses and projections. Doves' necks appear different in colour depending on the different ways they turn them.

[121] Since, then, all apparent things are observed in some place and from some interval and in some position, and each of these produces a

^x Reading τῆν <ἐκ> θατέρου πίστιν (Heintz): Mutschmann–Mau print the MSS text.

¹²⁶ For the reciprocal mode see I 169; for this application of it compare *M* VII 341.

¹²⁷ With I 118–23 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 85–6; Philo, *eb* 181–3; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 101–9.

¹²⁸ See I 32.

¹²⁹ A semi-precious stone allegedly consisting of the solidified urine of the lynx.

great deal of variation in appearances, as we have suggested, we shall be forced to arrive at suspension of judgement by these modes too.^y

For anyone wishing to give preference to some of these appearances over others will be attempting the impossible. [122] If he makes his assertion simply and without proof, he will not be convincing. But if he wants to use a proof, then if he says that the proof is false, he will turn himself about;¹³⁰ and if he says that the proof is true, he will be required to give a proof of its being true, and another proof of that (since it too has to be true), and so *ad infinitum*.¹³¹ But it is impossible to establish infinitely many proofs. [123] And so he will not be able to prefer one appearance to another with a proof either.

But if no-one can decide among these appearances either without proof or with proof, the conclusion is suspension of judgement: we are no doubt able to say what each thing appears to be like in this position or from that interval or in this place, but we are not able, for the reasons we have given, to assert what it is like in its nature.

[124]¹³² Sixth is the mode depending on admixtures. According to it we conclude that, since no existing object makes an impression on us by itself but rather together with something, it is perhaps possible to say what the mixture is like which results from the external object and the factor with which it is observed, but we cannot say purely what the external existing object is like.

That no external object makes an impression by itself but in every case together with something, and that it is observed as differing in a way dependent on this is, I think, clear. [125] For instance, the colour of our skin is seen as different in warm air and in cold, and we cannot say what our colour is like in its nature but only what it is like as observed together with each of these. The same sound appears different together with clear air or with muggy air. Aromatic herbs

^y Retaining the plural, τούτους τοὺς τρόπους (MSS and Latin translation): Mutschmann—Mau print τούτου τοῦ τρόπου (Bekker) — see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], p. 102.

¹³⁰ For 'turning about' or self-refutation, in Greek περιτροπή, see I 139, 200; II 64, 76, 88, 91, 128, 133, 179, 185, 188; III 19, 28; and see BURNYEAT [1976].

¹³¹ For the mode *ad infinitum* see I 166.

¹³² With I 124–8 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 84–5; Philo, *abr* 189–92; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985] pp. 112–18.

are more pungent in the bathhouse and in the sun than in chilly air. And a body surrounded by water is light, surrounded by air heavy.

[126] But to leave aside external admixtures, our eyes contain membranes and liquids inside them. Since, then, what we see is not observed without these, it will not be apprehended accurately; for it is the mixture which we grasp, and for this reason people with jaundice see everything as yellow, while people with a blood-suffusion in the eye see things as blood-red.¹³³ And since the same sound appears different in open places and in narrow winding places, and different in pure and in contaminated air, it is likely that we do not have a pure grasp of sound; for our ears have winding passages and narrow channels, and are contaminated by vaporous effluvia which are said to be carried from the region of the head. [127] Further, since certain kinds of matter exist in our nostrils and in the regions of taste, it is together with these, not purely, that we grasp what we taste and smell.

So because of the admixtures our senses do not grasp what external existing objects are accurately like. [128] But our intellect does not do so either, especially since its guides, the senses, fail it.¹³⁴ And no doubt it too produces some admixture of its own to add to what is announced by the senses; for we observe the existence of certain humours¹³⁵ round each of the regions in which the Dogmatists think that the 'ruling part' is located – in the brain or the heart or in whatever part of the animal they want to locate it.¹³⁶

According to this mode too, therefore, we see that we cannot say anything about the nature of external existing objects, and are forced to suspend judgement.

¹³³ Cf. I 44.

¹³⁴ Cf. I 99.

¹³⁵ Cf. I 46.

¹³⁶ On the 'ruling part' or intellect, the *ἡγεμονικόν*, and the celebrated dispute about its physical location in the body compare II 32, 58, 70–1, 81; III 169, 188; M VII 313; IX 119. The Stoics placed the ruling part in the heart, while the Platonists opted for the brain. The fullest account of the matter is in Galen, *PHP* II–III (see especially III i 10–15 (= v 252–3 K), quoting Chrysippus, who himself reports a dispute on the subject: see TIELEMAN [1992]). See ANNAS [1992a], ch. 2.

[129]¹³⁷ The seventh mode, we said, is the one depending on the quantities and preparations of existing objects – where by ‘preparations’ we mean compositions in general. That we are forced by this mode too to suspend judgement about the nature of objects is clear.

For instance, the shavings from a goat’s horn appear white when observed simply, without composition, but when combined in the existing horn are observed as black. Silver filings appear black on their own, but together with the whole they make a white impression on us. [130] Pieces of Taenarian marble when polished are seen as white, but appear yellowish in the whole mass. Grains of sand scattered apart from one another appear rough, but when combined in a heap affect our senses smoothly. Hellebore produces choking when consumed as a fine powder, but not when grated coarsely. [131] Wine drunk in moderation fortifies us, but taken in greater quantity enfeebles the body. Food likewise displays different powers depending on the quantity: often, for instance, through being consumed in large amounts it purges the body by indigestion and diarrhoea.

[132] Here too, therefore, we shall be able to say what the fine piece of horn is like, and what the combination of many fine pieces is like; what the small piece of silver is like, and what the combination of many small pieces is like; what the minute piece of Taenarian marble is like, and what the combination of many small pieces is like; and so with the grains of sand and the hellebore and the wine and the food – we can say what they are like relatively, but we cannot say what the nature of the objects is like in itself because of the anomalies in the appearances which depend on their compositions.

[133] For in general, beneficial things seem harmful depending on their being used in immoderate quantity; and things which seem harmful when taken to excess seem to do no harm in minute quantities. The chief witness to this argument is what is observed in the case of medicinal powers: here the accurate mixing of simple drugs makes the compound beneficial, but sometimes when the smallest error is made in the weighing it is not only not beneficial but

¹³⁷ With I 129–34 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 86; Philo, *abr* 184–5; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 120–7.

extremely harmful and often poisonous. [134] To such an extent does the relation among quantities and preparations determine² the reality of external existing objects.

Hence it is likely that this mode too will bring us round to suspension of judgement, since we cannot make assertions purely about the nature of external existing objects.

[135]¹³⁸ The eighth mode is the one deriving from relativity, by which we conclude that, since everything is relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are independently and in their nature. It should be recognized that here, as elsewhere, we use 'is' loosely, in the sense of 'appears',¹³⁹ implicitly saying 'Everything appears relative'.¹⁴⁰

But this has two senses: first, relative to the subject judging (for the external existing object which is judged appears relative to the subject judging), and second, relative to the things observed together with it (as right is relative to left). [136] We have in fact already deduced that everything is relative,¹⁴¹ i.e. with respect to the subject judging (since each thing appears relative to a given animal and a given human and a given sense and a given circumstance), and with respect to the things observed together with it (since each thing appears relative to a given admixture^{2a} and a given composition and quantity and position).

[137] We can also conclude in particular that everything is relative, in the following way. Do relatives differ or not from things which are

² Reading συνέχει, after the Latin translation, with Heintz: Mutschmann–Mau print συγγει, 'confound', the reading of the MSS.

^{2a} After 'admixture' the MSS have the phrase καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον, 'and a given mode'. Although Mutschmann–Mau print the phrase, it is a nonsense. We follow Kayser, who simply deletes the words. In any event, it is clear that Sextus means to allude to the fifth, sixth and seventh modes.

¹³⁸ With I 135–40 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 87–8; Philo, *abr* 186–8; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 130–45; BARNES [1988b].

¹³⁹ Cf. I 198; *M* XI 18.

¹⁴⁰ Note that many readers, both ancient and modern, have ignored Sextus' warning and identified scepticism with relativism: e.g. Anonymus, *in Theact* lxiii 1–40; Gellius XI v 7–8; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 96–8; BARNES [1988b].

¹⁴¹ There are explicit references to relativity at I 103, 132; and see also I 38–9, where, however, a different taxonomy of the modes is produced (see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 141–3).

in virtue of a difference?¹⁴² If they do not differ, then the latter are relatives too. But if they do differ, then, since everything which differs is relative (it is spoken of relative to what it differs from), things in virtue of a difference will be relative. [138] Again, according to the Dogmatists, some existing things are highest genera, others lowest species, and others both genera and species. But all of these are relative. Everything, therefore, is relative. Further, some existing things are clear, others unclear, as they themselves say, and what is apparent is a signifier while what is unclear is signified by something apparent (for according to them 'the apparent is the way to see the unclear'¹⁴³). But signifier and signified are relative. Everything, therefore, is relative. [139] Further, some existing things are similar, others dissimilar, and some are equal, others unequal. But these are relative. Everything, therefore, is relative.

And anyone who says that not everything is relative confirms that everything is relative. For by opposing us he shows that the very relativity of everything is relative to us and not universal.¹⁴⁴

[140] So, since we have established in this way that everything is relative, it is clear that we shall not be able to say what each existing object is like in its own nature and purely, but only what it appears to be like relative to something. It follows that we must suspend judgement about the nature of objects.

[141]¹⁴⁵ As for the mode based on frequent or rare encounters (which was said to be ninth in order), we shall set out the following cases.

The sun is surely a great deal more striking than a comet; but since we see the sun frequently and comets only rarely, we are so struck by comets that we actually think them to be portents, but are not struck at all by the sun. However, if we conceive of¹⁴⁶ the sun as appearing rarely and setting rarely, and as lighting up everything all at once and

¹⁴² 'Things in virtue of a difference', τὰ κατὰ διαφορᾶν, are absolute or non-relative items; see e.g. *M* VIII 161–2 (cf. 37); X 263–5; Simplicius, *in Cat* 165. 32–166.30.

¹⁴³ Anaxagoras, frag. 21a Diels–Kranz; see below, III 78.

¹⁴⁴ A typical 'turn about' argument: cf. I 122.

¹⁴⁵ With I 141–4 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 87; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 147–50.

¹⁴⁶ For imaginary examples see I 34.

suddenly plunging everything into darkness, then we shall consider the thing very striking. [142] Earthquakes, too, do not similarly upset people experiencing them for the first time and those who have grown accustomed to them. How striking the sea is to someone who sees it for the first time! Again, the beauty of a human body when seen for the first time, and suddenly, excites us more than it would if it became a customary sight.

[143] Again, what is rare is thought to be valuable, but not what is familiar and easily available. For instance, if we conceive of water as being rare, how much more valuable would it then appear to us than everything which seems valuable! Or if we imagine gold as simply strewn in quantity over the ground like stones, who do we think would find it valuable then, or worth locking away?

[144] Since, therefore, the same objects seem now striking and valuable, now not, depending on whether they impress us frequently or rarely, we deduce that we will no doubt be able to say what each of these things appears like given the frequency or rarity of the impressions they make on us, but we will not be able to state baldly what each external existing object is like. Because of this mode too, therefore, we suspend judgement about them.

[145]¹⁴⁷ The tenth mode, which especially bears on ethics, is the one depending on persuasions and customs and laws and beliefs in myth and dogmatic suppositions. A persuasion is a choice of life or of a way of acting practised by one person or by many (for example, by Diogenes or by the Spartans). [146] A law is a written contract among citizens, transgressors of which are punished. A custom or usage (there is no difference) is a common acceptance by a number of people of a certain way of acting, transgressors of which are not necessarily punished. For example, there is a law against adultery, but with us it is a custom not to have sex with a woman in public. [147] A belief in myth is an acceptance of matters which did not occur and are fictional – examples include the myths about Cronus, which many people find convincing. A dogmatic supposition is an acceptance of a

¹⁴⁷ With I 145–63 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 83–4; Philo, *abr* 193–202; below, III 198–234; see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 156–71; ANNAS [1986], [1993a], [1993b], [1993c].

matter which seems to be supported by abduction or proof of some kind, for example, that there are atomic elements of things, or homoeomerics, or least parts, or something else.

[148] We oppose each of these sometimes to itself, sometimes to one of the others.

For example, we oppose custom to custom like this: some of the Ethiopians tattoo their babies, while we do not;¹⁴⁸ the Persians deem it becoming to wear brightly-coloured full-length dresses, while we deem it unbecoming;¹⁴⁹ Indians have sex with women in public, while most other people hold that it is shameful.¹⁵⁰ [149] We oppose law to law like this: in Rome anyone who renounces his father's property does not repay his father's debts, while in Rhodes he repays them come what may; among the Tauri in Scythia there was a law that strangers should be sacrificed to Artemis, while among us killing a human at a religious rite is prohibited.¹⁵¹ [150] We oppose persuasion to persuasion when we oppose the persuasion of Diogenes to that of Aristippus, or that of the Spartans to that of the Italians. We oppose belief in myth to belief in myth when we say in one place that the mythical father of gods and men is Zeus, and in another that he is Ocean, citing

Ocean, source of the gods, and Tethys, their mother . . .¹⁵²

[151] We oppose dogmatic suppositions to one another when we say that some people assert that there is one element, others infinitely many; some that the soul is mortal, others immortal; some that human affairs are directed by divine providence, others non-providentially.¹⁵³

[152] We oppose custom to the others – for example, to law, when we say that in Persia homosexual acts are customary, while in Rome they are forbidden by law;¹⁵⁴ that among us adultery is forbidden,

¹⁴⁸ Cf. III 202.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. III 202.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. III 200.

¹⁵¹ Cf. III 208, 221.

¹⁵² Homer, *Iliad* XIV 201.

¹⁵³ See II 5; III 9–12.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. III 199.

while among the Massagetae it is accepted by custom as indifferent¹⁵⁵ (as Eudoxus of Cnidus narrates in the first book of his *Journey round the World*¹⁵⁶); that among us it is forbidden to have sex with your mother, while in Persia it is the custom to favour such marriages; and in Egypt they marry their sisters, which among us is forbidden by law.¹⁵⁷ [153] Custom is opposed to persuasion: most men have sex with their own women in private, while Crates did it with Hipparchia in public;¹⁵⁸ Diogenes went round in a sleeveless tunic, while we dress normally. [154] Custom is opposed to belief in myth: the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, while among us it is the custom to provide for our children;¹⁵⁹ and among us it is the usage to revere the gods as good and as unaffected by evils, while they are represented by the poets as suffering wounds and envying one another. [155] Custom is opposed to dogmatic supposition: with us it is the custom to ask for good things from the gods, while Epicurus says that the divinity pays no attention to us;¹⁶⁰ and Aristippus¹⁶¹ thinks that it is indifferent whether you wear women's clothes, whereas we hold that this is shameful.

[156] We oppose persuasion to law: although there is a law that a free man of a good family may not be struck, the all-in wrestlers strike one another because that is the persuasion in their way of life; and gladiators kill one another for the same reason, although manslaughter is prohibited.¹⁶² [157] We oppose belief in myth to persuasion when we say that the myths say that in Omphale's house Heracles

carded wool and endured slavery¹⁶³

and did things which nobody would have done by choice even in moderation, whereas Heracles' persuasion was noble. [158] We oppose persuasion to dogmatic supposition: athletes pursue glory as a

¹⁵⁵ Cf. III 209.

¹⁵⁶ frag. 278b Lasserre.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. III 205.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. III 200; see e.g. Diogenes Laertius VI 97.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. III 210–11.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. III 9–12.

¹⁶¹ Cf. III 204.

¹⁶² Cf. III 212.

¹⁶³ Homer, *Odyssey* XXII 423.

good and take on for its own sake a persuasion full of exertion, while many philosophers hold the belief that glory is a bad thing.

[159] We oppose law to belief in myth: the poets represent the gods as committing adultery and indulging in homosexual acts, while with us the law forbids these things. [160] We oppose law to dogmatic supposition: Chrysippus¹⁶⁴ says that it is indifferent whether or not you have sex with your mother or sister, while the law forbids this.

[161] We oppose belief in myth to dogmatic supposition: the poets say that Zeus came down and had sex with mortal women, while the Dogmatists deem this to be impossible; [162] and Homer says that Zeus because of his grief for Sarpedon

rained drops of blood upon the earth,¹⁶⁵

whereas it is a belief of the philosophers that the divinity is unaffected; and^{ab} they deny the myth of the centaurs, presenting the centaur to us as an example of what is unreal.

[163] We could have taken many other examples for each of these oppositions, but in a brief account¹⁶⁶ this will suffice.

Thus, since so much anomaly has been shown in objects by this mode too, we shall not be able to say what each existing object is like in its nature, but only how it appears relative to a given persuasion or law or custom and so on. Because of this mode too, therefore, it is necessary for us to suspend judgement on the nature of external existing objects.

In this way, then, by means of the ten modes we end up with suspension of judgement.

xv The Five Modes¹⁶⁷

[164] The more recent Sceptics¹⁶⁸ offer the following five modes of suspension of judgement: first, the mode deriving from dispute;

^{ab} Mutschmann–Mau mark a lacuna in the text, supposing Sextus to have written something of the form 'and <X says that so-and-so, while> they deny ...'.

¹⁶⁴ See III 206, note.

¹⁶⁵ *Iliad* XVI 459.

¹⁶⁶ For claims to brevity compare I 231; II 1, 219, 236; III 151, 222, 233; see I 4, note.

¹⁶⁷ With I 164–9 compare Diogenes Laertius IX 88–9 (cf. BARNES [1992], pp. 4263–8); on the chapter see especially BARNES [1990d].

¹⁶⁸ They contrast with 'the older Sceptics' of I 36 and are identified with Agrippa by Diogenes Laertius IX 88.

second, the mode throwing one back *ad infinitum*; third, the mode deriving from relativity; fourth, the hypothetical mode; fifth, the reciprocal mode.

[165]¹⁶⁹ According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement. [166] In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another such source, which itself needs another, and so *ad infinitum*, so that we have no point from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgement follows. [167] In the mode deriving from relativity, as we said above,¹⁷⁰ the existing object appears to be such-and-such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on what it is like in its nature. [168] We have the mode from hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being thrown back *ad infinitum*, begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue of a concession. [169] The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the object under investigation needs to be made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.

That every object of investigation can be referred to these modes we shall briefly show as follows.

[170] What is proposed is either an object of perception or an object of thought, and whichever it is it is subject to dispute. For according to some, only objects of perception are true, according to others, only objects of thought, and according to yet others, some objects of perception and some objects of thought are true. Now, will they say that the dispute is decidable or undecidable?¹⁷¹ If undecidable, we have it^{ac} that we must suspend judgement; for it is not possible to

^{ac} Retaining ἔχομεν with the MSS and Latin translation: Mutschmann–Mau print λέγομεν.

¹⁶⁹ On I 165 see BARNES [1990c].

¹⁷⁰ See I 135–6, with ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 142–3; BARNES [1992], pp. 4274–5.

¹⁷¹ For this question compare II 19, 32.

make assertions about what is subject to undecidable dispute. But if decidable, we shall ask where the decision is to come from. [171] For instance, is an object of perception (for we shall rest the argument on this first) to be decided by an object of perception or by an object of thought? If by an object of perception, then since we are investigating objects of perception, this too will need something else to make it convincing; and if this further thing also is an object of perception, it too will again need something further to make it convincing, and so *ad infinitum*. [172] But if the object of perception needs to be decided by an object of thought, then, since objects of thought are also in dispute, it too, being an object of thought, will need to be judged and made convincing. Now where will it get its conviction from? If from an object of thought, the business will proceed *ad infinitum* in the same way; but if from an object of perception then, since an object of thought was adduced to make the object of perception convincing and an object of perception for the object of thought, we have brought in the reciprocal mode.

[173] If to avoid this our interlocutor claims to assume something by way of concession and without proof in order to prove what comes next, then the hypothetical mode is brought in, and there is no way out. For¹⁷² if he is convincing when he makes his hypothesis, we will keep hypothesizing the opposite and will be no more unconvincing. and if he hypothesizes something true, he makes it suspect by taking it as a hypothesis rather than establishing it; while if it is false, the foundation of what he is trying to establish will be rotten. [174] Again, if hypothesizing something achieves anything towards making it convincing, why not hypothesize the object of investigation itself rather than something else through which he is supposed to establish the object about which he is arguing? If it is absurd to hypothesize the object under investigation, it will also be absurd to hypothesize what is superordinate to it.

[175] That all objects of perception are relative is clear: they are relative to those perceiving them. It is thus evident that whatever perceptible object is proposed to us may easily be referred to the Five Modes.

¹⁷² With the following arguments compare *M* VIII 369–78; *M* III 6–17; see BARNES [1990d], pp. 99–112.

We make similar deductions about objects of thought. For if the dispute about them is said to be undecidable, they will have granted us that we must suspend judgement about them. [176] But if the dispute is to be decided, then if this comes by way of an object of thought, we will throw them back *ad infinitum*, while if by an object of perception, we will throw them back on the reciprocal mode. For the object of perception is itself subject to dispute, and, being unable to be decided through itself because of the infinite regress, it will require an object of thought in just the same way as the object of thought required an object of perception. [177] Anyone who, for these reasons, assumes something as an hypothesis will again turn out to be absurd. And objects of thought are relative too: they are called objects of thought relative to the thinker,^{ad} and if they were by nature such as they are said to be there would have been no dispute about them.¹⁷³ Thus objects of thought too are referred to the Five Modes – and for that reason it is absolutely necessary for us to suspend judgement about the object proposed.

Such are the Five Modes which have been handed down by the more recent Sceptics. They put them forward not as rejecting the Ten Modes but in order to refute the rashness of the Dogmatists in a more varied way by using both sets together.

xvi What are the Two Modes?¹⁷⁴

[178] They also offer two other modes of suspension of judgement. Since everything apprehended is thought to be apprehended either by means of itself or by means of something else, they are thought to introduce puzzlement about everything by suggesting that nothing is apprehended either by means of itself or by means of something else.

That nothing is apprehended by means of itself is, they say, clear from the dispute which has occurred among natural scientists over, I suppose, all objects of perception and of thought – a dispute which is undecidable, since we cannot use either an object of perception or an

^{ad} Retaining *voũvta* with the MSS: Mutschmann–Mau, following the Latin translation, print *voũv voũtá*.

¹⁷³ Cf. III 193, 222, 226; *M* VIII 322–4 (and see below, III 179, note).

¹⁷⁴ On the Two Modes see BARNES [1990d], pp. 116–19; JANÁČEK [1970].

object of thought as a standard because anything we may take has been disputed and so is unconvincing.

[179] And^{ac} for the following reason they do not concede either that anything can be apprehended by means of something else. If that by means of which something is apprehended will itself always need to be apprehended by means of something else, they throw you into the reciprocal or the infinite mode;¹⁷⁵ and if you should want to assume that that by means of which another thing is apprehended is itself apprehended by means of itself, then this is countered by the fact that, for the above reasons, nothing is apprehended by means of itself.

We are at a loss as to how what is in conflict¹⁷⁶ could be apprehended either from itself or from something else, since the standard of truth or of apprehension is not apparent, while signs – quite apart from proof – are overthrown, as we shall learn in what follows.¹⁷⁷

This discussion of the modes of suspension of judgement will suffice for the present.

xvii What are the modes which overthrow those who offer causal explanations?¹⁷⁸

[180] Just as we offer the modes of suspension of judgement, so some also set out modes in accordance with which we bring the Dogmatists to a halt by raising puzzles about their particular causal explanations – we do this because they pride themselves on these especially.¹⁷⁹ Aenesidemus, indeed, offers eight modes in accordance with which he thinks he can refute and assert to be unsound every dogmatic causal explanation.¹⁸⁰

^{ac} Placing a full stop rather than a comma after ... εἶναι ἄπιστον.

¹⁷⁵ See I 169, 166.

¹⁷⁶ I.e. (presumably) something over which there is conflict or dispute.

¹⁷⁷ See II 104–33.

¹⁷⁸ See BARNES [1990a], pp. 2656–68.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. Democritus, frag. 118 Diels–Kranz; Strabo, II.3.8 (on Posidonius). But by and large the Hellenistic philosophers did *not* concern themselves greatly with causal explanations. For other sources of special dogmatic pride see II 194, 205; *M* VII 27.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Photius, *bibl* 212, 170b17–22.

[181] The first of these, he says, is the mode in accordance with which causal explanations, which are all concerned with what is unclear, have no agreed confirmation from what is apparent. According to the second, some people often give an explanation in only one way, although there is a rich abundance enabling them to explain the object of investigation in a variety of ways. [182] According to the third, they assign causes which reveal no order to things which take place in an ordered way. According to the fourth, when they have grasped how apparent things take place, they deem that they have apprehended how non-apparent things take place. But perhaps¹⁸¹ unclear things are brought about similarly to apparent things, perhaps not similarly but in a special way of their own. [183] According to the fifth, just about all of them give explanations according to their own hypotheses about the elements, not according to any common and agreed approaches. According to the sixth, they often adopt what is concordant with their own hypotheses but reject what runs counter to them, even when this has equal plausibility. [184] According to the seventh, they often assign causes which conflict not only with what is apparent but also with their own hypotheses. According to the eighth, often when what seems to be apparent is just as puzzling as what is being investigated, they rest their exposition about what is puzzling upon what is just as puzzling.

[185] He says that it is not impossible that some should fail in their causal explanations in virtue of certain mixed modes deriving from the ones I have just described.

Perhaps the five modes of suspension of judgement will also suffice against causal explanations. For the explanation which is offered will either be in agreement with all the philosophical schools as well as with Scepticism and what is apparent or it will not. No doubt it cannot be in agreement; for both what is apparent and what is unclear are all subject to dispute. [186] But if it is subject to dispute, we shall ask for an explanation of this explanation as well; and if he gives an apparent explanation of an apparent explanation or an unclear of an unclear, he will be thrown back *ad infinitum*, whereas if he gives his explanation crosswise he will fall into the reciprocal mode. If he takes

¹⁸¹ For the Pyrrhonian use of 'perhaps' see I 194-5.

a stand somewhere, then either he will say that the explanation holds so far as what he has said goes, and will introduce something relative, rejecting what is by nature, or else he will assume something as a hypothesis and be led to suspend judgement.

Thus it is no doubt possible to refute the rashness of the Dogmatists in their causal explanations through these modes too.

xviii The Sceptical phrases¹⁸²

[187] When we use one of these modes or one of the modes of suspension of judgement, we utter certain phrases which manifest a sceptical disposition and our feelings – we say, for example, ‘No more’, ‘Nothing should be determined’, and so on. So it will be apposite to deal next with these. Let us begin with ‘No more’.

xix The phrase ‘No more’

[188]¹⁸³ This phrase, then, we utter sometimes in the form I have given and sometimes in the form: ‘In no way more’. It is not the case, as some suppose, that we use ‘No more’ in specific investigations and ‘In no way more’ in generic ones; rather, we utter ‘No more’ and ‘In no way more’ indifferently, and will here discuss them as a single phrase.

This phrase, then, is elliptical. Just as when we say ‘A thoroughbred’ we implicitly say ‘A thoroughbred horse’ and when we say ‘An annual’ we implicitly say ‘An annual flower’,¹⁸⁴ so when we say ‘No more’ we implicitly say ‘No more this than that’.^{af}

[189] Now some of the Sceptics use the phrase in the sense of the question ‘How come this rather than that?’^{ag} and they use ‘How

^{af} Omitting ἄνω κάτω: cf. I 83.

^{ag} The text is uncertain, Most MSS read ἀντι πύσματος τοῦ τὸ τί μᾶλλον κτλ. This makes no sense. Various conjectures have been made. We read: ἀντι πύσματος τοῦ τί μᾶλλον κτλ.

¹⁸² With this and the following chapters compare Diogenes Laertius IX, 74–6.

¹⁸³ With I 188–91 compare I 14–15. On ‘no more’ see DE LACY [1958].

¹⁸⁴ The Greek examples are διπλῆ for ἐστία διπλῆ (if the text may stand) [‘a double’ for ‘a double hearth’] and πλατεῖα for πλατεῖα ὁδός [‘a broad’ for ‘a broad street’].

come?’ here to ask for an explanation, so as to say: ‘Why this rather than that?’¹⁸⁵ It is normal to use questions for statements, e.g.:

What mortal does not know the wife of Zeus?¹⁸⁶

and statements for questions, e.g. ‘I’m inquiring where Dio lives’ and:

I’m asking why one should admire a poet.¹⁸⁷

Again, ‘How come?’ is used in the sense of ‘Why?’ by Menander:

How come I have been abandoned?¹⁸⁸

[190] ‘No more this than that’ makes clear our feelings: because of the equipollence of the opposed objects we end in equilibrium. (By ‘equipollence’ we mean equality in what appears plausible to us; by ‘opposed’ we mean in general conflicting;¹⁸⁹ and by ‘equilibrium’ we mean assent to neither side.) [191] Thus,^{ah} although the phrase ‘In no way more’ exhibits the distinctive character of assent or denial, we do not use it in this way: we use it indifferently and in a loose sense, either for a question or for ‘I do not know which of these things I should assent to and which not assent to’,^{ai190} Our intention is to make clear what is apparent to us, and as to what phrase we use to make this clear we are indifferent.¹⁹¹ Note too that when we utter the phrase ‘In no way more’ we are not affirming that it is itself certainly true and firm: here too we are only saying how things appear to us.¹⁹²

xx Non-assertion

[192] About non-assertion we have this to say. ‘Assertion’ is used in two senses, one general and one specific. In the general sense it is a

^{ah} Retaining οὐν with the MSS (γούν is printed by Mutschmann–Mau after earlier editors).

^{ai} Retaining συγκατατίθεσθαι, with the Greek MSS: Mutschmann–Mau, following the Latin translation, omit the word.

¹⁸⁵ In Greek the word τί (which we render by ‘How come?’) may be used to mean either ‘What?’ or ‘Why?’

¹⁸⁶ Euripides, *Hercules Furens* 1.

¹⁸⁷ Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1008.

¹⁸⁸ frag 900 Kock.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. I 10.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. I 213; *M* I 315.

¹⁹¹ Cf. I 195, 207.

¹⁹² Cf. I 4.

phrase meaning the positing or denying of something – e.g. ‘It is day’, ‘It is not day’. In the specific sense it means only the positing of something (in this sense negations are not called assertions). Now non-assertion is refraining from assertion in the general sense (which we say covers both affirmation and negation), so that non-assertion is the feeling we have because of which we say that we neither posit nor reject anything.¹⁹³

[193] Hence it is clear that we do not use ‘non-assertion’ to mean that objects are in their nature such as to move us necessarily to non-assertion, but rather to make it clear that now, when we utter it, we feel in this way with regard to these matters under investigation. Remember too that we say we neither posit nor reject anything which is said dogmatically about what is unclear; for we do yield to things which passively move us and lead us necessarily to assent.¹⁹⁴

xxi ‘Perhaps’, ‘Maybe’ and ‘Possibly’

[194] We take ‘Perhaps’ and ‘Perhaps not’ in the sense of ‘Perhaps it is and perhaps it is not’; ‘Maybe’ and ‘Maybe not’ for ‘Maybe it is and maybe it is not’; ‘Possibly’ and ‘Possibly not’ for ‘Possibly it is and possibly it is not’. (Thus for the sake of brevity we take ‘Maybe not’ in the sense of ‘Maybe it is not’, ‘Possibly not’ for ‘Possibly it is not’ and ‘Perhaps not’ for ‘Perhaps it is not’.¹⁹⁵) [195] Here again we do not fight about phrases, nor do we investigate whether the phrases make these things clear by nature, but (as I have said) we use them indifferently.¹⁹⁶ Now it is, I think, clear that these phrases are indicative of non-assertion. For instance, someone who says ‘Perhaps it is’ implicitly posits what is thought to conflict with it, namely ‘Perhaps it is not’, insofar as he does not make an affirmation about its being so. Similarly with the other phrases too.

¹⁹³ Cf. I 10.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. I 13, note.

¹⁹⁵ We use μή ἐξεῖναι for ἐξεῖναι μὴ εἶναι. In Greek οὐκ ἐξεστὶ would normally be taken to mean ‘It is not possible that ...’ rather than ‘It is possible that not ...’: Sextus is excusing the ambiguity of his formulae (which does not appear in the English) by urging the advantage of brevity.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. I 191.

xxii 'I suspend judgement'

[196] We use 'I suspend judgement' for 'I cannot say which of the things proposed I should find convincing and which I should not find convincing', making clear that objects appear to us equal in respect of convincingness and lack of convincingness. Whether they are equal, we do not affirm: we say what appears to us about them, when they make an impression on us. Suspension of judgement gets its name from the fact that the intellect is suspended¹⁹⁷ so as neither to posit nor to reject anything because of the equipollence of the matters being investigated.¹⁹⁸

xxiii 'I determine nothing'

[197] About 'I determine nothing' we have this to say. Determining we deem to be not merely saying something but making an utterance about an unclear object and assenting to it. For in this sense Sceptics will perhaps be found to determine nothing – not even 'I determine nothing' itself.¹⁹⁹ For this is not a dogmatic supposition (i.e. assent to something unclear) but a phrase which shows our feeling. Thus when Sceptics say 'I determine nothing', what they say is this: 'I now feel in such a way as neither to posit dogmatically nor to reject any of the things falling under this investigation'. When they say this they are saying what is apparent to them about the subject proposed – not dogmatically making a confident assertion, but describing and reporting how they feel.²⁰⁰

xxiv 'Everything is undetermined'

[198] Indeterminacy is an intellectual feeling in virtue of which we neither deny nor posit anything investigated in dogmatic fashion, i.e. anything unclear. Thus when a Sceptic says 'Everything is undeter-

²⁰⁰ Reading οὐ δογματικῶς ..., ἀλλ' ἀπαγγελτικῶς ὁ (Heintz): the Greek MSS have οὐκ ἀπαγγελτικῶς ..., ἀλλ' ὁ; Mutschmann–Mau follow the Latin translation and print ἀπαγγελτικῶς, οὐ δογματικῶς ..., ἀλλ' ὁ.

¹⁹⁷ ἐποχή, 'suspension of judgement', comes from ἐπέχειν 'to hold back', 'to check' (used of e.g. holding your breath, suspending payment).

¹⁹⁸ Cf. I 10.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Diogenes Laertius IX 74, 104; Photius, *bibl* 212, 170a12 (Aenesidemus).

mined', he takes 'is' in the sense of 'appears to me';²⁰⁰ by 'everything' he means not whatever exists but those unclear matters investigated by the Dogmatists which he has considered; and by 'undetermined' he means that they do not exceed what is opposed to – or, in general, conflicts with²⁰¹ – them in convincingness or lack of convincingness. [199] And just as someone who says 'Go away' implicitly says 'You, go away',²⁰² so someone who says 'Everything is undetermined' also signifies according to us^{ak} 'relatively to me' or 'as it appears to me'. Hence what is said is this: 'Those of the matters investigated by the Dogmatists which I have considered appear such to me that none of them seems to me to exceed in convincingness or lack of convincingness what conflicts with it.'

xxv 'Everything is inapprehensible'

[200] Our attitude is similar when we say 'Everything is inapprehensible': we explain 'everything' in the same way, and we supply 'to me'. Thus what is said is this: 'All of the unclear matters investigated in dogmatic fashion which I have inspected appear to me inapprehensible.' This is not to make an affirmation that the matters investigated by the Dogmatists are of such a nature as to be inapprehensible; rather, it is to report our feeling 'in virtue of which', we say, 'I suppose that up to now I have not apprehended any of these things because of the equipollence of their opposites.' Hence everything brought forward to turn us about seems to me to be at variance with what we profess.^{al 203}

^{ak} Reading συσσημαίνει καθ' ἡμᾶς τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐμέ κτλ. Mutschmann prefers ἦ (after T) to τό, and he then takes καθ' ἡμᾶς as the first of three disjunctive objects of the verb. The textual reading makes little difference; but Mutschmann's construe of καθ' ἡμᾶς is surely wrong.

^{al} Reading ἐπαγγελλομένων (Heintz) for ἀπαγγελλομένων (MSS, Mutschmann-Mau).

²⁰⁰ Cf. I 135.

²⁰¹ Cf. I 10.

²⁰² Sextus' example is περιπατῶ and ἐγὼ περιπατῶ, '(I) go for a walk': in Greek, the verbal ending indicates the person, and the pronoun is only used for emphasis.

²⁰³ For complaints of being misunderstood see I 19. Here the point is not clear. If 'turn about' is being used in its technical sense (see I 122, note), then perhaps Sextus means this: 'When we say that we do not hold beliefs, the Dogmatists think that they can show our view to be self-refuting – for are we not thereby indicating that *we believe* that we have no beliefs? But there is no turn about: our remarks do not state beliefs but merely manifest feelings.'

xxvi 'I have no apprehension' and 'I do not apprehend'

[201] The phrases 'I have no apprehension' and 'I do not apprehend' also show the Sceptic's own feeling, in virtue of which he refrains, for the moment, from positing or rejecting any of the unclear matters being investigated. This is clear from what we have said above about the other phrases.

xxvii 'Opposed to every account there is an equal account'²⁰⁴

[202] When we say 'Opposed to every account there is an equal account', we mean by 'every' every one we have inspected; we speak not of accounts in an unqualified sense but of those which purport to establish something in dogmatic fashion (i.e. about something unclear) – which purport to establish it in any way, and not necessarily by way of assumptions and consequence;²⁰⁵ we say 'equal' with reference to convincingness and lack of convincingness;²⁰⁶ we take 'opposed' in the sense of 'conflicting' in general;²⁰⁷ and we supply 'as it appears to me'. [203] Thus when I say 'Opposed to every account there is an equal account', I am implicitly saying this: 'To every account I have scrutinized^{am} which purports to establish something in dogmatic fashion, there appears to me to be opposed another account, purporting to establish something in dogmatic fashion, equal to it in convincingness or lack of convincingness'. Thus the utterance of this remark is not dogmatic but a report of a human feeling which is apparent to the person who feels it.

[204] Some utter the phrase in the form 'There is to be opposed to every account an equal account', making the following exhortatory

^{am} Reading ἐξητασμένω (Heintz): Mutschmann–Mau print ζητουμένω after earlier editors; the MSS have ἐζητημένω or ἐζητουμένω or ἐξητουμένω.

²⁰⁴ Cf. I 12.

²⁰⁵ The word λόγος sometimes means 'argument': by alluding to the Stoic definition of an argument (see II 135), Sextus indicates that here he is taking the word λόγος in a more general sense – for any consideration in favour of a dogmatic claim you can find an equally convincing consideration in favour of something conflicting with it.

²⁰⁶ Cf. I 10.

²⁰⁷ Cf. I 10.

request: 'To every account purporting to establish something in dogmatic fashion let us oppose an account which investigates in dogmatic fashion, equal in convincingness or lack of convincingness and conflicting with it.' For they mean what they say to be directed to the Sceptics, though they use the infinitive 'to be opposed' for the imperative 'let us oppose'.²⁰⁸ [205] They make this exhortation to the Sceptics to prevent them from being seduced by the Dogmatists into abandoning their investigation^{an} and thus through rashness missing the tranquillity apparent to them, which (as we suggested above²⁰⁹) they deem to supervene on suspension of judgement about everything.

xxviii Rules for the sceptical phrases

[206] Those will be enough of the phrases to deal with in an outline,²¹⁰ especially since it is possible to discuss the rest on the basis of what we have said here.

In the case of all the sceptical phrases, you should understand that we do not affirm definitely that they are true – after all, we say that they can be destroyed by themselves, being cancelled along with what they are applied to, just as purgative drugs do not merely drain the humours from the body but drive themselves out too along with the humours.²¹¹

[207] We say too that we do not use the phrases strictly, making clear the objects to which they are applied, but indifferently and, if you like, in a loose sense – for it is unbecoming for a Sceptic to fight over phrases,²¹² especially as it works to our advantage that not even these phrases are said to signify anything purely but only relatively, i.e. relatively to the Sceptics.²¹³

^{an} Excising *περὶ αὐτοῦ* (MSS) – Heintz proposes *περὶ αὐτούς*, but this is little better.

²⁰⁸ In the Greek 'There is to be opposed' is represented simply by the infinitive, *ἀντικεῖσθαι*.

²⁰⁹ I 25–9.

²¹⁰ Cf. I 4, note.

²¹¹ Cf. I 14–15, and – for the metaphor – II 188; *M* VIII 480; Diogenes Laertius IX 76; Aristocles, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV xviii 21.

²¹² Cf. I 191.

²¹³ Cf. I 122.

[208] Besides, you must remember that we do not use these phrases about all objects universally, but about what is unclear and investigated in dogmatic fashion, and that we say what is apparent to us and do not make firm assertions about the nature of externally existing things.

For these reasons, every sophism brought against a sceptical phrase can, I think, be overthrown.²¹⁴

[209]²¹⁵ We have now examined the concept of scepticism, its parts, its standard, its aim, and also the modes of suspension of judgement, and we have spoken about the sceptical phrases. Thus we have exhibited the distinctive character of Scepticism. It is thus apposite, we think, to consider briefly the distinction between it and its neighbouring philosophies, in order that we may understand more clearly the suspensive persuasion. Let us begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus.

xxix That the Sceptical persuasion differs from the philosophy of Heraclitus

[210] That it differs from our own persuasion is clear: Heraclitus makes dogmatic assertions on many unclear matters, while we, as I have said,²¹⁶ do not. But Aenesidemus and his followers used to say that the Sceptical persuasion is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, because the idea that contraries appear to hold of the same thing leads to the idea that contraries actually do hold of the same thing; and while the Sceptics say that contraries appear to hold of the same thing, the Heracliteans go on from there to the idea that they actually do hold.²¹⁷

Against this we say that the idea that contraries appear to hold of the same thing is not a belief of the Sceptics but a fact which makes an impression not only on Sceptics but on other philosophers too – and indeed on everyone. [211] For example, no-one would venture to say

²¹⁴ Cf. I 19, 200.

²¹⁵ Cf. I 5.

²¹⁶ See I 208.

²¹⁷ For the 'Unity of Opposites' in Heraclitus cf. II 63; texts in BARNES [1987], pp. 102–4, 114–17.

that honey does not affect healthy people sweetly or sufferers from jaundice bitterly.²¹⁸ Thus the Heracliteans start from a preconception common to all men – just as we do and no doubt the other philosophies too. Now, had it been from something said in Sceptical fashion (such as ‘Everything is inapprehensible’ or ‘I determine nothing’ or the like²¹⁹) that they took the idea that contraries hold of the same thing, then perhaps they would have proved their point; but since they start from items which impress themselves not only on us but also on other philosophers – and on ordinary life too – why should anyone say that our persuasion rather than any of the other philosophies – or indeed ordinary life – is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus? We all make use of common material

[212] Perhaps the Sceptical persuasion not only does not work in favour of recognition of the philosophy of Heraclitus but actually works against it. For Sceptics decry all the beliefs advanced by Heraclitus as rash assertions: they oppose the conflagration,²²⁰ they oppose the idea that contraries hold of the same thing, and in the case of every Heraclitean belief they disparage its dogmatic rashness and (as I said before) repeat their refrains: ‘I do not apprehend’, ‘I determine nothing’. All this is in conflict with the Heracliteans; but it is absurd to call a conflicting persuasion a path to the school it conflicts with: therefore it is absurd to call the Sceptical persuasion a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus.

xxx How does the Sceptical persuasion differ from the philosophy of Democritus?

[213] The philosophy of Democritus is also said to have something in common with Scepticism,²²¹ since it is thought to make use of the same materials as we do. For from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and bitter to others, they say that Democritus deduces that it

²¹⁸ Cf. II 51 (and I 20; *M* VIII 53–4).

²¹⁹ See I 200, 197.

²²⁰ ἑκπύρωσις, or the theory that the world is periodically consumed by fire, was regularly (and perhaps wrongly) ascribed to Heraclitus.

²²¹ Cf. Diogenes Laertius IX 72, which ascribes this view to the Sceptics themselves; Numenius, apud Eusebius, *PE* XIV vi 4. For the ‘sceptical’ fragments of Democritus see BARNES [1987], pp. 251–7.

is neither sweet nor bitter,²²² and for this reason utters the phrase ‘No more’, which is Sceptical.

But the Sceptics and the Democriteans use the phrase ‘No more’ in different senses. The latter assign it the sense that neither is the case, we the sense that we do not know whether some apparent thing is both or neither.²²³ [214] Hence even in this respect we differ. But the clearest distinction is made when Democritus says ‘In verity²²⁴ there are atoms and void.’²²⁵ For by ‘In verity’ he means ‘In truth’ – and I think it is superfluous to remark that he differs from us in saying that atoms and void in truth subsist, even if he does begin from the anomaly in what is apparent.

xxxi How does Scepticism differ from Cyrenaicism?

[215] Some say that the Cyrenaic persuasion is the same as Scepticism, since it too says that we only apprehend²⁰ feelings.²²⁶ But it differs from Scepticism since it states that the aim is pleasure and a smooth motion of the flesh,²²⁷ while we say that it is tranquillity, which is contrary to the aim they propose – for whether pleasure is present or absent, anyone who affirms that pleasure is the aim submits to troubles, as we argued in the chapter on ‘The Aim’.²²⁸ Further, we suspend judgement (as far as the argument goes) about external existing things, while the Cyrenaics assert that they have an inapprehensible nature.²²⁹

²⁰ Retaining *καταλαμβάνειν* (MSS and the Latin translation): Mutschmann-Mau print *καταλαμβάνεσθαι* (Pohlenz).

²²² Cf. II 63 (and I 101). But Democritus’ views were notoriously hard to interpret: see Plutarch, *adv Col* 1108E–1111F.

²²³ Cf. I 191.

²²⁴ *ἐτεῖ*, a somewhat archaic word.

²²⁵ frag. 9 Diels–Kranz; cf *M VII* 135.

²²⁶ Cf. *M VII* 190–8. The testimonia to the Cyrenaics are collected in GIANNANTONI [1990]; on Cyrenaic epistemology see TSOUNA MCKIRAHAN [1992].

²²⁷ See *M VII* 199–200.

²²⁸ Cf. I 25–30.

²²⁹ Cf. I 3.

xxxii How does Scepticism differ from the Protagorean persuasion?

[216] Protagoras has it that human beings are measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not.²³⁰ By 'measure' he means the standard, and by 'things' objects; so he is implicitly saying that human beings are the standard for all objects, of those that are that they are and of those that are not that they are not. For this reason he posits only what is apparent to each person, and thus introduces relativity. [217] Hence he is thought to have something in common with the Pyrrhonists.²³¹

But he differs from them, and we shall see the difference when we have adequately explained what Protagoras thinks.²³²

He says that matter is in a state of flux, and that as it flows additions continually replace the effluxes;²³³ and that our senses are rearranged and altered depending on age and on the other constitutions of the body. [218] He also says that the reasons²³⁴ for all apparent things are present in matter, so that the matter can, as far as it itself is concerned, be all the things it appears to anyone to be. Men grasp different things at different times, depending on their different conditions: someone in a natural state apprehends those things in the matter which can appear to those in a natural state, someone in an unnatural state apprehends what can appear to those in an unnatural state. [219] And further, depending on age, and according to whether we are sleeping or waking, and in virtue of each sort of condition, the same account holds.²³⁵ According to him, then, man is the standard for what is; for all things that are apparent to men actually are, and what is apparent to nobody is not.

We see, then, that he holds beliefs about matter being in flux and

²³⁰ Cf. *M* VII 60 = frag. 1 Diels-Kranz, from the opening of his book *Καταβάλλοντες* or *Overthrowers*.

²³¹ See BARNES [1988b].

²³² With the following account of Protagoreanism compare *M* VII 60-4; see DECLEVA CAIZZI [1988].

²³³ Cf. III 82.

²³⁴ 'Reasons' translates *λόγοι*: the general sense of the view ascribed (no doubt falsely) to Protagoras is clear, but the precise sense of *λόγοι* is obscure.

²³⁵ Cf. I 100, the fourth of the Ten Modes.

about the presence in it of the reasons for all apparent things. But these things are unclear and we suspend judgement about them.

xxxiii How does Scepticism differ from the Academic philosophy?

[220] Some say that the philosophy of the Academy is the same as Scepticism; so it will be apposite for us to deal with that too.²³⁶

There have been, so most people say, three Academies: one – the oldest – was Plato's; a second was the Middle Academy of Arcesilaus, Polemo's pupil; and the third was the New Academy of Carneades and Clitomachus. Some add a fourth, the Academy of Philo and Charmidas, and some reckon as a fifth the Academy of Antiochus.²³⁷

[221] Beginning with the Old Academy, then, let us see the difference between us and these philosophies.²³⁸

As for Plato,²³⁹ some have said that he is dogmatic, others aporetic, others partly aporetic and partly dogmatic (for in the gymnastic works,²⁴⁰ where Socrates is introduced either as playing with people or as contesting with sophists, they say that his distinctive character is gymnastic and aporetic; but that he is dogmatic where he makes assertions seriously through Socrates or Timaeus or someone similar).

[222] It would be superfluous to say anything here about those who say that Plato is dogmatic, or partly dogmatic and partly aporetic; for they themselves agree on his difference from us. As to whether he is purely sceptical, we deal with this at some length in our *Comment-*

²³⁶ The relationship between Academics and Pyrrhonians was discussed by Aenesidemus (see Photius, *bibl* 212, 169b18–170b3) and became a standard topic of debate. On the issue see STRIKER [1981]; ANNAS [1988].

²³⁷ On the problems raised by this doxographical account (repeated by Eusebius, *PE* XIV iv 12–16, and [Galen] *hist phil* 3 (= XIX 230 K (cf. 2, XIX 226–7 K))) see GLUCKER [1978], pp. 344–56.

²³⁸ The testimonia to the Middle and New Academies are collected by METTE [1984], [1985].

²³⁹ On Plato the sceptic see ANNAS and BARNES [1985], pp. 13–14; WOODRUFF [1986]; ANNAS [1988], [1992b].

²⁴⁰ I.e. the works allegedly written as training manuals for budding philosophers: the ancient categorizations of Plato's dialogues classified several dialogues – among them *Meno* and *Theaetetus* – as 'gymnastic' in this sense (see e.g. Diogenes Laertius III 49).

aries.²⁴¹ Here, in an outline,²⁴² we say,^{ap} in opposition to Menodotus^{aq} and Aenesidemus (who were the main proponents of this position), that when Plato makes assertions about Forms or about the existence of Providence or about a virtuous life being preferable to a life of vice, then if he assents to these things as being really so, he is holding beliefs; and if he commits himself to them as being more plausible, he has abandoned the distinctive character of Scepticism, since he is giving something preference in point of convincingness and lack of convincingness – and that even this is foreign to us is clear from what I have already said.²⁴³ [223] Even if he does make some utterances in sceptical fashion when, as they say, he is exercising, this will not make him a Sceptic. For anyone who holds beliefs on even one subject, or in general prefers one appearance to another in point of convincingness or lack of convincingness, or makes assertions about any unclear matter, thereby has the distinctive character of a Dogmatist.

Timon makes this clear in what he says about Xenophanes. [224] For although he praised him in many passages, even dedicating his *Lampoons* to him, he represented him lamenting and saying:

If only I had had a share of shrewd thought
and looked in both directions! But I was deceived by the treacherous
path,
being a man of the past and having no care for any
inquiry. For wherever I turned my thought,

^{ap} Reading λέγομεν (after the Latin translation): Mutschmann–Mau print διαλεξόμεθα (Nebe); the Greek mss have διαλαμβάνομεν.

^{aq} At this notorious textual crux we do not disagree with the text of Mutschmann–Mau.

²⁴¹ Elsewhere Sextus refers to his *Sceptical Commentaries* (*M* I 29, probably referring to *M* VIII, as the parallel at *M* XI 232 indicates; II 106, probably referring to *M* VIII; and VII 52); at *M* VII 446 and VIII 1 he uses the word ‘commentary’ to refer to *M* VII; at *M* III 116 the ‘commentaries against the natural scientists’ are perhaps *M* IX. All this makes it likely that the *Commentaries* to which Sextus here refers are the work of which *M* VII–XI is the surviving torso (see above, p. xii). – The reference to the commentaries on the soul at *M* VI 55 is puzzling: there is no obvious text in *M* VII–XI. The *Empirical Commentaries* (*M* I 61) and the *Medical Commentaries* (*M* VII 202) are no doubt distinct from the *Sceptical Commentaries*.

²⁴² See I 4, note.

²⁴³ See e.g. I 10.

everything resolved into one and the same; and everything, existing
 always,
 was drawn back all about and came to a stand in one homogeneous
 nature.²⁴⁴

Hence he calls him half-conceited – not perfectly unconceited – when
 he says:

Half-conceited Xenophanes, mocker of Homeric deceit,
 who feigned an inhuman god,²⁴⁵ equal all about,
 unmoving, unharmed, more thought-like than thought.²⁴⁵

He calls him 'half-conceited' as being partly unconceited, and 'mocker
 of Homeric deceit' because he disparaged the deceit in Homer. [225]
 Xenophanes held as beliefs, contrary to the preconceptions of other
 men, that everything is one, that god is united with everything, and
 that he is spherical, impassive, unchanging and rational.²⁴⁶ Hence it is
 easy to display the difference between Xenophanes and us.²⁴⁷

Thus it is clear from what we have said that even if Plato is aporetic
 about some things, he is not a Sceptic; for in some matters he appears
 to make assertions about the reality of unclear objects or to give
 certain unclear items preference in point of convincingness.

[226]²⁴⁸ The members of the New Academy, if they say that
 everything is inapprehensible, no doubt differ from the Sceptics
 precisely in saying that everything is inapprehensible. For they make
 affirmations about this, while the Sceptic expects it to be possible for
 some things actually to be apprehended.²⁴⁹ And they differ from us
 clearly in their judgements of good and bad. For the Academics say
 that things are good and bad not in the way we do, but with the
 conviction that it is plausible that what they call good rather than its

²⁴⁵ Reading $\delta\varsigma$ (Roeper): the MSS have $\xi\alpha$; Mutschmann–Mau print $\epsilon\iota$ (Diels).
 And retaining the MS reading $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu$: Mutschmann–Mau print $\acute{\alpha}\pi$
 $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega\nu$ (Fabricius).

²⁴⁴ Timon, frag. 833 Lloyd–Jones–Parsons.

²⁴⁵ frag. 834 Lloyd–Jones–Parsons (see below, III 218).

²⁴⁶ This reflects the account of Xenophanes' theology found in e.g. [Aristotle], *On
 Melissus, Xenophanes, Gorgias* 977a14–b20.

²⁴⁷ For Xenophanes as a Sceptic see *M* VII 49–52 (cf. VIII 325–6; Diogenes Laertius
 IX 72); for the dispute over how to interpret his epistemological position see
M VII 110.

²⁴⁸ With the account of the New Academy in I 226–8 compare *M* VII 159–89.

²⁴⁹ Cf. I 3.

contrary really is good (and similarly with bad), whereas we do not call anything good or bad with the thought that what we say is plausible – rather, without holding opinions we follow ordinary life in order not to be inactive.²⁵⁰

[227] Further, we say that appearances are equal in convincingness or lack of convincingness (as far as the argument goes), while they say that some are plausible and others implausible.²⁵¹ Even among the plausible ones they say there are differences: some, they think, really are just plausible, others plausible and inspected, others plausible and scrutinized and undistractable. For example, suppose a coil of rope is lying in a certain way in a dark room. When someone comes in suddenly, he receives a merely plausible appearance from it as if from a snake. [228] But to someone who has looked round carefully and inspected its features (e.g. it does not move, it has a certain colour, and so on) it appears as a rope, in virtue of an appearance which is plausible and scrutinized. Appearances which are in addition undistractable are like this: Heracles is said to have brought Alcestis, who had died, back from Hades and to have shown her to Admetus. He received an appearance of Alcestis which was plausible and inspected; but since he knew that she had died, his intellect was distracted from assent and inclined to lack of conviction.^{as252} [229] The members of the New Academy, then, prefer plausible and scrutinized appearances to those which are merely plausible and to both they prefer appearances which are plausible and scrutinized and undistractable.

Even if both Academics and Sceptics say that they go along with certain things, the difference even here between the two philosophies

^{as} Mutschmann–Mau mark a lacuna here; but see n. 252.

²⁵⁰ Cf. I 23.

²⁵¹ On 'plausibility' in the New Academy see BETT [1989].

²⁵² The appearance of Alcestis is not undistractable but, on the contrary, distracted. The example reappears at *M* VII 254–6 as a case of a *non*-plausible appearance; there it is coupled with the appearance of Helen to Menelaus – and this, implausible, appearance occurs at *M* VII 180–1 in the explanation of what an *undistractable* appearance is. Thus both in *PH* and in *M* Sextus explains undistractableness by adducing a case of distraction. The procedure is in itself unimpeachable (but it must be admitted that Sextus hardly makes it clear that he is following the procedure); and the text need not be altered. For problems with the examples see ANNAS [1990].

is clear. [230] For 'go along with' is used in different senses.²⁵³ It means not resisting but simply following without strong inclination or adherence (as a boy is said to go along with his chaperon); and it sometimes means assenting to something by choice and, as it were, sympathy (as a dissolute man goes along with someone who urges extravagant living). Hence, since Carneades and Clitomachus say that they go along with things and that some things are plausible in the sense of having a strong wish^{at} with a strong inclination, whereas we say so in the sense of simply yielding without adherence, in this respect too we differ from them.

[231] We also differ from the New Academy with regard to what leads to the aim. For those who profess to belong to the Academy make use of the plausible in their lives, while we follow laws and customs and natural feelings, and so live without holding opinions.²⁵⁴

We would say more about the distinction were we not aiming at brevity.²⁵⁵

[232] Arcesilaus, who we said was champion and founder of the Middle Academy, certainly seems to me to have something in common with what the Pyrrhonists say – indeed, his persuasion and ours are virtually the same.²⁵⁶ For he is not found making assertions about the reality or unreality of anything, nor does he prefer one thing to another in point of convincingness or lack of convincingness, but he suspends judgement about everything. And he says that the aim is suspension of judgement, which, we said, is accompanied by tranquillity.²⁵⁷ [233] He also says that particular suspensions of judgement are good and particular assents bad.

Yet someone might say that we say these things in accordance with

^{at} Following Heintz, we transpose the words κατὰ τὸ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι τοῖς κλειτόμαχον.

²⁵³ 'Go along with' translates the verb πείθεσθαι: πείθεσθαι + dative means either (i) 'obey' or (ii) 'believe'. According to Sextus, the Academics go along with things in sense (ii), whereas the Sceptics only go along with things in sense (i). Sextus here alludes to the fact that the Sceptic will 'yield' or 'assent' to items forced upon us: see I 13.

²⁵⁴ See I 23–4.

²⁵⁵ See I 163.

²⁵⁶ On the scepticism of Arcesilaus see e.g. MACONI [1988].

²⁵⁷ See I 10; and note I 30 for the remark that some *Sceptics* say that the aim is suspension of judgement.

what is apparent to us, not affirmatively, whereas he says them with reference to the nature of things – so he says that suspension of judgement is a good thing and assent a bad thing. [234] And if one is to be convinced by what is said about him, they say that he appeared superficially to be a Pyrrhonist but in truth was a Dogmatist. Because he used to test his companions by his aporetic skill, to see if they were gifted enough to receive Platonic beliefs, he seemed to be aporetic; but to the gifted among his companions he would entrust²⁵⁸ Plato's views.²⁵⁸ Hence Aristo called him

Plato in front, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle

because he made use of dialectic in Diodorus' fashion but was an out-and-out Platonist.

[235]²⁵⁹ Philo and his followers say that as far as the Stoic standard (i.e. apprehensive appearance) is concerned objects are inapprehensible, but as far as the nature of the objects themselves is concerned they are apprehensible.²⁶⁰ And Antiochus brought the Stoa into the Academy, so that it was said of him that he did Stoic philosophy in the Academy; for he tried to show that Stoic beliefs are present in Plato. So the difference between the sceptical persuasion and what are called the Fourth and Fifth Academies is quite clear.

xxxiv Is Medical Empiricism the same as Scepticism?

[236] Some say that the Sceptical philosophy is the same as the Empiric school in medicine. But you must realize that if this form of Empiricism makes affirmations about the inapprehensibility of unclear matters, then it is not the same as Scepticism, nor would it be appropriate for Sceptics to take up with that school.²⁶¹

²⁵⁸ Reading *παρεγγχειρίζειν* (Bekker) for *παρεγγχειρεῖν* (MSS, Mutschmann-Mau).

²⁵⁹ Cf. e.g. Cicero, *Luc* 60; Anonymus, in *Theaet* liv 14; Numenius, apud Eusebius, *PE* xiv vi 6; Augustine, *Against the Academics* III 38 (see GLUCKER [1978], pp. 296–306).

²⁶⁰ On the accounts of Philo and Antiochus given here see TARRANT [1985]; BARNES [1989].

²⁶¹ See Cicero, *Luc* 34; Photius, *bibl* 212, 170a22 (Aenesidemus).

²⁶¹ On Medical Empiricism see e.g. EDELSTEIN [1964]; FREDE [1985], [1988]. Sextus himself was a doctor (texts in DEICHGRÄBER [1965], pp. 216–18) and an Empiric: see [Galen], *Introduction* XIV 683 K (other texts in DEICHGRÄBER

They might rather adopt, as it seems to me, what is called the Method;²⁶² [237] for this alone of the medical schools seems to practise no rashness in unclear matters and does not presume to say whether they are apprehensible or inapprehensible, but it follows what is apparent, taking thence, in line with Sceptical practice, what seems to be expedient.

We said above²⁶³ that ordinary life, which the Sceptics too participate in, is fourfold, consisting in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. [238] By the necessitation of feelings Sceptics are conducted by thirst to drink, by hunger to food, and so on. In the same way Methodic doctors are conducted by feelings to what corresponds to them: by contraction to dilatation (as when someone seeks refuge in heat from the compression due to intense cold²⁶⁴) and by flux to checking²⁶⁵ (as when those in the baths who are dripping with sweat and relaxed come to check it and so seek refuge in the cold air). And it is clear that things foreign to nature force us to proceed to remove them: even a dog will remove a thorn which has got stuck in his paw.²⁶⁶ [239] And – not to overstep the outline character of my essay²⁶⁷ by discussing each case – I think that everything which the Methodics say in this vein can be brought under the necessitation of feelings, either natural or unnatural.

Furthermore, lack of opinion and indifference in the use of words is common to the two persuasions. [240] Just as Sceptics, without holding opinions, use the phrases ‘I determine nothing’ and ‘I do not apprehend anything’ (as we have said),²⁶⁸ so the Methodics talk about ‘common features’ and ‘pervading’ and the rest in a straightforward way; and similarly they take the word ‘indication’, without holding any opinions, in the sense of being conducted from apparent

[1965], pp. 40–1) – hence his modern name. How, then, are we to explain I 236?

²⁶² On Medical Methodism see e.g. FREDE [1982].

²⁶³ I 23–4.

²⁶⁴ Cf. II 239.

²⁶⁵ The word is ἐποχή, which normally means ‘suspension of judgement’: a pun.

²⁶⁶ Cf. I 70.

²⁶⁷ See I 4, note.

²⁶⁸ See I 197, 201.

feelings, both natural and unnatural, to what seems to correspond to them (as I suggested for thirst and hunger and so on).²⁶⁹

[241] Hence, judging by these and similar points, we should say that the medical persuasion of the Methodics has some affinity with Scepticism – not absolutely but more so than the other medical schools and in comparison with them.²⁷⁰

So much for what seem to be neighbours of the Sceptical persuasion. Here we bring to a close both the general account of Scepticism and the first Book of our *Outlines*.²⁷⁰

²⁷⁰ Punctuating with Bury, i.e. omitting the brackets in Mutschmann–Mau.

²⁶⁹ With Methodic ‘indications’ compare the Dogmatic notion of an indicative sign: below, II 101.

²⁷⁰ See I 4, note.

BOOK II



Outlines of Scepticism

These are the Contents of the Second Book of the *Outlines of Scepticism*:

- i Can Sceptics investigate what the Dogmatists talk about?
- ii Where should the investigation of Dogmatism begin?
- iii Standards
- iv Is there a standard of truth?
- v That by which
- vi That through which
- vii That in virtue of which
- viii Truths and truth
- ix Is anything true by nature?
- x Signs
- xi Are there any indicative signs?
- xii Proof
- xiii Are there any proofs?
- xiv Deductions
- xv Induction
- xvi Definitions
- xvii Divisions
- xviii The division of a word into significations
- xix Do wholes divide into parts?
- xx Genera and species
- xxi Common attributes
- xxii Sophisms

i Can Sceptics investigate what the Dogmatists talk about?

[1] Since we have reached^a our investigation of Dogmatism, let us inspect, concisely and in outline,¹ each of the parts of what they call philosophy, having first answered those who persistently allege that Sceptics can neither investigate nor, more generally, think about the items on which they hold beliefs.²

[2] They say that Sceptics either apprehend what the Dogmatists talk about or do not apprehend it. If they apprehend it, how can they be puzzled about what they say they apprehend? If they do not apprehend it, they do not even know how to talk about what they have not apprehended.³ [3] For just as someone who does not know what, for example, the removal argument⁴ or the theorem in two complexes⁵ is cannot even say anything about them, so someone who does not recognize any of the items the Dogmatists talk about cannot conduct an investigation in opposition to them about things which he does not know. In neither case, therefore, can Sceptics investigate what the Dogmatists talk about.

[4] Now those who put this argument forward must tell us how they are here using the word 'apprehend' – does it mean simply 'think of', without any further affirmation of the reality of the things about which we are making our statements? Or does it also include^b a positing of the reality of the things we are discussing?

If they say that 'apprehend' in their argument means 'assent to an

^a Reading ἐπει δ' <ἐπι> ...

^b Omitting νοεῖν with Heintz: Mutschmann–Mau print μετὰ τοῦ νοεῖν; the MSS offer τὸ νοεῖν μετὰ τοῦ.

¹ See I 4, note.

² The persistent allegation is not referred to elsewhere. Its ultimate origin lies in Plato (*Meno* 80DE – cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* A 1, 71a29).

³ Compare the parallel argument ascribed to the Epicureans at *M* VIII 337 (and see below, III 268).

⁴ τὸ καθ' ὃ περιαιρουμένου: Sextus alludes to some technical notion (perhaps, like the second example, a notion drawn from Stoic logical theory). We do not catch the allusion, either because the text is corrupt (as the Latin tradition suggests) or simply because no other occurrence of the phrase has survived.

⁵ 'Complex' [τροπικόν] is a term of art from Stoic logic, where it designates a compound proposition (cf. II 202; *M* VIII 440–2; Galen, *inst log* vii 1). The 'theorem in two complexes' is the argument-schema: 'If P, then Q; if P, then not-Q; therefore not-P' (see Origen, *c Cels* VII xv).

apprehensive appearance⁶ (an apprehensive appearance comes from something real, is imprinted and stamped in accordance with the real object itself, and is such as would not come from anything unreal⁷), then they themselves will perhaps be unwilling to allow that they cannot investigate things which they have not apprehended in this way. [5] For example, when a Stoic conducts an investigation in opposition to an Epicurean who says that substance is divided or that god does not show providence for things in the universe or that pleasure is good,⁸ has he apprehended these things or has he not apprehended them? If he has apprehended them, then in saying that they are real he utterly rejects the Stoa; and if he has not apprehended them, then he cannot say anything against them. [6] And similar things are to be said against those who come from the other schools, when they want to investigate the beliefs of those who hold different views from themselves. Thus they cannot investigate anything in opposition to one another.

Or rather – not to put too fine a point on it – pretty well all of their dogmatic philosophy will be confounded and the Sceptical philosophy vigorously advanced if it is granted that you cannot investigate what has not been apprehended in this way. [7] For anyone who makes assertions and holds beliefs about any unclear object will say that he is making an assertion about it either having apprehended it or not having apprehended it. If not having apprehended it, he will not carry conviction. If having apprehended it, he will say that he has apprehended it either directly and in itself and by an evident impression, or else by way of some inquiry and investigation. [8] If the unclear object is said to have made an immediate and evident impression on him in itself and so to have been apprehended, then in this case it will not in fact be unclear – rather, it will be equally apparent to everyone and agreed upon and not disputed.⁹ (On

⁶ See III 241; *M* VIII 397.

⁷ For this Stoic definition see e.g. *M* VII 248, 402, 426; Diogenes Laertius VII 46; Cicero, *Luc* XXIV 77–8 – cf. ANNAS [1990]; FREDE [1983].

⁸ Three central tenets of Epicureanism, all rejected by the Stoics. ‘Substance is divided’ expresses Epicurean atomism (for ‘substance’, οὐσία, in the sense of ‘matter’ see III 2): the Stoics held that matter (within the cosmos) is continuous, the Epicureans that it consists of atoms separated by void. On providence see I 151; on pleasure, III 181.

⁹ Cf. e.g. II 182; III 254, 266.

everything unclear there has been an interminable dispute among them.) Thus a Dogmatist who makes affirmations and assertions about the reality of something unclear will not have apprehended it as a result of its having made an evident impression on him in itself. [9] But if by way of some inquiry, how – on the hypothesis before us – could he have investigated it before accurately apprehending it? For the investigation requires that what is going to be investigated should first have been accurately apprehended and then be investigated; and the apprehension of the object under investigation in turn demands that the object has already been investigated. Thus, by the reciprocal mode of perplexity,¹⁰ it becomes impossible for them to investigate and hold beliefs about what is unclear: if any of them wish to start from apprehension, we face them with the demand that they should have already investigated the object before apprehending it; and if they wish to start from investigation, we face them with the demand that they should have apprehended what is to be investigated before investigating it. Thus for these reasons they can neither apprehend anything unclear nor make any firm assertion about it. And from this, I think, it will directly result that the subtleties of the Dogmatists are destroyed and the philosophy of suspension is introduced.

[10] If they say they mean that it is not apprehension of this sort but rather mere thinking which ought to precede investigation, then investigation is not impossible for those who suspend judgement about the reality of what is unclear. For a Sceptic is not, I think, barred from having thoughts, if they arise from things which give him a passive impression and appear evidently to him^c and do not at all imply the reality of what is being thought of – for we can think, as they say, not only of real things but also of unreal things. Hence someone who suspends judgement maintains his sceptical condition while investigating and thinking; for it has been made clear¹¹ that he assents to any impression given by way of a passive appearance insofar as it appears to him.

[11] And consider whether in actual fact the Dogmatists are not barred from investigation. For those who agree that they do not

^c Omitting λόγῳ (for which the main MSS read λόγων).

¹⁰ See I 169.

¹¹ See I 13.

know how objects are in their nature may continue without inconsistency to investigate them: those who think they know them accurately may not. For the latter, the investigation is already at its end, as they suppose, whereas for the former, the reason why any investigation is undertaken – that is, the idea that they have not found the answer – is fully present.¹²

[12] We must investigate each part of what they call philosophy – briefly on the present occasion.¹³ And since there has been much dispute among the Dogmatists about the parts of philosophy¹⁴ (some saying that it has one part, some two, some three), a dispute which it would not be appropriate to deal with in more detail here, we shall set down impartially the opinion of those who seem to have dwelt upon the matter more fully and advance our argument on this basis.

ii Where should the investigation of Dogmatism begin?

[13] The Stoics and some others say that there are three parts of philosophy – logic, physics, ethics – and they begin their exposition with logic (although there has indeed been much dissension even about where one should begin.)¹⁵ We follow them without holding any opinion on the matter; and since what is said in the three parts requires judgement and a standard and the account of standards seems to be included in the logical part, let us begin with the account of standards and with the logical part,¹⁶

iii Standards¹⁷

[14]¹⁸ first remarking that although they call a standard both that by which they say reality and unreality are judged and that by attending

¹² Cf. I 2–3.

¹³ See I 163.

¹⁴ See *M* VII 1–19; Diogenes Laertius VII 39–41; Plutarch, *Stoic rep* 1035A. The tripartite division of philosophy was in fact accepted by pretty well all later Greek philosophy; see HADOT [1979].

¹⁵ Cf. *M* VII 20–3.

¹⁶ Cf. *M* VII 24. Note that Zeno and Chrysippus both began with logic: Diogenes Laertius VII 40.

¹⁷ On the notion of a standard or κριτήριον see STRIKER [1974]; HUBY and NEAL [1989].

¹⁸ Cf. *M* VII 29–30.

to which we live our lives, it is now our purpose to discuss what is said to be the standard of truth. (We have dealt with standards in the other sense in our account of Scepticism.¹⁹)

[15]²⁰ The standards with which our account is concerned are spoken of in three senses – a general, a special and a very special. In the general sense, every measure of apprehension is a standard – it is in this sense that we talk of ‘natural standards’ such as seeing. In the special sense, every technical measure of apprehension is a standard – such as a ruler or a pair of dividers. In the very special sense, every technical^d measure of apprehension of an unclear object is a standard²¹ – this sense applies not to everyday standards but only to logical standards and those which the Dogmatists bring forward in order to judge the truth.

[16]²² We propose to deal principally with logical standards. But logical standards are spoken of in three senses²³ – that by which, that through which, and that in virtue of which. For example, that by which – a human; through which – either perception or intellect; in virtue of which – the impact of an appearance in virtue of which humans set themselves to make judgements through one of the means we have mentioned.

[17] It was no doubt appropriate to make these preliminary remarks in order to have a conception of what our account is about. For the rest, let us proceed to our counterargument against those who rashly say that they have apprehended the standard of truth. We begin with the dispute.

^d Adding τεχνικόν after καταλήψεως with three MSS; but see the parallel at *M* VII 33, where the word appears in no MSS (and is restored by Heintz).

¹⁹ See I 21–4.

²⁰ Cf. *M* VII 31–3.

²¹ But see II 95 (cf. I 178) and – more clearly – *M* VII 25 (cf. VIII 141–2), where standards, in contrast to signs and proofs, are said to bear upon ‘the things which make an impression on us directly in perception or thought’. The problem is discussed by BRUNSCHWIG [1988a].

²² Cf. *M* VII 33–7.

²³ Cf. Diogenes Laertius I 21 (Potamo); Albinus, *The Doctrines of Plato* IV, p. 154 H; Ptolemy, *On the Standard* 1–2.

iv Is there a standard of truth?²⁴

[18]²⁵ Of those who have discussed standards, some have asserted that there is one (e.g. the Stoics and certain others), some that there is not (among them, Xenias of Corinth²⁶ and Xenophanes of Colophon who says: 'but belief is found over all'²⁷); and we suspend judgement^c as to whether there is one or not.

[19] Now they will say either that this dispute is decidable or that it is undecidable.²⁸ If undecidable, they will immediately grant that one must suspend judgement; if decidable, let them say by what it will be judged when we neither possess an agreed standard nor even know if there is one but are investigating the matter.

[20]²⁹ Again, in order for the dispute that has arisen about standards to be decided, we must possess an agreed standard through which we can judge it; and in order for us to possess an agreed standard, the dispute about standards must already have been decided. Thus the argument falls into the reciprocal mode and the discovery of a standard is blocked – for we do not allow them to assume a standard by hypothesis, and if they want to judge the standard by a standard we throw them into an infinite regress.

Again, since a proof needs a standard which has been proved and a standard needs a proof which has been judged, they are thrown into the reciprocal mode.³⁰

[21] Now, although we think that these considerations are actually enough to show the rashness of the Dogmatists in their account of standards, nevertheless, so that we may be able to bring some variety into our refutation of them, it is not absurd to persevere with the topic. Not that we propose to contest each of their opinions about standards one by one – for the dispute is vast, and in that way we too

^c Reading ἐπίσχομεν: the MSS have ἐπίσχωμεν, Mutschmann–Mau print ἐπέσχομεν (Kayser).

²⁴ On this chapter see LONG [1978a].

²⁵ Cf. *M* VII 47–54.

²⁶ Known only from Sextus, who ascribes to him the view that 'everything is false, i.e. every appearance and belief is false' (*M* VII 53; see below II 76, 85).

²⁷ See note to I 223; for the context of the quotation see *M* VII 49–52.

²⁸ Cf. I 170.

²⁹ For the modes of Agrippa which Sextus here deploys see I 164–9.

³⁰ Cf. II 183.

would necessarily fall into giving an unmethodical account.³¹ But since the standard we are investigating is thought to be threefold – that by which, that through which, and that in virtue of which³² – we shall tackle each of these in turn and establish its inapprehensibility; for in this way our account will be at once methodical and complete.

Let us begin with the standard by which; for along with it the others too seem in a way to reach an impasse.³³

v That by which

[22] Humans – so far as what the Dogmatists say goes – seem to me to be not only inapprehensible but actually inconceivable. After all, we hear Plato's Socrates explicitly confessing that he does not know whether he is a human or something else.³⁴ And when they wish to establish the concept, first they are in dispute and secondly what they say is actually unintelligible.

[23] Democritus says that a human being is what we all know.³⁵ But as far as this goes, we shall not be acquainted with humans; for we also know dogs – and for that reason dogs will be humans. And there are some humans we do not know – so they will not be humans. Or rather, as far as this conception goes, no-one will be a human; for if Democritus says that a human must be known by everyone, and no human is known by all humans, then no-one will be a human according to him. [24] That this point is not sophistical but^f in line with his own views is apparent. For our author says that the only things that are truly real are the atoms and the void, and these, he says, belong not only to animals but to *all* compounds.³⁶ Thus, as far as these items are concerned, we shall not conceive of what is peculiar to humans (since they are common to everything); and yet nothing else exists apart from them. Therefore we shall not have anything through

^f Adding ὅλλ' after λέγομεν (Heintz).

³¹ Cf. II 48; III 37; *M* VIII 337a.

³² Cf. II 16.

³³ Cf. *M* VII 263.

³⁴ A willful misreading of *Phaedrus* 230A (paraphrased at *M* VII 264).

³⁵ Cf. *M* VII 265–6 (Democritus, frag. 165 Diels–Kranz).

³⁶ Cf. Plutarch, *adv Col* III 10E: see Democritus, frag. 125 Diels–Kranz (cf. also above, I 214).

which we shall be able to distinguish humans from other animals and to think purely of them.

[25]³⁷ Epicurus says that a human being is a figure of *that* sort, together with vitality. So, according to him, since humans are shown by pointing, anyone who is not being pointed to is not a human; and if someone is pointing to a woman, men will not be humans, and if to a man, women will not be humans. (We shall argue along the same lines from difference in circumstances, which we know from the fourth mode of suspension.³⁸)

[26] Others³⁹ have said that human beings are mortal rational animals, capable of understanding and knowledge. Now since we show in the first mode of suspension⁴⁰ that no animal is irrational but that all are capable both of understanding and of knowledge, then – so far as what the Dogmatists say goes – we shall not know what on earth they mean. [27] Moreover, the attributes contained in the definition are meant either as actual or as potential. If as actual, then you are not a human unless you have already acquired perfect knowledge and are perfect in point of reason and are in the very process of dying (for that is what being actually mortal is). If as potential, then you will not be a human if you possess perfect reason or have acquired understanding and knowledge – and this is more absurd than the former alternative. It is apparent, then, that the concept of a human being cannot be constituted in this way either. [28] As for Plato, when he asserts that human beings are broad-nailed two-footed featherless animals capable of political knowledge,⁴¹ he does not himself claim to be setting this out affirmatively. For if humans are among the things which, according to him, are coming into being but never really exist, and if it is impossible, according to him, to assert anything affirmatively about things which never exist,⁴²

³⁷ Cf. *M* VII 267–8.

³⁸ Above I 100–17. Sextus means that if you point to, e.g., a drunk or a sleeper, then the sober and the wakeful will not be men.

³⁹ Cf. *M* VII 269. The 'others' include Peripatetics (e.g. Aristotle, *Top* 133b2) and probably Stoics (e.g. Seneca, *ep* lxxvi 9–10).

⁴⁰ See above, I 62–78.

⁴¹ Cf. *M* VII 281 (see [Plato], *Definitions* 415A; Diogenes Laertius VI 40); cf. below, II 211.

⁴² See *Theaet* 152D, *Tim* 27E (cf. below, III 54).

then Plato will claim to set out⁸ the definition not as affirming it but rather as speaking – as was his custom⁴³ – in accordance with plausibility.

[29] Even if we grant by way of concession that humans can be conceived of, we shall find that they are inapprehensible. For they are composed of soul and body; but neither bodies nor souls perhaps are apprehended: nor, therefore, are humans. [30] That bodies are not apprehended is clear from the following considerations.⁴⁴ The attributes of a thing are different from that of which they are attributes. Thus, when a colour or something of that sort makes an impression on us, it is likely that the attributes of a body make the impression but not the body itself. At any rate, they say that bodies are extended in three dimensions.⁴⁵ We ought then to apprehend length, breadth and depth if we are to apprehend bodies. <But we do not apprehend depth.>^h For if this made an impression on us, we should recognize silver-gilt for what it is.⁴⁶ Therefore, bodies do not make an impression on us.

[31] But to leave aside the controversy about body, humans are again found to be inapprehensible because souls are inapprehensible. That souls are inapprehensible is clear from the following considerations. Of those who have discussed the soul,ⁱ some have said that there are no souls (e.g. Dicaearchus of Messene⁴⁷), others that there are, while others have suspended judgement.

[32] Now if the Dogmatists say that this dispute is undecidable,⁴⁸ they will immediately grant the inapprehensibility of the soul; and if they say that it is decidable, let them tell us what they will decide it with. They cannot decide it with perception, since souls are said by them to be objects of thought; but if they say they will decide it with

⁸ Omitting δοκεῖν.

^h Adding οὐδέ γε τὸ βάθος καταλαμβάνομεν (Kayser), *exempli gratia*.

ⁱ Omitting ἵνα τὴν πολλὴν καὶ ἀνήνυτον μάχην παραλίπωμεν: the clause makes no sense in its present position, and perhaps arose as a variant reading for the first clause of this section.

⁴³ See I 221.

⁴⁴ Cf. *M* VII 294–5; on body in general see III 38–49; *M* IX 359–440.

⁴⁵ Cf. III 39.

⁴⁶ Cf. *M* VII 299.

⁴⁷ A pupil of Aristotle: see *M* VII 349 and esp. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* I x 21.

⁴⁸ Cf. I 170.

intellect, we shall reply that, since the intellect is the most unclear part of the soul – this is shown by the fact that some people agree about the reality of the soul and yet differ about the intellect⁴⁹ – [33] then if it is with the intellect that they want to apprehend the soul and decide the dispute about it, they want to decide and confirm what is less a matter of investigation by what is more a matter of investigation – which is absurd. Thus the dispute about the soul will not be decided with the intellect. Therefore with nothing. But if this is so, souls are actually inapprehensible. Hence humans cannot be apprehended either.

[34]⁵⁰ But even if we grant that humans are apprehended, it is surely not possible to show that it is by humans that objects must be judged. For anyone who says that objects should be judged by humans will say this either without proof or with proof. Not with proof; for the proof must be true and must have been judged – and so have been judged by something. Now since we cannot say on the basis of agreement by what the proof itself can be judged (for we are investigating the standard by which), we shall not be able to decide the proof; and for this reason we shall not be able to prove the standard, with which our account is now concerned. [35] But if it is said without proof that it is by humans that objects must be judged, this will be unconvincing. Thus we shall not be able to affirm that humans are the standard by which.

And by what will it be judged that humans are the standard by which? If they state the point without giving a judgement, they will not be found convincing. But if they say that it will be judged by humans, they take for granted the matter under investigation; [36] and if by another animal, how will this animal be adduced to judge whether humans are the standard? If without giving a judgement, it will not be found convincing. If with a judgement, then it ought in turn to be judged by something: if by itself, the same absurdity remains (the matter under investigation will be judged through the matter under investigation); if by humans, the reciprocal mode⁵¹ is introduced; if by something else apart from these, we shall again ask

⁴⁹ See I 128.

⁵⁰ With 34–6 compare *M* VII 315–16 (see also above, I 59–61).

⁵¹ Cf. I 169.

for the standard by which for that – and so *ad infinitum*.⁵² For this reason too, therefore, we will not be able to say that it is by humans that objects must be judged.

[37] But suppose it to be the case, and to have been made convincing, that objects must be judged by humans. Now, since there are many differences among humans,⁵³ let the Dogmatists first agree with one another that we should attend to this human, and only then let them bid us give him our assent. But if they are going to dispute about this ‘as long as water flows and trees grow tall’ (as the saying goes⁵⁴), how can they urge us rashly to give our assent to anyone?

[38] If they say that we should find the Sage convincing,⁵⁵ we shall ask them which Sage – the Sage according to Epicurus, or according to the Stoics, or the Cyrenaic Sage, or the Cynic? They will not be able to agree on an answer. [39]⁵⁶ And if someone claims that we should abandon our search for the Sage and simply find convincing whoever is cleverest at present, then, first, they will also dispute about who is cleverer than the others; and secondly, even if it is granted that they can agree in determining who among everyone present and past is cleverest, even so he should not be found convincing. [40] For since there are many – indeed, pretty well infinitely many – grades and degrees of cleverness, we say that it is possible⁵⁷ that someone else should be born who is even cleverer than the one we say is cleverest of everyone past and present. Then just as we are required to find convincing because of his cleverness the one who is now said to be the most intelligent of everyone present and past, so we should rather find convincing the cleverer one who will exist after him. And when he is born, we should expect in turn that someone else will be born, cleverer than him; and someone else cleverer than him; and so *ad infinitum*. [41] (It is unclear whether these people will agree with one another or dispute in what they say.) Hence, even if someone is allowed to be the cleverest of everyone past and present, still, since we

⁵² Cf. I 166.

⁵³ See the second mode of suspension, above I 79–81.

⁵⁴ The line, from an anonymous epigram on Midas (see Plato, *Phaedrus* 264D) is quoted again by Sextus at *M* VIII 184 and *M* I 28.

⁵⁵ See I 91.

⁵⁶ With II 39–42 compare II 61–2.

⁵⁷ For the appeal to possible cases see I 34, note.

cannot say affirmatively that there will be no-one shrewder than him (for that is unclear), we shall always have to wait for the judgement of the cleverer person who will exist later, and never assent to the one who is now superior.

[42] Even if we grant by way of concession that there neither is nor was nor will be anyone cleverer than this hypothetical clever person, even so it is not right to find him convincing. For clever people, when they try to establish something, are especially prone to champion what is unsound and make it seem sound and true;⁵⁸ so when our shrewd person says something we shall not know whether he is describing the object as it is in its nature or whether he is presenting it as true although it is false and persuading us to consider it as though it were true – for he is the cleverest of all and for that reason cannot be refuted by us. Hence we shall not give even him our assent as judging objects truly; for while we think that he is speaking the truth,^j we also think that, because of his excessive shrewdness, he says what he does from a desire to present false objects as truths. For these reasons, in judging objects one should not find convincing even someone who seems to be shrewdest of all.

[43] If someone says that we should attend to the agreement of the majority, we shall say that that is idle. For, first, what is true is no doubt rare, and for this reason it is possible for one person to be more intelligent than the majority.⁵⁹ Secondly, for *every* standard there are more people opposed to it than in agreement about it; for those who admit any standard different from the one which some people seem to agree upon are opposed to it and are far more numerous than those who agree about it.⁶⁰

[44]⁶¹ Besides, those who agree either exhibit different conditions or share a single condition. Now they do not exhibit different conditions so far as the matter in question goes – how then would

^j Reading οἷσθαί μὲν with the MSS; Mutschmann–Mau print οἷόν τε μὲν εἶναι (Apelt).

⁵⁸ Cf. *M* VII 325.

⁵⁹ Cf. *M* VII 329.

⁶⁰ Cf. *M* VII 330–2.

⁶¹ Cf. *M* VII 333–4 (and see the fourth of the Ten Modes, above, I 100–17).

they say the same thing about it?^k But if they share a single condition, then, since the one person who says something different has a single condition and all of these who agree have a single condition, we will find no difference in number so far as the conditions we are attending to go. [45] For this reason we should not attend to the majority any more than to one person. Moreover, as we suggested in the second^l mode of scepticism,⁶² numerical difference among judgements is actually inapprehensible; for there are infinitely many individual humans and we cannot survey all their judgements and assert what the majority of all humans assert and what the minority. For this reason too, then, preference among judges on the basis of number is absurd.

[46] But if we do not attend to number either, we shall find no-one by whom objects will be judged, even though we have granted so much by way of concession. Hence on all these grounds the standard by which objects are to be judged is found to be inapprehensible.

[47] Since the other standards too are cancelled along with this one (for each of them is either a part or a feeling or an activity of humans⁶³), it would no doubt be apposite to proceed in our account to one of the topics next in order, on the grounds that the other standards too have been sufficiently discussed;^m but so that we may not seem to be reluctant to make a specific counterargument against each of them, we shall for good measure⁶⁴ say a few words about them too. And first we shall discuss the standard called 'through which'.

vi That through which

[48]⁶⁵ The dispute among the Dogmatists on this subject is great – indeed, pretty well infinite; but, with methodical procedure again in view,⁶⁶ we say that, since according to them humans are that by

^k Retaining the MS reading *περὶ αὐτοῦ*: Mutschmann–Mau emend to *περὶ ταύτου*.

^l Reading *δευτέρῳ* (*τετάρτῳ* MSS).

^m Reading *εἰρημένον* (Chouet: *εἰρημένων* MSS, Mutschmann–Mau).

⁶² Above I 89.

⁶³ Cf. *M* VII 263.

⁶⁴ Cf. I 62.

⁶⁵ Cf. *M* VII 343.

⁶⁶ See II 21.

which objects are judged and humans – as they themselves agree – have nothing through which they can judge except the senses and the intellect, then if we show that they can judge neither through the senses alone nor through intellect alone nor through both of them together, we shall have spoken concisely against all their particular opinions; for they all seem to be traceable back to these three positions.

[49] Let us begin with the senses. Since some say that the senses are affected vacuously (for none of the things they seem to grasp exists), while others assert that everything by which they think they are moved exists, and yet others that some of these things exist and some do not exist,⁶⁷ we shall not know to whom to give our assent. For we shall not decide the dispute with the senses (since we are investigating whether they are affected vacuously or truly apprehend things), nor yet with anything else (for there is no other standard through which we should judge, according to the hypothesis before us). [50] It will therefore be undecidable and inapprehensible whether the senses are affected vacuously or apprehend something; from which it follows that we must not attend to the senses alone in judging objects – for we cannot say of them whether they apprehend anything at all.

[51]⁶⁸ But suppose it to be the case, by way of concession, that the senses are capable of grasping things. Even so, they will nonetheless be found unconvincing with regard to judging external existing objects. After all, the senses are moved in contrary ways by external objects⁶⁹ – e.g. taste, by the same honey, is now affected bitterly, now sweetly, and sight takes the same colour to be now blood-red, now white. [52] Nor does smell agree with itself – after all, people with headaches say that myrrh is unpleasant and people not in this state say that it is pleasant. People who are possessed or mad think that they hear others talking to them when we do not hear anything. The same water seems unpleasant to the feverish because of excessive heat, but lukewarm to others. [53] Now whether one should say that all

⁶⁷ Cf. *M* VIII 213, 354–5 (where Sextus' paradigms for the three groups are Democritus, Epicurus and Zeno the Stoic).

⁶⁸ With II 51–2 compare *M* VII 345–6.

⁶⁹ The following illustrations are taken from the fourth of the Ten Modes, I 101 (with the exception of the colours, for which see I 44). Note that *M* VII 345 refers explicitly to the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.