Filosof’a de las Matem‡ticas
Naturalismo: El Debate Contempor‡neo
Posgrado en Filosof’a de la Ciencia
I.
El Fantasma
de Quine: La Ontolog’a Naturalizada
Textos en discusi—n:
W.v.O. Quine, ÒFive
Milestones of EmpiricismÓ, en Theories and Things, (Harvard 1981) Originalmente publicado
en 1975.
Bibliograf’a Secundaria:
Azzoni,
Jody, (1998) ÒOn ÒOn what there isÓÓ, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 79, No. 1
Dyson, Freeman J. (2004) ÒOne in a MillionÓ, New York
Review of Books, v. 51,
no. 5, Marzo 25.
Hersh, Reuben (1997) What
is Mathematics, Really? New
York: Oxford University Press.
Quine, W.v.O. (1951) ÒOn what
there isÓ en Paul Benacerraf y Hilary Putnam (eds.), Philosophy of
Mathematics, Selected Readings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983 y en From a Logical
Point of View, segunda
edici—n, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-19. Original de 1948.
(1980)
ÒTwo Dogmas of EmpiricismÓ, en From a Logical Point of View, segunda edici—n, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, pp. 20-46. Original de 1951.
(1976),
ÒPosits and RealityÓ en The Ways of Paradox, editci—n revisada, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, pp. 246-254. Original de 1955.
II.
El
Naturalismo de Maddy
Textos en discusi—n:
Maddy, PenŽlope (1997) Naturalism
in Mathematics, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Bibliograf’a Secundaria
Barcel—, Axel, (2004), ÒRevisionismo
en la Filosof’a de las Matem‡ticasÓ, Signos Filos—ficos, vol. 6, no.
12, pp. 149-154.
Leng, Mary, (1999), Rese–a de
Naturalism in Mathematics de Penelope Maddy, International
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 195-197
Maddy, Penelope (1997) Realism
in Mathematics, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Una bibliograf’a m‡s completa
sobre la obra de Penelope Maddy se encuentra en http://sun3.lib.uci.edu/eyeghiay/Philosophy/Faculty/maddy.html
III.
La Cr’tica
de Gideon y Rosen al Nominalismo
Textos en discusi—n:
(1997)
A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalist Reconstrual in
Mathematics, Oxford
University Press.
Bibliograf’a Secundaria:
Azzouni, Jody (2004), Deflating
Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism, New York: Oxford University Press.
Chihara, Charles (1990) Constructibility
and Mathematical Existence,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Field, Hartry (1980). Science
Without Numbers. Oxford:
Blackwell.
(1989). Realism, Mathematics and
Modality. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Hellman, Geoffrey, (1989), Mathematics
without Numbers, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
(2001), ÒOn NominalismÓ, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, vol. 62, pp. 691Ñ705.
Katz, Jerrold, (1998)
ÒPhilosophical PreliminariesÓ, primer cap’tulo de Realistic Rationalism, Boston: MIT Press.
Una bibliograf’a m‡s completa
sobre el Nominalismo en Matem‡ticas se encuentra en: http://weka.ucdavis.edu/~ahwiki/bin/view/Arche/MathNominalism
Sesiones Efectivas |
Presentador |
Texto en discusi—n |
|
Agosto |
25: |
Karla |
Mark Colyvan, ÒThe Quinean BackdropÓ |
Septiembre |
1 |
Dalia |
W.v.O. Quine, ÒFive Milestones of
EmpiricismÓ |
8 |
Juan Carlos |
Maddy, PenŽlope (1997), Cap’tulos 1-3,
de la secci—n III ÒNaturalismÓ
de Naturalism in Mathematics, pp. 161-182 |
|
Octubre |
6 |
Marco |
Maddy, PenŽlope (1997) III.4
ÒMathematical NaturalismÓ, en Naturalism in Mathematics, pp. 183-205 |
13 |
Axel |
Dieterle, J. M. (1999) ÒMathematical,
Astrological, and Theological NaturalismÓ & Tennant, Neil (2000) ÒWhat is
Naturalism in Mathematics, Really?Ó |
|
20 |
Marco |
Maddy, PenŽlope (2001), ÒNaturalism:
Friends and FoesÓ |
|
27 |
Miguel |
Rosen, Gideon y John P. Burgess, (1997)
A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalist Reconstrual in
Mathematics, pp. 3-25 |
|
Noviembre |
10 |
Karla |
Rosen, Gideon y John P. Burgess, (1997)
A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalist Reconstrual in
Mathematics, pp.25-66 |
24 |
HŽctor |
Rosen, Gideon y John P. Burgess, (1997)
Conclusiones de A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalist
Reconstrual in Mathematics. |
|
Diciembre |
1 |
Alejandro |
Rosen, Gideon y John P. Burgess, (2005)
ÒNominalism ReconsideredÓ & John P. Burgess, (2004), Rese–a de Deflating existential consequence: a
case for nominalism |
8 |
|
Conclusiones Finales |