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**Happiness and the Good: Does Aristotelian moral philosophy rest on a mistake?  
(TEXTS)**

**1. The mistaken question 'Why be moral?'**

1. H.A. Prichard, 'The meaning of *agathon* in Aristotle's *Ethics*' (1935) and 'Does moral philosophy rest on a mistake? (1912) in *Moral Obligation* (1949). Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (1874-1907). J.L. Ackrill, 'Aristotle on *eudaimonia*', *Proc. Brit. Acad* 60 (1974). J.L. Austin, 'Agathon and *eudaimonia* in the *Ethics* of Aristotle' in *Collected Papers*. J.H. McDowell, 'The role of *eudaimonia* in Aristotle's *Ethics*', in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Rorty (1980).

2. ... the subject [sc. moral philosophy], at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. (Prichard, 'Mistake' 1)

3. Anyone who, stimulated by education, has come to feel the force of the various obligations in life, at some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognize the sacrifice of interest involved; and, if thoughtful, he inevitably puts to himself the question: 'Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? May I not have been all the time under an illusion in so thinking? Should not I really be justified in simply trying to have a good time?' Yet, like Glaucon, feeling that somehow he ought after all to act in these ways, he asks for a *proof* that this feeling is justified. In other words, he asks, 'Why should I do these things?', and his and other people's moral philosophizing is an attempt to supply the answer, i.e. to supply by a process of reflection a proof of the truth of what he and they have prior to reflection believed immediately or without proof. ('Mistake' 1-2)

4. The tendency to justify acting on moral rules in this way is natural. For if, as often happens, we put to ourselves the question 'Why should we do so and so?', we are satisfied by being convinced either that the doing so will lead to something which we want (e.g. that taking certain medicine will heal our disease), or that the doing so itself, as we see when we appreciate its nature, is something that we want or should like, e.g. playing golf. The formulation of the question implies a state of unwillingness or indifference towards the action, and we are brought into a condition of willingness by the answer. And this process seems to be precisely what we desire when we ask, e.g., 'Why should we keep our engagements to our own loss?'; for it is just the fact that the keeping of our engagement runs counter to the satisfaction of our desires which produced the question. ('Mistake' 3)

5. The answer is, of course, not an answer, for it fails to convince us that we ought to keep our engagements; even if successful on its own lines, it only makes us *want* to keep them. And Kant was really only pointing out this fact when he distinguished hypothetical and categorical imperatives, even though he obscured the nature of the fact by wrongly describing his so-called 'hypothetical imperatives' as imperatives. ('Mistake' 3)

6. PRICHARD'S ARGUMENT: (1) The egoist argues: Keeping our promises promotes happiness, and we want happiness; therefore we have a reason to keep our promises in so far as we want happiness. (2) The egoist's conclusion states a hypothetical

imperative. (3) 'We ought to keep our promises' is not a hypothetical imperative, but a categorical imperative. (4) An argument from what we want cannot justify a categorical imperative. (5) Hence the egoist cannot explain why we ought to keep our promises.

## 2. Prichard and Sidgwick

7. It is, however, possible to take a view of virtuous action in which, ... this notion of rule or dictate is at any rate only latent or implicit, the moral ideal being presented as attractive rather than imperative. Such a view seems to be taken when the action to which we are morally prompted, or the quality of character manifested in it, is judged to be 'good' in itself (and not merely as a means to some ulterior Good). This ... , was the fundamental ethical conception in the Greek schools of Moral Philosophy generally ...' (Sidgwick, *Methods* 105)

8. And this historical illustration may serve to exhibit one important result of substituting the idea of 'goodness' for that of 'rightness' of conduct. ... Virtue or Right action is commonly regarded as only a species of the Good: and so, ... the first question that offers itself, when we endeavour to systematise conduct, is how to determine the relation of this species of good to the rest of the genus. It was on this question that the Greek thinkers argued, from first to last. Their speculations can scarcely be understood by us unless with a certain effort we throw the quasi-jural notions of modern ethics aside, and ask (as they did) not "What is Duty and what is its ground?" but "Which of the objects that men think good is truly Good or the Highest Good?" or, in the more specialised form of the question which the moral intuition introduces, "What is the relation of the kind of Good we call Virtue, the qualities of conduct and character which men commend and admire, to other good things?" (105-6)

9. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. (Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ch. 2 §5.)

## 3. Prichard's interpretation of Aristotle on good

10. ... wherever Plato uses the term *agatha* (goods) elsewhere in the *Republic* and in other dialogues, such as the *Philebus*, the context always shows that he means by a good a good to oneself, and, this being so, he must really be meaning by an *agathon*, a source of satisfaction, or perhaps, more generally, a source of happiness. ('Duty and Interest' = *MW* 33)

11. Prichard on 'agathon': (1) All *agatha* contribute to happiness (*eudaimonia*). (2) *Eudaimonia* is a state of enjoyment, of being pleased, or of having one's desires satisfied.

12. Now about many other things also it is not easy to judge finely, but especially about that on which it seems to everyone to be easy and a matter for every man to find out, which one of the things in living is choiceworthy, and getting which one would fulfil one's appetite. (*EE* 1215b15-18) *περὶ πολλῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐτέρων οὐ ῥᾶδιον τὸ κρῖναι καλῶς, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ οὗ πᾶσι ῥᾶστον εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς τὸ γνῶναι, τί τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν αἰρετόν, καὶ λαβῶν ἂν τις ἔχοι πλήρη τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.*

13. ... honour, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose **because of themselves also – for we would choose each of them even if nothing resulted - had but we also choose them for the sake of happiness**, supposing that through them we shall be happy, but happiness no one ever chooses for their sake, or because of anything else at all. (1097b2-5) τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα /3/ μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτὰ (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοιμέθ' ἂν /4/ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, /5/ διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμο/6/νίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὄλως δι' ἄλλο.

14. Earlier in the present century leading lights in Oxford were strongly inclined to believe, and some of them did believe, that if Plato and Aristotle were eudaemonists, they would have had to be utilitarians: H.A. Prichard, a stubborn Kantian, so argued with conviction. What he and others had failed to understand is how it was possible for Plato and Aristotle to hold that everything is chosen for the sake of happiness *and* that some things are chosen for their own sake ... (Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 205)

#### 4. Reformulation and defence of Prichard's criticism

15. ... if, as often happens, we put to ourselves the question 'Why should we do so and so?', we are satisfied by being convinced either that the doing so will lead to something which we want (e.g. that taking certain medicine will heal our disease), or that the doing so itself, as we see when we appreciate its nature, is something that we want or should like, e.g. playing golf. (Prichard, 'Mistake'; see §4 above)

#### 5. A reply on behalf of Aristotle: McDowell's interpretation

16. [Someone engaged in a naturalist project] risks being accused of missing the point of moral thought; that the demand is a mistake is a well-known doctrine of H. A. Prichard. (McDowell 15)

17. When Aristotle says that activity in accordance with excellence is *eudaimonia*, what he says can be paraphrased as the claim that two prima facie different interpretations of phrases like 'doing well' coincide in their extension: doing well (sc. in accordance with excellence, living as a good man would) is doing well (sc. as one would wish: living in one's best interest). (McDowell 14f)

18. McDowell's two accounts of 'activity in accordance with excellence [= left-hand side] is eudaimonia [= right-hand side]': (1) REDUCTIVE: We may 'make our way into the equation at the right-hand side' (15), by relying on some prior idea of the most desirable life. We claim that life in accord with moral excellence satisfies this prior idea of the most desirable life. Hence Aristotle's formula means: Activity in accordance with virtue is identical to happiness (as we already understand it). (2) MORALIZING: We enter the equation at the left-hand side, and so that our conception of excellence determines our conception of eudaimonia. We claim that our prior conception of moral excellence determines the judgments about our good, interest, welfare, and so on that form our judgments about happiness. Hence Aristotle's formula means: Activity in accordance

with moral virtue (as we already understand it) is identical to the life that (from the moral point of view) we correctly count as happy.

## 6. Objection to McDowell

19. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence also on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. (1094a22-6) ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ (25) τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων.

## 7. Is good attractive or imperative?

20. To avoid this objection, it would have to be said that a man's future good on the whole is what he **would now desire and seek on the whole** if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him **were accurately foreseen and adequately realised in imagination** at the present point of time. (Sidgwick, *ME* 111)

21. ... I cannot deny that this hypothetical object of a resultant desire supplies an intelligible and admissible interpretation of the terms 'good' (substantive) and 'desirable,' as giving philosophical precision to the vaguer meaning with which they are used in ordinary discourse: and it would seem that a calm comprehensive desire for 'good' conceived somewhat in this way, though more vaguely, is normally produced by intellectual comparison and experience in a reflective mind. The notion of 'Good' thus attained has an ideal element: it is something that *is* not always actually desired and aimed at by human beings: but **the ideal element is entirely interpretable in terms of fact, actual or hypothetical, and does not introduce any judgment of value, fundamentally distinct from judgments relating to existence;--still less any 'dictate of Reason'**. (Sidgwick, *ME* 111-12)

22. It seems to me, however, more in accordance with common sense to recognise--as Butler does--that the calm desire for my 'good on the whole' is *authoritative*; and therefore carries with it **implicitly a rational dictate** to aim at this end, if in any case a conflicting desire urges the will in an opposite direction. (*ME* 112)

23. Still we may keep the notion of 'dictate' or 'imperative' merely implicit and latent,--as it seems to be in ordinary judgments as to 'my good' and its opposite--by interpreting 'ultimate good on the whole for me' to mean **what I should practically desire if my desires were in harmony with reason**, assuming my own existence alone to be considered. ... **what as a rational being I should desire and seek to realise**, assuming myself to have an equal concern for *all* existence. (*ME* 112)

## 8. The connexion between eudaimonia and the good

GOODS AND HAPPINESS: (1) Goods are to be explained by reference to happiness, and happiness is to be understood without any prior understanding of goods. (2) Goods are to be explained without reference to happiness, and happiness is to be understood as

the ultimate good. (3) Neither happiness nor goods are to be explained without reference to the other.

## 9. Eudaimonia as a source of external reasons

24. Having noticed about these things that everyone who has the power to live according to his own decision sets up some goal of living finely (whether honour or reputation or wealth or culture), with reference to which he will then do all his actions, since not to have one's life organized towards some end is a sign of much folly, we ought above all first to define in oneself without hurry or laziness in which of the things of ours living well is, and what are the things without which it cannot belong to human beings; for being healthy is not the same as the things without which it is not possible to be healthy, and the same is also true in many other cases, **so that living finely and the things without which it is not possible to live finely are not the same.** (*EE* 1214b6-17) περι δὴ τούτων ἐπιστήσαντας ἅπαντα τὸν δυνάμενον ζῆν κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν θέσθαι τινὰ σκοπὸν τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν, ἥτοι τιμὴν ἢ δόξαν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ παιδείαν, πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ποιήσεται πάσας τὰς πράξεις (ὡς τό γε μὴ συντετάχθαι τὸν βίον πρὸς τι τέλος ἀφροσύνης πολλῆς σημεῖον ἐστίν), μάλιστα δὴ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν αὐτῷ διορίσασθαι μήτε προπετῶς μήτε ῥαθύμως, ἐν τίνι τῶν ἡμετέρων τὸ ζῆν εὔ, καὶ τίνων ἄνευ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦθ' ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν, ὧν τ' ἄνευ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν· ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων πολλῶν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ ζῆν καλῶς καὶ ὧν ἄνευ οὐ δυνατόν ζῆν καλῶς.

25. Certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz. external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that the happy person must have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence ... but people **differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good.** Some think that any degree of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires for wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. (*Politics* 1323a24-38) ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἂν ὡς οὐ, τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηθὲν μόνον ἔχοντα ἀνδρείας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονήσεως, ... διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὅποσονοῦν, πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

26. For, it would seem, people quite reasonably reach their conception **of the good and of happiness**, from the lives ... The many, the most vulgar, would seem to conceive the good and happiness as pleasure; that is why they also like the life of gratification. .... The cultivated and active people conceive the good as honour ... This, however, appears to be too superficial to be what we are seeking; for it seems to depend more on those who honour than on the one honoured, whereas we intuitively believe that **the good** is something of our own and hard to take from us. ... Perhaps, indeed, one might conceive virtue more than honour to be the end of the political life. However, this also is apparently too incomplete. (*EN* 1095b15-31) τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ

άλόγως εόικασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. ... οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, ... οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν .... φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τάγαθόν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. ... τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη·

27. But presumably the remark that **the best <good> is happiness** is apparently something agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what it is. ... For just as **the good and the well**, for a flautist, a sculptor, and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true for a human being, if a human being has some function . ... Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord with the proper virtue. If so, **the human good** proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue. ... Let this, then, be a sketch of **the good** ... (EN 1097b28-1098b21) Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστίν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. ... ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῆ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῶ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τάγαθόν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὔ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ. ... ἕκαστον δ' εὔ κατὰ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν ... Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τάγαθόν ταύτη·

#### 10. Desire and the good

28. What, then, is the good of each action or craft? Surely it is that for the sake of which the other things are done ... And so, if there is some end of everything achievable in action, the good achievable in action will be this end; if there are more ends than one, these ends. (EN 1097a17-24) Πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τάγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; ... ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα.

29. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For what appears fine is the object of appetite, and what is really fine is the primary object of wish. But **we desire because it seems <good? fine?> rather than its seeming because we desire**; for the thinking is the starting-point. (Met. 1072a26-30) κινεῖ δὲ ὧδε τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν· κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενα. τούτων τὰ πρῶτα τὰ αὐτά. ἐπιθυμητὸν μὲν γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν· ὀρεγόμεθα δὲ διότι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖ διότι ὀρεγόμεθα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις.

#### 11. Relational and non-relational goodness

30. Some things are goods, but not good for any beneficiary.

The contemplative life is superior (*kreittōn*) to a merely human life, and it belongs to the better element in a human being. EN 1177b26-1178a2

Prudence (*phronêsis*) is not the most excellent science (or ‘the one to be taken more seriously’ *spoudaiotatên*), because human beings are not the best among living beings, but are inferior to divine beings. 1140a21-2.

31. For even if it <sc. the human good> is the same for one person and for a city, still the <good> of a city appears greater and more complete both to acquire and to preserve. For it is satisfactory <to acquire and to preserve the good> even for one person alone, but it is finer and more divine <to acquire and to preserve it> for a people and for cities. The discipline <that we engage in>, therefore, aims at these <goods>, being a <sort of> politics. (1094b7-11) εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ /8/ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνει/9/ται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῶζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ /10/μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἢ μὲν /11/ οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.

## 12. Why does happiness matter?

32. The very idea of constructing a compound end out of two or more independent ends may rouse suspicion. Is the compound to be thought of as a mere aggregate or as an organized system? If the former, the move to *eudaimonia* seems trivial. If the latter, if there is supposed to be a unifying plan, what is it? (Ackrill, ‘*Eudaimonia*’ 22)

33. One possibility worth considering is that he realizes in the EN that the notion of *parts* is really much too crude ... Aristotle is particularly conscious of the variety of ways in which different factors contribute to a good life, and also of the fact that the distinguishable is not necessarily separable. (Ackrill 29)

## 13. Scholastic expositions of Aristotle on the good

34. He clarifies the claim put forward, through the definition [diffinitionem, Leonine; effectum, Marietti] of good. About this one should keep in mind that good is counted among the first things ... According to the truth of the matter, good is converted with being. Now first things cannot be clarified though any prior things, but they are clarified through posterior things, as causes are by their proper effects. **Now since good is properly mover of desire, good is described through motion of desire, just as moving power is usually clarified through motion.** manifestat propositum per diffinitionem boni. Circa quod considerandum est, quod bonum numeratur inter prima ... Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. (Aquinas, *in EN* §9)

35. What is said about something in the second way of saying per se is not included in the account (ratio) of that subject, but the converse is true, as is clear from Posterior Analytics I. But desirable is said about good in the second way of saying per se. Therefore good does not have the account of desirable, but the converse. The minor is proved. **First because something is desirable because it is good, and not conversely. Secondly because good is the formal object of desire, but desirable is an extrinsic denomination taken from desire, and the relation is that of colour and visible;** now it is established that visible is said about colour in the second way, from De Anima II. To this

one can say two things, corresponding to two ways in which something is taken to have the account of desirable, namely formally and fundamentally. If the desirable is taken formally, then good is said to have its account not as intrinsic, but as an attribute (*passio*). If, however, it is taken fundamentally, then good is said to have the account of desirable intrinsically, since a proper account of good is the foundation and proper cause of desirability, as colour is of visibility. And granted that each gloss is true without qualification, and that the first is derived from the beginning of St Thomas on the books of Ethics, still the second is directly intended in the claim put forward, since the question is about the intrinsic account of good. But notice here that, though any of those <properties> assumed in the deduction of the account – **namely good, perfect, being in act, and being – introduces a foundation and cause of desirability, and for that reason the real identity between them is concluded, still only good introduces the proximate foundation of desirable, because only good signifies that thing that founds desirability in such a way that it founds and causes it.** ... *illud quod dicitur de aliquo in secundo modo dicendi per se, non clauditur in ratione illius subiecti, sed e converse, ut patet I Poster. Sed appetibile dicitur de bono in secundo modo dicendi per se. ergo bonum non habet rationem appetibilis, sed e converso. – Minor probatur. Tum quia ideo aliquid est appetibile, quia bonum; et non e converso. Tum quia bonum est obiectum formale appetitus; appetibile autem est denominatio extrinseca sumpta ab appetitu; et habet se sicut color et visible; constat autem quod visibile dicitur de colore in secundo modo, ex II de Anima [cap 7, n1] Ad hoc potest dici dupliciter, iuxta duos modos quibus accipitur aliquid habere rationem appetibilis, scilicet formaliter et fundamentaliter. Si sumatur ly appetibile formaliter, tunc bonum dicitur habere rationem eius, non ut intrinsecam, sed ut passionem. Si vero sumatur fundamentaliter, tunc bonum dicitur habere rationem appetibilis intrinsece; quoniam propria ratio boni est fundamentum et causa propria appetibilitatis, sicut color visibilitatis. – Et licet utraque glossa sit absolute vera, et prima ex principio s. Thomae super libros Ethicorum habeatur, secunda tamen in proposito esst directe intenta; quoniam de intrinseca boni ratione sit quaestio. Sed advertete hic quod, quamvis quodlibet horum quae in deductione rationis assumpta sunt, scilicet bonum, perfectum, ens in actu, et ens, importet fundamentum et causam appetibilis; et propterea concluditur identitas realis inter ea: **solum tamen bonum importat proximum fundamentum appetibilis; quia solum bonum significat rem illam quae fundat appetibilitatem, ut fundat et causat eam** ... (Cajetan on Aquinas, *ST* 1a q5 a1)*