

## THE MEANING OF TASTE AND THE TASTE OF MEANING

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Taste turns out to be a sense that is more complex, subtle, and worthy of interest than its placement in the history of philosophy would suggest. The sense of taste is an educable faculty, as the dizzying variety of eating preferences displayed across the globe testify. At the same time, as physiologists and psychologists have demonstrated, there are a number of inborn, universal preferences, such as attraction to sweet and salt and aversion to bitter. These responses not only account for common likes and dislikes but seem to be the foundation for common meanings assigned to flavors. A question that remains to be addressed is whether the educability and discrimination of taste permit a defense of its aesthetic importance. Can taste experiences be legitimately considered genuine aesthetic experiences?

This question needs to be paired with a related and equally important one concerning the status of food as art. This is not a simple question about linguistic habits, for terms such as "culinary art" are both widely used and perfectly clear. But the question persists: Is the artistic potential for food comparable in its own domain to the artistic potential for sound to be transformed into music, for pigments to become paintings, words to form poems? Opinion leans heavily to the negative. . . . Taste and food have had their advocates, however. A few brave theorists have defended the aesthetic potential for the enjoyment of taste, and yet others have gone on to argue on behalf of the artistic possibilities of food and drink. . . .

Elizabeth Telfer does make a case for food as an art form, though decidedly not a major one. The concept of art she employs considers the defining feature of an artwork to be its status as an object for aesthetic consideration. Carefully planned and presented meals organize eating sequentially, harmonizing the flavors and textures to be experienced. This kind of cooking, she believes, qualifies as the making of food as art, an art that is appreciated through aesthetic eating. The kind of art that food represents, however, is simple compared to symphonies, buildings, poems, or paintings. The medium of food has four limitations that preclude its development into a proper fine art. First of all, as Prall also notes, the formal arrangements and expressive range possible

are far more restricted in food than in the fine art media.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Telfer argues, food is a transient medium. While recipes may linger, actual meals are consumed and their remnants disposed of. Foods therefore cannot garner the studied appreciation over time that elevates especially fine products of more durable media such as paintings and poetry into canonicity. Third, she claims that unlike other arts, foods do not have meaning.

To begin with, food does not represent anything else, as most literature and much visual art does. We can see the representational arts – painting and literature – as telling us something about the world and ourselves, and we can see the world and ourselves in the light of ways in which they have been depicted in the representational arts. But we cannot do either of these things with food. This is an important way in which some of the arts have meanings which food cannot have.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, food cannot express emotion (though a cook may "express herself" and feelings such as love for friends in the act of cooking). Nor can it move us in the way great art can. Its aesthetic and artistic limitations lead Telfer to conclude that while food affords aesthetic enjoyment and can be considered a simple art, it is also a *minor* art. This is not intended to be a criticism of food, just a recognition of its nature: "we must not be so heedless as to waste a satisfying kind of aesthetic experience, but not so precious as to expect more of it than it can give."<sup>3</sup> A similar sentiment is expressed by Frank Sibley: "Perfumes, and flavours, natural or artificial, are necessarily limited: unlike the major arts, they have no expressive connections with emotions, love or hate, death, grief, joy, terror, suffering, yearning, pity, or sorrow, or plot or character development. But this need not put them out of court."<sup>4</sup> This conclusion may be found as well in other defenses of food as an art form – but not a major art form – including that of the anthropologist Mary Douglas. Douglas believes the display function of food and its occasional dissociation from nourishment is reason to class certain types of foods with the *decorative* arts.<sup>5</sup> It seems that whatever pleasures food can deliver and however refined cuisine may become, it is in the end just pleasure, after all, and offers less to our minds and imaginations than do more important art forms.

Given the concept of the aesthetic Telfer employs, she has articulated a cogent and sympathetic defense of food as art. Yet it is a pallid victory if there is nothing more to be said. Gustatory delectation is a positive pleasure, and a discriminating palate is perhaps as hard to come by as a musical ear. But . . . any brief for foods that focuses on the enjoyment of the sensation of tasting alone is going to reach a limit very quickly. Without question good food is enjoyable, and a discrimination that is difficult and educable pays dividends in taste pleasures. The case that the perceptual discrimination and enjoyment of taste are at least close cousins, phenomenally speaking, to aesthetic discrimination and enjoyment is fairly easy to make. We can travel down this road to gourmet land and the haute cuisine that marks the dining possibilities of an elite, but

the deeper kinds of significance granted works of art will not appear so long as refined enjoyment is the highest end of eating. Discriminating and relishing fine distinctions are only one part of aesthetic apprehension. Omitted are the insight, emotion, and deepened understanding that are expected from encounters with important aesthetic objects. Since among the latter are works of art, this merges into consideration of the status of food as art and a comparison of foods and drink with artworks. A case for comparability in this domain is harder to make, not because the grounds for comparison are absent but because of the tendency to continue attention to gourmet eating and fine dining when one seeks to understand the aesthetic qualities of food. Therefore, if we want to pursue the parallels between food and standard art forms beyond pleasant savoring and cultivated discrimination, we need to inquire about the possibilities for the cognitive dimensions of taste and food....

## REPRESENTATIONAL FOOD

Many philosophers, including Telfer, have concurred that food does not represent anything outside itself and thus fails in one of the standard tasks of art, to deliver understanding and insight about life and the world. The disclosure of the symbolic functions of food will dispel that misunderstanding. The most obvious example of symbolic food, what would be classified as representational food, is food that is crafted to look like something other than itself. The examples I offer may appear at first to be incidental, perhaps even frivolous, but they direct attention to the pervasiveness of meaning in foods. In fact, representational foods are quite common. Consider the following very limited list:

- Gummy bears, candy canes, sugar skulls, cinnamon hearts, candy corn, the metaphorical chocolate kiss
- Gingerbread men, hamentaschen, hot cross buns, pretzels, croissants, braided breads, chocolate Yule logs
- Radish roses, goldfish crackers, melon boats, vegetables cut and assembled into bouquets of flowers
- Easter eggs, butter lambs, molded gelatins shaped like stars, tequila sunrises, birthday cakes in the shape of basketballs, wedding cakes that look like temples, carved ice sculptures flanking a buffet table
- The bread and wine of the Christian Eucharist.

These few examples are hardly all comparable in the significance that their representations possess. Most of them appear to be more or less sui generis cases of nondenoting representations, shaped foods that are fun or witty or pleasant or decorative. (The bread

and wine of the Eucharist are a striking exception and possibly appear shocking lined up with the other cases). But they illustrate the intriguing fact that an enormous amount of what we put into our mouths represents (in some sense or other) something else. Many such instances derive from actual representations of things or events, though if their popularity persists long enough, that function may be lost to awareness and they may lose their original significance.

Consider the pretzel. In Italy, where pretzels are said to have been invented, the word denominating this food is *bracciatelli*, which translates into English as "folded arms." In the early seventeenth century, an inventive monk twisted a string of dough and baked it into the curved outline of the arms of a brother at prayer to dispense as a reward for his pupils who recited their catechism correctly.<sup>6</sup> In some parts of Europe pretzels are a Lenten food, and presumably there the curls of the snack are recognized to denote the folded arms of a monk.... When the monk representation is pointed out, the experience of eating a pretzel is transformed very slightly and perhaps achieves the aesthetic predicate "witty." The food takes on a new, expressive dimension, and the aesthetic apprehension of the pretzel expands.

Another familiar food that began its life as a symbol is the croissant. Croissants were invented in Vienna in 1683. In celebration of the successful defense of the city against the Ottoman Turks, Viennese bakers crafted little buns in the shape of the crescent moon on the flag of their enemies. In this case, not only is the crescent shape recognized as denoting the foreign enemy, but the fact that one *devours* the crescent reenacts the defeat of the invaders, and perhaps also represents Christianity conquering Islam. How long such references continue to function will vary greatly with time and place, and in this case the representational function of croissants is only a historical curiosity. But it is a curiosity with a lesson that cautions against any easy dismissal of the representational possibilities of food. The fact that crafting an item of daily bread was so readily turned to triumphant commemoration should indicate the easy commerce between food and shared social significance, a significance manifest in the symbolic use of foods.

Some of the most famous food representations have been intended to deceive, and hence qualify as a type of illusionism. Such is the case with items of the meal satirized by Petronius in his account of Trimalchio's feast in the *Satyricon*, during which apparent live boats turn out to be skins filled with birds, cooked fish seem to swim in their sauces, a hare sprouts wings, and dishes that look like piglets are really sweet cakes. But we need not rely only on such legendary excesses; a visit to a Japanese restaurant will provide plenty of examples: carrots trimmed into small turtles and fish, or radishes and onions mimicking bunches of tiny flowers. Here there are also deceptive possibilities, such as the pale-green leaf shapes that appear to be the uninitiated to be bland substances such as mashed avocado but are actually putted horseradish. Employing Goodman's idiom, we could say that these are leaf-representations that metaphorically extemply coolness but possess furious hotness. The combination might be described as ironic....

A little reflection reveals that representation in food of a similar sort, if less elaborately crafted, is fairly common, though it is most dramatic when the meal involved is part of a ceremony. (The sugar skulls in the list above are a component of the celebration of the Day of the Dead in Mexico. Their design is contiguous with the practice of serving an entire ceremonial meal to the dead.) Ceremonies provide some of the most sustained and complex instances of symbolic function . . . In the European Middle Ages commemorative set pieces accompanied certain state or ecclesiastical banquets, at which the events or people being honored were represented in food sculptures displayed between courses: scenes from the Holy Land presented to knights returning from a crusade, or biblical tableaux and saints for archbishops. Often central components of such displays required that the skins of animals and birds be reassembled with their cooked contents, which presented chefs with the considerable challenge of resurrecting a peacock, deer, or swan and posing it in a convincingly lifelike posture. These creations perhaps skirt the borderland of "foods," for they were chiefly for display and parade and were not eaten, though the fact that their media were edible is part of their artistry. (Edible in theory, anyway. Revel reports that such presentations were often accompanied by an unappetizing stench from the decomposing skins into which the spiced and cooked meats were stuffed.) These creations raise the question of the boundaries of culinary art, and just where the experience of eating stops and starts. Shortly I shall address the ceremonial function of foods. At issue now, however, is the extent to which the sheer artistry of symbolic foods alone — the difficulty attendant on rendering them, the skill required, and the accomplishment of the finished product — qualifies these sorts of displays as art.

Obvious reference to objects and events make these foods representational, and to that degree the claim that foods cannot represent or refer to anything outside themselves is demonstrably false. The types of representation include denotation (reference to an existing individual or actual event) and representation-as (food that is shaped like something else but does not refer to any particular thing). The problem at this stage of analysis seems to be that such representations appear to have a frivolous, unnecessary quality that makes the food interesting and curious but not necessarily profound or important. . . . Shortly I shall supply a way to understand food that minimizes this suspicion, but even then stunt cuisine alone will not serve as a central or paradigm example of what is most important about eating. At best, it sustains the characterization of cooking as a decorative art, to use Douglas's classification. And indeed much food artistry is for decorative purposes, as traditions of techniques for carving and cutting demonstrate. For centuries before Carême noble kitchens employed carvers for the preparation of meats and fruits, and a cookbook of the twentieth century continues this tradition with an appendix devoted to garnishes that announces that "garnishes are to foods what lace collars, belt buckles, and costume jewelry are to dresses."<sup>7</sup> The decorative capacities of food appear to be well established. So far, however, even the

extravagant displays of Carême can do little to extend the artistic value of foods beyond decoration.

Moreover, we may also note an objection to decorative food that points to an adventurous element to the representational capacities of food: the examples of symbolic function in food discussed above are largely the result of *visual* manipulation.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, an Easter egg is a symbol of rebirth and renewal, partly because an egg literally houses new life but also partly because of its roundish shape — the endlessness of the edge of a sphere. The pretzel denotes a praying figure because of loops it makes that also could be made with a pencil. The churchish could complain that nothing especially "culinary" resides in these examples, and that their representational forms are simply derived from the repertoire of the objects of vision.

This objection indicates the need to extend recognition of the symbolic features of food yet further, to which task I shall turn momentarily. First, however, I acknowledge that much of the representational value of foods does indeed rely on information provided by other senses, particularly vision. To me this is not an indication of a poverty of symbolic possibility for food but an illustration of the unremarkable fact that the experience of eating involves more than one sense. We have already invited smell into the company of taste, fully considered, and texture as well, which makes use of the sense of touch. The crunch and slurp of food involves hearing (there are Japanese dishes for which audible slurping is prescribed), and the preparation of a table is carefully attuned to visual pleasure.

But more can be said by way of response, both for the fact that sometimes what is seen is also eaten and for the symbolic function of the taste sensation itself. The fact that when a croissant was eaten the defeated Ottomans were metaphorically consumed involves the medium of food intimately. The croissant is still a symbol relying on visual representation, though its edibility enters dramatically into the enactment of its meaning. Nonetheless, representation (both denotation and representation-as) is but one mode of symbol that food achieves. It is when we examine [the] concept of exemplification that the pervasiveness of the symbolic function of food is most clearly demonstrated.

### EXEMPLIFICATION

Exemplification, the symbolic relation in which an object both possesses a property and refers to it, is possibly the most common symbol type that food offers, for virtually any food exemplifies. That is, it refers and calls attention to some of the properties of what is eaten, presenting them for special notice and assessment or enjoyment through direct experience. In fact, the gourmet exercising a discriminating palate is attending to the properties exemplified in food and drink. These are not simply qualities that the food happens to possess. The gourmet does not direct attention to incidental properties that

do not represent the aspects of food that demand appreciation. She does not care, for example, about the weight of the sow that discovered the truffles on the plate; she cares only about the taste properties of the truffles themselves. If she cares about when they were gathered and where they were found, it is insofar as such facts account for exemplified properties of taste. Note that when the claim is put this way, it does not fall prey to the complaint that taste directs attention only to the subjective state of one's own body. Attention to exemplified properties is attention directed to the object of perception via the taste sensations that it is capable of delivering. . . . The symbolic relation of exemplification refers to qualities possessed by the object of experience. True, they are experienced in the mouth. But this is simply a signal that we are in the domain of taste.

Chicken soup, for example, possesses a variety of properties, such as flavor, saliness, and a somewhat oily texture. The ingredients are more or less present in the final product, and the sipper of soup may attend to them appreciatively (perhaps while at the same time assuaging hunger or dosing a cold). The property of (say) a subdued hint of parsnip well cloaked by onion and dill is exemplified in the soup in much the same way that being in a minor key may be exemplified in music or being blue exemplified by certain Picasso paintings.

These aesthetic characteristics are taste's version of aesthetic savoring and are familiar under other descriptions. They are also the most frequent sorts of evaluations and *encomia* one encounters in food writing. Exemplification enfolds the sensuous elements of taste experience — the quality of flavor, the blends or conflicts of sensations, as well as the pleasures. Thus this particular symbolic function, inseparable from the felt qualities of sensation, recasts in other vocabulary the most common defense of the aesthetic experience of food, but makes clear that the relish and enjoyment is more than subjective delectation, though it is that as well.

Because food exemplifies a multitude of complex sensory relationships of different tastes, smells, and textures, any meal (perhaps excepting K-rations, astronaut food, and the airline snack) also possesses what Goodman terms relative repleteness — that condition in which "comparatively many aspects of a symbol are significant." "Relative repleteness" is just a way of stating that a large range of the properties available to the sense are relevant to its appreciative assessment. Interestingly, this term of the aesthetic, "repleteness," like "taste" itself, is also part of the gastronomic vocabulary.

These types of exemplified properties, all of which refer to the taste qualities to which attention is drawn, are familiar in terms of the savoring and enjoyment of eating. Exemplification extends further than taste experience *per se*, however, and enters into the kinds of meanings that we absorb so deeply from our cultural practice that they are often lost to conscious awareness. The sorts of foods we eat at different times of the day vary, and in fact certain kinds of foods come to "mean" the meal that they provide. Oatmeal conveys the meaning of breakfast, for example, in those cultures where cereals

constitute a typical first meal of the day. Examination of this sort of meaning gives us more senses in which foods may exemplify.

Possibly the nearest relative to a cognitivist account of food has been articulated by structuralist anthropologists. They assume that human behavior falls into patterns or structures that are similar no matter what the task at hand, and that activities such as cooking and eating, and indeed choosing what is considered edible, make most sense when compared with other aspects of a society's activities and belief systems. In Claude Lévi-Strauss's famous trope, for example, "raw" and "cooked" are oppositions that are isomorphic with other binaries (such as nature-culture and male-female), which taken together illuminate the myths and social practices of vastly divergent societies.<sup>9</sup> Mary Douglas considers food as a "system of communication," and she speculates about how food might be understood as an art form.<sup>10</sup>

If food is to be considered as an art form it would be necessary first to choose questions which could be asked equally well of other art forms, and then to identify an area of problems which are specific to the food medium. Having first distinguished what kind of art form food is amongst the others in that culture, it would then be right to ask how does the local food art compare with other food arts in other cultures.<sup>11</sup>

Considering eating practices in her home country, England, Douglas observes that because food has a practical function, nourishment, it is appropriately grouped with the applied arts such as clothing, architecture, and utensils, rather than with the fine arts of music, sculpture, and painting. (When food is for display, as we have already noted, Douglas classifies it more specifically as an applied decorative art.) Hence the aesthetic elements in foods are those that are distinct from nutrition and are "subject to pattern-making rules" just like the fine arts. The sensory qualities of food are a big part of its aesthetic aspect. Food can have its own distinctive patterns of acceptable textures, smells, tastes, and colors; or sometimes (as with representational foods) it borrows from the registers of other art forms. Appropriate qualities for foods may transfer from standards of social behavior; for example, smooth, refined foods for formal occasions (structurally similar to silks and satins) and rough-textured foods for informal gatherings (where denim or tweed may be worn). Eating practices are also heavily patterned by social relations and class: what people eat and when, as well as with whom, varies according to their job and economic status. Generally speaking, "if food is treated as a code, the messages it encodes will be found in the pattern of social relations being expressed. The message is about different degrees of hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and transactions across the boundaries."<sup>12</sup>

Not only can eating be analyzed according to the social patterns it manifests, single meals have their own structure as well. Which combinations of foods count as meals

depend on their sequence, their mixture of liquids and solids, of meats and vegetables and starches, the utensils required for their consumption, and the time of their service. Little of these patterns is supplied by the biological need for nutrition; they are the result of accumulated traditions and practices that culminate in the recognition of certain foods as edible, as constituting meals, as tasting good. All these recognitions, exercised so routinely that they are rarely even present to awareness, demand complex "cognitive energy."<sup>13</sup>

Douglas's disclosure of the structures that order eating and the classification of foods is illuminating for several elements of the "meaning" of food. Particularly insightful are her discoveries about what is recognizable as edible and the isolation of "meals," as well as what we may call the social hierarchies present in eating habits: the kinds of foods eaten, who eats with whom, and so on. (One shares meals with friends and equals, for example.) The structures of eating reveal a good deal about large social patterns and are thus aptly descriptive of behavior. Often they are so inculcated in practice that they are not sufficiently obvious to consciousness to constitute an "experience" at all, but they may be brought into the focus of awareness with a little attention. Such implicit meanings may be understood as exemplified properties.

To wit: one wakes up in the morning and brews coffee. Toast, butter, and cereal complete this American-style breakfast. That the coffee is freshly ground and particularly savory, or that the toast is whole wheat rather than white this morning, may be the only exemplifications noticed by a sleepy eater. The other properties exemplified by this breakfast, however, are unnoticed only because they are habitual. Transport this person to Norway and serve him small silver fish and dark orange cheese redolent of goat, and he will surely take note of the fact that these foods do not "mean" breakfast to him. Not only are they not the types of foods he ordinarily encounters upon waking (a rather conservative time of ingestion) but they offer the kinds of tastes that seem more appropriate to lunchtime. Even more dramatic is the difference between cereal and the cooked rice dishes that he would be offered in China. Such national differences in what is eaten and when produce different exemplified properties, different "meanings" embodied in the foods. It is an obvious point, but the fact that tastes are always embedded in meanings is so often overlooked that the obvious is worth stating.

### EXPRESSIVE FOODS

Exemplification has offered us two types of features of foods and their tastes: the particular properties that are savored and enjoyed in foods, which qualify conventionally as the aesthetic experience of taste according even to noncognitivist analyses; and the implicit properties that food acquires when it occupies a particular place in the rhythm of nourishment that is represented by mealtimes. We have not yet explored to any extent . . . expressive properties.

In these instances, the property possessed and referred to by the food is one that applies metaphorically. The example given earlier was the property "sinister" applied to an apple. Obviously, this is not a property that usually applies to apples, metaphorically or literally; in the context of the story of Snow White, an apple is sinister because it is poisoned and because it was malevolently prepared to bring about the death of Snow White. There are numerous cases in which expressive properties attach to foods because of the particular context of a story, but there are also more ordinary cases in which foods come to express certain properties because of the traditional or routine circumstances of their preparation.

Chicken soup, again, is a home remedy of sorts in a number of cultures. There may be some medical reason for this custom; the healthful reintroduction of salt and liquid into a body that is dehydrated from fever has been suggested. Such palliative features are not likely to be a part of the experience of the soup, however; more relevant for the expressive properties such as "soothing" and "comforting" that are exemplified by chicken soup is the very fact that it is a home remedy and *means* that one is being taken care of. The expression of care that soup exemplifies is supported by the literal properties that soup also has: a rich but not taxing flavor, ingredients that are easy to swallow, and so on. The expression of this kind of property by foods may be culturally dispersed, localized in smaller groups such as families, or even perhaps a product of the habits of individuals.

Sometimes the expressive potential of foods exploits what seem to be the natural disposition of some flavors to be liked or disliked. Sweet, as we have seen, is one of the basic flavors that all people like, whatever their differences in securing particular sweet substances. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that sweet foods are used in ritual ceremonies to signal prosperity or luck. At the Jewish New Year, for example, bread is dipped in honey to signal a promise of hope and prosperity for the coming year. During ritual meals Hindus offer something sweet to eat in honor of the gods. Salt is needed for survival; it is also a universally sought-after taste in moderation, as physiological studies have demonstrated. Recognition of the significance of salt is formalized in the hospitality practices of several cultures. According to traditional code, one who breaks bread and shares salt with a Bedouin thereby achieves that person's protection, a custom that has also entered into literary tradition and into the expression "to share the salt with" or to "break bread with" in English. One word for hospitality in Russian means literally "bread-salt."<sup>14</sup> Conversely, the *Weyerwa* of Indonesia may quietly rebuke one who violates the social code by offering him nuts of particular bitterness.<sup>15</sup> Such examples confirm a certain common expressive quality recognized in the basic tastes reviewed in the last chapter, which seem to lend themselves to being considered natural symbols when deliberately employed as flavors of food and drink.

The potential for even a simple, basic flavor to convey complex propositional understanding is illustrated at some length by an old English fairy tale, which shows us



something of the direct, intimate force of understanding possible by means of the sense of taste. The title of the story is the nickname of its heroine, "Capornushes." It tells of a rich man who demanded professions of love from his three daughters. "I love you as I love my life" was the satisfactory answer of the first. "Better than all the world beside," said the second, and was also approved. The youngest (and of course the prettiest) daughter avoided clichés and described her love thoughtfully with a humble kitchen comparison: "I love you as fresh meat loves salt!" she said. Believing himself slighted, the father banished her from his household. The girl wandered until she came to a fen; then, fearing robbers, she wore herself a concealing cloak and hat of rushes to cover her rich dress and jeweled hair. So disguised, she took up an anonymous life as a scullery maid in the house of a neighboring noble. Some time later the son and heir of the manor fell in love with the beautiful scullery girl, and they became betrothed. Her father, grief-stricken and now blind, was invited to the wedding feast. Knowing he would be present, the bride ordered no salt to be used in preparation of the meal. As the story is told:

Now when the company sat down to table their faces were full of smiles and content, for all the dishes looked so nice and tasty; but no sooner had the guests begun to eat than their faces fell, for nothing can be tasty without salt.

Then Capornushes' blind father, whom his daughter had seated next to her, burst out crying.

"What is the matter?" she asked.

Then the old man sobbed, "I had a daughter whom I loved dearly, dearly. And I asked her how much she loved me, and she replied, 'As fresh meat loves salt.'

And I was angry with her and turned her out of house and home, for I thought she didn't love me at all. But now I see she loved me best of all."

And then – for it is a fairy story – "as he said the words his eyes were opened, and there beside him was his daughter lovelier than ever."<sup>16</sup>

This simple story illuminates several features of a discovery of a "truth" through immediate sense experience. Both literally and figuratively, the father is made to "see" his daughter's love through the taste of unseasoned meat. Moreover, what he comes to see or know through the exercise of the sense of taste is clearly an instance of propositional knowledge (that his daughter loved him and captured that love with reference to meat and salt). At the same time, what he discovers qualifies as a more or less commonplace truth, an obvious insight demanding little cogitation. The reader has had no difficulty from the start in recognizing the declaration of love in the words of the youngest daughter; the reader does not require the taste of the meat to know the meaning of her words. Everyone knows that food is more tasty with salt. What delivers the particular revelation to this sad father?

The circumstances of the wedding feast provide a context for his discovery. There is a wedding, an occasion for celebration; yet there is also grief and remorse over a lost, beloved child. We assume that the father has dwelt upon her words and his harsh response repeatedly. The sudden, unexpected, unmistakable taste of unseasoned meat brings home the pain of her rejected declaration of love. He *knows* viscerally, intimately, literally at a "gut level" that she loved him and that he cast her out unjustly. The sequence of events in the story and the particular position of the father focus the sense quality of saltless meat and its meaning in a discovery, an epiphany; *this* was her profession of love; *this* was my loss.

Philosophers have long struggled to reconcile two apparently opposing insights about aesthetic apprehension, especially when the object of attention is a work of art: on the one hand, art seems to afford unique, particular, and indispensable insights about life and experience. Yet on the other hand, when one is pressed to say just what a particular work of art "says," the reply is often something close to a truism. This tale helps us to see how both insights are reconcilable. It is significant that the father became blind after he banished his daughter, a signal of his stubborn refusal to recognize her love, even of his limited understanding of language, for he was expecting a more lofty statement and was not flexible enough to recognize the originality and force of her words. Through the revelation afforded him by taste, he gains wisdom, happiness, and vision both literal and figurative. He had not only to know her love "intellectually," as it were, but to *feel* the force of it. The power of the sensory experience of saltless meat can be delivered *only* through this "subjective" route: apprehending with one's whole being – mind and body – what before was recognized only intellectually. This is the force of "aesthetic" apprehension: that some truth or realization or discovery is delivered in a way that touches one intimately, that focuses and concentrates insight with the poignant immediacy of the blind father's taste of saltless meat. (So read, this little story confirms the reason taste was considered so suitable as a metaphor for aesthetic experience.) . . .

### CEREMONIES AND RITUALS

The cognitive significance of food is an effect of reference, representation, expression, exemplification, and the social conditions of its preparation and serving. Not all eating has much significance, but any ceremonial meal possesses it in abundance. Virtually all cultures and religions practice ceremonial eating, and so again a few examples must suffice to demonstrate the symbolic functioning of this kind of activity.

Festival meals can be analyzed by considering their individual components, their social context, and the fact of the meal as a whole. In the United States the fall holiday of Thanksgiving supposedly reenacts and thereby refers to the survival of an early European settlement through the harsh Massachusetts winter of 1621, during which

time they would have starved without the good offices of the local Indians. This allusion to a happy relationship between peoples who were often at odds is vague and romantic, and the cynical might call this a case of fictional representation rather than denotation. Nonetheless, the reference to this historical event, whatever its actual character may have been, is important and makes the entire dinner itself representational. In keeping with the idea that the meal commemorates fellowship and community, it is ideally a large dinner among family and friends. There is a limited menu that recreates what is popularly believed to be the first Thanksgiving feast, including turkey and root vegetables. The food is hot, savory, and heavy – the kind of slowly digested sustenance that ushers in cold months. Literal exemplified properties such as warmth, flavor, texture, and weight contribute to the metaphoric exemplified properties of comfort, well-being, and plenty. In commoner parlance, the meal has a languid, comforting quality that is exaggerated by the habit of putting too much on the table and inducing torpor. The menu relies very much on tradition; innovation is frowned upon. There must be a turkey with stuffing and cranberry sauce, gravy, and several pies, including pumpkin or sweet potato, harvest vegetables not ordinarily associated with dessert at other times of the year. The choice of green vegetables, breads, and additional foods is optional, but without the core turkey the meal is unrecognizable as Thanksgiving. The selection of foods is so prescribed by tradition that many are prepared only at this time.

With the Thanksgiving meal, as with many ritual occasions, the conservative combination of foods indicates the degree to which it is the entire meal itself that acts as a symbol. The various dishes contribute to the expressive quality of the whole, and some of them also refer to events of the first Thanksgiving (the turkey to a bird native to the North American woods, the squash and other root vegetables to seasonal fare and approaching winter, cranberries to a food uniquely available to the region in colonial America). Their seasonal position is experienced as part of the experience of eating, which imparts awareness of a particular time of year. The fact that seasonal festivals are repeated is a critical part of the experience of eating. One is aware of oneself participating yet again in a cyclical celebration, one that is never quite the same as festivals of time past yet retains an enduring identity over time.<sup>17</sup> This is an indispensable element of all rituals, that they occur over and over, that the diner takes his or her place among others participating in similar rituals of dinner; that one time is ending and another beginning. Possibly one reason why sometimes foods taste good only during their relevant festivals is that their meaning is so restricted to that time.

Another festival meal illustrates even more legislated symbolic functions for foods. The Jewish Passover seder commemorates the exodus of the Jews from captivity in Egypt, and by extension the freedom of all peoples from slavery. A religious ritual meal such as this is rich with symbolic relations manifest not only in the visual presentation of foods but also in their very tastes. In the center of the table is the seder plate, and on it are placed six foods that are part of the ceremony that opens and closes the meal: the

roasted shank bone of a lamb, a roasted egg, bitter herbs, *charoses* (a mixture of ground nuts, honey, and apples), parsley or chervil, and a dish of salt water. The bitter herbs signify bondage and sorrow in Egypt. This symbolic value does not depend on visual properties; the herbs metaphorically exemplify sorrow by means of their sharp taste. The small bowl of salt water denotes (and indeed chemically replicates) the tears shed in captivity, and the parsley, indicating the renewal of spring, is dipped in the salt water and eaten. The *charoses* symbolizes with its texture the mortar the Jews used in building temples for the Egyptians, and it is eaten in combination with the bitter herbs (which may be horseradish or a sharp-tasting green herb). The egg stands for renewal of life, and the shank bone for the Paschal lamb eaten in commemoration of the Passover itself, the fact that God passed over the houses of the Jews and slew the firstborn of the Egyptian captors.

No risen bread is eaten during the ten days of Passover observance, in commemoration for the flight from Egypt, which necessitated taking bread from ovens before it had time to rise. The matzo that signifies this aspect of the exodus exemplifies the properties of unleavened bread, as opposed to merely possessing the properties, as any cracker may do. It also metaphorically exemplifies or expresses haste and urgency, and by all these means it commemorates the biblical event and its continued significance.

Some ritual foods of the seder plate are present and tasted but not actually consumed. The lamb shank bone simply sits on the plate and is raised and replaced during the ceremony. Salt water has emetic properties and cannot be more than tasted. Thus many foods with important symbolic functions are not actually to be eaten, in the sense that their role is not one of nourishment or of sensory enjoyment and delectation. Nevertheless they not only are part of the meal, they also have a significance that is manifest in the act of tasting. Passover also has standard foods that are eaten chiefly at that time, as does Thanksgiving. (Because it is a much older and more dispersed festival – many centuries old and celebrated all over the world – local customs for choice of those foods vary.) And as with many religious practices, there are also prescribed means of preparing foods, some of which alter their taste from the way they would be experienced at other seasons. (Matzo flour, for example, must be substituted in any recipe that otherwise would call for wheat flour.) The regional differences in the enactment of the Passover seder, including the different foods considered traditional, do not disturb the identity of the ceremony.

The profound importance of foods that are not actually to be eaten as part of a meal is also illustrated by the Christian sacrament of the Eucharist.<sup>18</sup> This is the liturgical rendering of the Passover seder Christ held with his disciples, though the meaning of the substances and what is considered "tasting" and "eating" have altered with the change of religious belief and the circumstances in which the foods are encountered. The water and wine of Communion denote the body and blood of Christ. If one subscribes to the doctrine of transubstantiation, they actually become those substances,

in which case the body and blood are literally re-presented: present again to the congregation. The Communion bread and wine metaphorically exemplify or express the events foreshadowed by the Last Supper – the agony in the garden of Gethsemane, the crucifixion, and the resurrection. These instances of bread and wine are both food and not food. They are tasted and swallowed, but not for nourishment. The tastes of the bread and when permitted of the wine – for not all churches allow the laity to drink of the blood of Christ – occasion reflection of the profoundest sort. The fact that the sacrament is actually taken into the body indicates the most direct participation in the mystical reenactment of God's sacrifice, one that the exercise of any sense other than taste might not render so intimate.

Not only eating but also its opposite should be considered as part of the ritual meanings of foods, for fasts as well as feasts are observances of many religions, such as Lent, Ramadan, Yom Kippur. When expedient, fasting may be incorporated into the religious practices of daily life, as with the Ethiopian church that demands one fast day a week – not only penance and self-discipline, perhaps, but prudent rationing of food resources in a country where food distribution is difficult.<sup>19</sup> Periods when one should neither exercise the sense of taste nor nourish the body are significant; they nourish the soul, for the assumption is that the body's comfort is a hindrance to probing reflections of the spirit. In this way the very hierarchy of the senses is incorporated into the rhythms and meanings of eating practices.

These examples indicate that the customs and beliefs of the ambient culture contribute to the meanings of foods, and reciprocally foods themselves contribute to the defining characteristics of a culture. The tea ceremony of Japan is a practice of Zen Buddhism and manifests (exemplifies) the values of that philosophy. It involves far more than just drinking tea, for the ceremony is a staged event that prescribes ideal qualities for the physical surroundings and for the utensils to be used. It invites engagement with all the senses and fosters meditation on the meaning of the experience. D.T. Suzuki describes the art of tea drinking in terms of the Zen value of simplicity. The hut for the ceremony is spare, nestled in a spot chosen for vegetation, view, water, wind. The preparation of the tea is unhurried; the tastes are delicate, indeed all the sensations surrounding the event are soft and harmonious. Here is Zen Master Takuan's description of a tea ceremony:

Let us then construct a small room in a bamboo grove or under trees, arrange streams and rocks and plant trees and bushes, while [inside the room] let us pile up charcoal, set a kettle, arrange flowers, and arrange in order the necessary tea utensils. And let all this be carried out in accordance with the idea that in this room we can enjoy the streams and rocks as we do the rivers and mountains in Nature, and appreciate the various moods and sentiments suggested by the snow, the moon, and the trees and flowers, as they go through the transformation of seasons,

appearing and disappearing, blooming and withering. As visitors are greeted here with due reverence, we listen quietly to the boiling water in the kettle, which sounds like a breeze passing through the pine needles, and become oblivious of all worldly woes and worries.<sup>20</sup>

The meaning of tea in this setting – its simplicity, its harmony, its conduciveness to mental clarity and awareness of the flow of life – indicates that the taste and other experiences afforded through this ceremony should be inflected and guided by a suitable and informed philosophic attitude. Indeed, simply tasting the tea alone would be an impoverished experience. It would lack the meaning, the significance, of tea. The tea itself may be said to exemplify some of these properties, for the quality of the liquid and of its service draw attention to the delicacy and subtlety of its flavor. Like any of the single dishes served at the festival meals mentioned above, however, it is a part of a complex whole and its meaning emerges from the entire event and the philosophical tradition it embodies and perpetuates.

## FOOD AND ART COMPARED

I have been presenting the case for the similarity of foods with works of art by demonstrating how . . . certain symbolic functions seem to be enacted by foods in much the same way that they are by works of art. . . . Ought we now to take the next step and conclude that foods also qualify as works of art in the full sense of the term? That they represent in their own medium the same sorts of objects as paintings, sculptures, poems, and symphonies? I do not believe we should. For one thing, the concept of art, dominated as it is today by the idea of *fine* art, is a poor category to capture the nature of foods and their consumption. While one earns a bit of stature for food by advancing it as an art form, the endeavor is apt to divert attention from the interesting ways in which the aesthetic importance of foods diverges from parallel values in art. Much of my argument has been devoted to correcting misunderstandings about the sense of taste and to defending the theoretical significance of food, but the discontinuities between meals and art should not be gainsaid. How ought we to characterize these dissimilarities without at the same time losing sight of the important similarities between foods and arts?

We may begin by considering again a possible objection to aesthetic meanings for foods that I have flagged from time to time: foods seem to be heavily dependent on either ceremonial context or personal or cultural narrative to attain their cognitive and aesthetic significance. The symbolic functions of food of the wider variety – those that involve expression and denotation in particular – seem to require a place in some cultural practice in order to come into being. Consequently, one may suspect that it is not the food itself that has meaning. Without its placement on the appropriate Thursday in



November, for instance, Thanksgiving is just another heavy meal; the food alone does not express the festival.<sup>21</sup> Without the surrounding story and the history of ritual, the individual items on the Passover table are just things to eat; without the tradition of Zen philosophy, displayed equally in the setting, the utensils, and the surroundings of the ceremony, the cup of tea is only a cup of tea. In short, foods and their tastes appear to depend inordinately on defining context if they are to achieve the cognitive significance that I am claiming underwrites their aesthetic standing.

Of course, one could grant this point and retreat to just one symbolic function, exemplification, as the basis for the aesthetic import of foods. Foods that are presented for the delight of the palate can be understood to exemplify their tastes. Yet it would be a sacrifice of richness and breadth for the significance of foods if this were the only grounds on which it could be aesthetically justified. It would be another way of claiming that well-prepared food tastes really good – and we knew that already. Therefore this suspicion regarding context dependence is to be taken seriously. Rather than constituting a brief against the cognitive and aesthetic dimensions of tastes and foods, however, these considerations illuminate two important discontinuities between foods and fine arts: the aesthetic functions of food exceed the qualities of the food itself, and food and art do not have parallel histories and traditions.

Consider the disparaging contrast one artist was moved to make between food and art. The composer Hector Berlioz was an acerbic critic of the music of his day, and on his travels in Italy he complained that the audiences of Milan were so boisterous and inattentive to the operas performed that one could hardly hear the music. In his *Memoirs* of 1832 he recorded this gripe: "To the Italians music is a sensual pleasure, and nothing more. For this most beautiful form of expression they have scarcely more respect than for the culinary art. They like music which they can assimilate at a first hearing, without reflection or attention, just as they would do with a plate of macaroni."<sup>22</sup>

One may have a higher opinion of both Italian opera and pasta and still acknowledge that Berlioz's complaint expresses an insight about the difference between eating and encountering art. It is not, however, that eating never provokes "reflection and attention," as he surmises. I hope that the examples of ritual and ceremonial eating and the complex situations in which foods and tastes exemplify metaphorical properties lay to rest the idea that tasting and eating are to be appreciated only for sensuous enjoyment. The uses of foods and drink for religious and commemorative purposes clearly foster, even force, reflection on the meaning of the event taking place, its location in culture and history, and its personal emotional import. Unlike music or other fine art, however, this sort of reflection – important as it is – is not a mark of greatness for food *as food*. Berlioz might complain about the quality of Italian comic opera, and his objection to the shallow fare served up by the composers of that genre – the fact that they appeal to the ear more than to the heart or mind – would be at the same time a complaint about the quality of the music, about whether it merits being considered

"great art." By contrast, many of the symbolic features of food may be fully present in food that is not particularly tasty but still serves the significant function of being part of a ceremonial event. To be sure, this is not the case for all aspects of taste and of food. For food to be "great" *as food*, its sensuous exemplified properties – those delivered for particular attention to the thoughtful diner – need to be especially fine. But it may represent, express, and otherwise signify without being haute cuisine; without, in other words, being particularly fine insofar as the "culinary art" is considered.

This feature of food is connected to the observation that foods require extended context to achieve their denotative and expressive meanings, that the items to eat *by themselves* do not always manage to carry their ritual or traditional or cultural significance. In certain cases meaning may become so attached to particular items that they indeed do stand alone by virtue of unique association. But in most instances fuller context is required for the foods to possess their symbolic functions. The reason is both very complex and rather obvious, though it tends to be obscured by the tendency to compare works of art to items of food on a case-by-case basis: the history of art and the history of food are not parallel. Thus what art has come to be and what food has come to be in our contemporary culture are not the same. This observation could lead to some intricate historical investigation, but I shall invoke only one fairly evident distinction: in the Western tradition there has developed a concept of *fine* art that is held to contrast to craft or to applied or decorative arts. Moreover, within the tradition of fine art, we also have the recent and still powerful legacy of the idea that aesthetic value is autonomous and intrinsic, that art is valuable for its own sake alone. The influence of this historical shift on the concept of art and on aesthetics has led us to consider the various cognitive and aesthetic qualities of works of art to inhere in the works themselves, free of surrounding context. Foods have no such history. Their aesthetic qualities emerge from practice and are embedded in the festivals and ceremonies and occasions in which they take on their fullest meanings. To try to compare a single meal or individual food with any given work of art is to yank that item from its context and impoverish its aesthetic import. It directs attention only to its exemplified qualities, and not even to all of those: the ones that remain to be relished free from ceremonial practices are just those *sensuous* exemplified qualities – the savor of the tastes themselves – that for all their undeniable pleasures do not fill the terrain of deeper aesthetic significance that foods display in their practical contexts, including ritual, ceremony, and commemoration. On its own food is assessed only for a relatively narrow band of exemplified properties; art is assessed for all symbolic functions.

Thus despite the similarities between food, drink, and artworks in terms of their cognitive significance and related aesthetic dimensions, there is a lack of symmetry between the features of foods that are comparable to central aesthetic features of art and the measure of the quality of the individual objects under assessment. This is probably why those who have advanced briefs on behalf of both the aesthetic and the

artistic significance of foods have fallen short of being able to assert their full status as works of art. Either food is denied the status altogether while being granted aesthetic value, as Prall argues, or foods are recognized as permitting a certain degree of artistic achievement but are relegated to a minor art form, as Telfer, Douglas, and perhaps even Revel maintain. I believe that insofar as they carry the same sort of aesthetic significance, understood as constituting a cognitive dimension in the sort of way that Goodman accommodates, food and drink merit aesthetic standing, and at the same time serve many of the same symbolic functions as do works of fine art. However, the latter role, which I believe makes foods deeply important and not just sensuously delightful, is not always paramount when the quality of cuisine is being evaluated. In this instance, the sensuous enjoyment of eating and drinking often legitimately takes the foreground, and the other symbolic functions of foods (expressive, representational, and so on) recede – unless, of course, fine cuisine is also a part of a ceremony, ritual, or commemoration. Even when the fare is scanty or poor and the sensuous enjoyment thereby lessened, however, the other symbolic functions of foods may still be of such importance that the festival, practice, or ritual of which eating is a component is in no way diminished.

So is food an art form? This does not seem to me to be the crucial question, though the commonalities between food and art are centrally significant for understanding what food is in its own right. Certainly food does not qualify as a fine art; it does not have the right history, to make a complex point in shorthand. Culinary art can still be considered a minor or a decorative art, or perhaps a functional or applied art (for we should not minimize the fact that eating is a daily aspect of living in the most literal sense of that term). The reasons advanced by Telfer, Revel, and Douglas are sufficient to support in this sense the artistic achievement of fine cooking, distilling, and winemaking. However, this warrant for the label "art" is not the most important link between food and art. It is much more significant that both form symbolic systems with similar components, though those components are not symmetrically related to the merits of the created products. The fine achievements of the cook, the winemaker, and others who prepare what we ingest are sometimes but not invariably a part of the most important aesthetic experiences of eating and drinking. These achievements need to be understood in related and overlapping ways, but ways that also acknowledge and preserve the distinctive roles that foods, tastes, and eating may assume.

Moreover, though I have disputed the dismissal of taste as a low, bodily sense from the beginning, my purpose has been not to elevate taste to the status of the distal senses but rather to point out the ways in which taste invites philosophical interest. Some portion of that interest is in the ranking of the senses itself, for the bodily element of the experience of eating has its own significance that contributes to the asymmetry between foods and fine art forms. It is not only that so many of the exemplified properties savored in food are sensuous (which is to say it tastes good). An important part of eating, drinking, and tasting is precisely that they signify the bodily, the mortal

part of existence. There is only a superficial irony in this claim: part of the importance of food, eating, and awareness of tasting, swallowing, digesting is that they do direct attention to the supposedly "lower" aspect of being human – the fact that we are animal and mortal. Eating is and must be rooted in a relentless routine of hunger, swallowing, satiety, and hunger again. No wonder sometimes we do not have the time for aesthetic attention to this demand. The significance of eating is ineluctably bodily, and the constancy of the rhythms of eating remind us of the transience of the activity. (In Hegel's words, "we can smell only what is in the process of wasting away, and we can taste only by destroying."<sup>12</sup>) Despite the fact that tasting and eating provide fully aesthetic cognition, I do not want to try to level the senses or their objects in such a way that the traditions that rank the senses disappear altogether. It will be more illuminating to probe the meanings assigned to foods and to eating, including aspects of what may appear at first to be their negative valence. This needs to be acknowledged so that the different reflections prompted by food and by tasting and eating may be rightly understood. The inescapable cycle of hunger and eating is in a sense commemorated by the fragility of food itself, which melts, collapses, is eaten and digested, for, molds, and decays. Because eating is a repetitive and transient experience, because food does not last but spoils, because it not only nourishes but poisons, eating is a small exercise in mortality. Rather than transcend time, as romantic ideas of art suggest is the goal of masterworks, food succumbs to time – as do we ourselves. This perhaps is the final reflection that tasting prompts: not just that it is pleasurable but that it fades so quickly.

## NOTES

- 1 See also Carolyn Korsmeyer, "On the aesthetic senses and the origin of fine art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 34(1) (Fall 1975).
- 2 See above, p. 27.
- 3 See above, p. 28.
- 4 Frank Sibley, "Tastes and smells and aesthetics," unpublished manuscript.
- 5 Mary Douglas, "Food as an art form," in *In the Active Voice* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 107.
- 6 Martin Ellort, *The Secret Life of Food* (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1991), p. 100.
- 7 *The Village Cookbook* (Scarsdale, NY, 1948) p. 325.
- 8 Kevin Sweeney raised this point to me.
- 9 Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked*, trans. John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, 1969). Lévi-Strauss is widely criticized among anthropologists – including those who share a structuralist approach, such as Mary Douglas – for imposing too rigid a structure of analysis on the phenomena under question.
- 10 Douglas, *In the Active Voice*, pp. 85–7. This "system" is closely connected to the social systems of rest, health and body care, clothing, and family. Ultimately, the patterns revealed in a study of such systems are heavily influenced by social power relations.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 106.

12 Mary Douglas, "Deciphering a meal," *Daedalus* (Winter 1972): 61; reprinted in Douglas, *Implicit Meanings* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

- 13 "Each meal carries something of the meaning of the other meals; each meal is a structured social event which structures others in its own image. The upper limit of its meaning is set by the range incorporated in the most important member of its series. The recognition which allows each member to be classed and graded with the others depends upon the structure common to them all. The cognitive energy which demands that a meal look like a meal and not like a drink is performing in the culinary medium the same exercise that it performs in language. First, it distinguishes order, bounds it, and separates it from disorder. Second, it uses economy in the means of expression by allowing only a limited number of structures. Third, it imposes a rank scale upon the repetition of structures. Fourth, the repeated formal analogies multiply the meanings that are carried down any one of them by the power of the most weighty." (*Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.)
- 14 Leonard R. Kass discusses this and other aspects of hospitality in food practices in *The Hungry Soul* (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 111-27.
- 15 Joel C. Kuipers, "Matters of taste in Weyewa," in *The Varieties of Sensory Experience*, ed. David Howes (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 111-27.
- 16 *English Fairy Tales*, retold by Flora Annie Steel (New York: Macmillan, 1918), p. 308.
- 17 For observation on the nature of festivals and their continuity with art, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (1960), trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 122-3.
- 18 On the Eucharist, see Louis Marin, *Food for Thought*, trans. Mette Hjort (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 120-4.
- 19 This observation was suggested to me by Terrell Asrat.
- 20 Takuan (1573-1645) quoted in D.T. Suzuki, *Zen and Japanese Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 275-6.
- 21 As Barbara Salazar pointed out to me, festival timing is not open to arbitrary manipulation. During World War II President Roosevelt moved Thanksgiving up a week or two, to nationwide outrage. It was moved back as soon as the war was over.
- 22 Hector Berlioz, *Memoirs of Hector Berlioz from 1803 to 1865*, trans. Rachel Holmes and Eleanor Holmes, rev. Ernest Newman (New York: Tudor, 1935), p. 133.
- 23 G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, trans. T.M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 1:138.

## SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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Anyone interested in this topic should also read some good writing about food, cooking and eating, for example, anything by M.F.K. Fisher, or Elizabeth David, or Jane Grigson, to name just three of the very best.