The Later Wittgenstein
& Ordinary Language Philosophy
When trying to understand the role of ordinary language in
Wittgenstein later Philosophy, the first difficulty one faces is to
understand the mere meaning of the expression "Ordinary Language".
All through the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein uses a
variety of terms like common, ordinary, everyday, etc. while
presenting his view on the intimate relationship between Language
and Philosophy. One can either assume that all those expressions are
synonymous and that its multiplicity answers more to stylistic
criteria than to actual philosophical ones, or take seriously
Wittgenstein's own recommendation in §132 of not overlooking
subtle distinctions which occur in ordinary language. The distinction
between common, ordinary and everyday is certainly one of these.
Therefore, it may prove to be fruitful to take a closer look at it.
On the postscript of On Rules and Private Language, Kripke
asks us to "remember that Wittgenstein does not analyze a form of
language in terms of its truth conditions, but rather asks under what
circumstances the form is introduced into discourse, and what role,
what utility, the practice of so introducing it has" [p.134].
Therefore, my analysis of the expression 'Ordinary Language' will not
go through the traditional methods of argumentation and
counterexamples, as if its goal were to find whether it is true that
the later Wittgenstein is an ordinary language philosopher. On the
contrary, and faithful to the methods of ordinary language
philosophy, in the following few lines I will be drawing
comparisons between Wittgenstein's use of these terms in The
investigations, their use in ordinary German speech, their
etymological senses, an their English translations. This way, this
brief investigation will serve both as a discussion of Wittgenstein's
position regarding Ordinary Language Philosophy, and an illustration
of some of its methods.
The first thing Wittgenstein says of ordinary Language is that
it is the language which we use in our ordinary life [§108]. Here,
gewöhnliche, the German word for ordinary, literally means 'the way
in which we live'. However, Wöhnenthe word for living which
occurs in this word is neither the same that is used in general
German expressions like "living being" [Lebewesen] , nor the one used
by Wittgenstein in expressions like "form of life" [Lebensform] or
"experience" [Erlebniss]; but the word used also to mean to reside or
dwell. However, it is also noticeable that throughout his many
architectonic metaphors and images all through the Investigations,
he never uses the word Whönen again. Nevertheless, it may be better
to translate ordinary as 'the way in which we dwell'. Therefore,
ordinary language is the language we dwell by.
Wittgenstein uses the expression 'ordinary life' again in §156,
where he distinguishes between the use of a term in our ordinary
life, and its role in our life. The same word for ordinary appears in
§132, and later in §402 applied not to ordinary life, but to ordinary
language and ordinary linguistic forms. In these texts, Wittgenstein
says that ordinary language is that which works (§108) adequately
to do its duty (§402), which is to assist us in the satisfaction of
certain needs (§132). In all three cases, Wittgenstein is talking
about language as it works in our ordinary life, contrary to it
remaining idle (§132), abstracted out of time and space (§108).
There is an easy distinction to draw between the terms
common [allgemeinen] and everyday [alltäglich] . Sometimes, both
terms are translated into English as 'common' in so far as they refer
to certain unity in multiplicity. Allgemeinen literally means
'common to every person', while alltäglich means 'common to every
day'. Wittgenstein uses them to assert the unity of language through
the multiplicity of practices and practices. He uses the first term to
compare common language against private language (§261), and the
second to contrast everyday language versus metaphysical (§116). In
this sense, all language is common (under the traditional
interpretation of the private language argument), even though not all
language is everyday language. The word 'common' never shows up
again, but 'everyday' does, and many times. Mostly, as part of the
expression everyday language. Furthermore, täglich, a slight
variation of alltäglich, is also used to refer to everyday practice in
§197. There, Wittgenstein says that it is everyday [täglich] practice
which connects intentional actions with their intentions.
Finally, there is another interesting word in the same
semantic circle that the aforementioned ones. It is Heimat, i.e.
fatherland. In §116, Wittgenstein calls the everyday [alltägliche]
use of words the way they are used in their fatherland. Notice that,
in the next paragraph of this same fragment [ §116], there is a very
engaging spatial metaphor about taking words back into their
cotidianity, which, in this context, means back to their fatherland.
Here, Wittgenstein is no longer talking about looking at language in
its ordinary use, but about taking it back to its everyday use. This
brief sentence marks very clearly the distinction between everyday
and ordinary language in the Investigations. A distinction which is
parallel to that of the two sense of the word 'object' in expressions
like "the object of Philosophy". Sometimes, when we ask for the
object of Philosophy, we ask what is the matter which is studied by
Philosophy or, shortly, what is philosophized upon. Some other
times, however, we ask for its end, that is, its aim or goal.
In the later Wittgenstein's view of Philosophy, Language is
both its matter and its goal. On the one hand, ordinary [gewöhnlichen]
language is the matter in Philosophy (§494). Remember that, for
Wittgenstein, language is, foremost, ordinary language. Anything
else is called a language only as an analogy or in comparison with
ordinary language. Given this, other (non-everyday) languages, like
logic, cannot correct or reform ordinary language. Much the less can
they serve as ideals. On the other hand, if what we are asking is
what is its goal, the answer, therefore, is to take Language (that is
ordinary language) back to its everyday use. Wittgenstein believes
that our ordinary language is no longer everyday language. It has
been perverted out of cotidianity into the realm of metaphysics. Our
work as philosophers is to take it back from the hands of the
metaphysicians, and put it to work again in its everyday duties.
When reading the Investigations, people commonly find it hard to
understand whether Philosophy should take a passive or active
stance towards Language. By drawing this later distinction we can
now understand that both are required in different senses. When
faced with metaphysical fancies, we should be active. Regarding
what is ordinary in language, we must be more passive and
descriptive.
If you ask me now what is my final assessment of the methods
of Ordinary Language Philosophy, I have nothing to offer but this
example. If you think it has provided a fruitful insight into the
Philosophical Investigations, let those results be proof of its value
as a philosophical method. However, remember Wittgenstein when he
said that [§133] even if there are many methods in philosophy,
[p.315] the results should not be judged with regards to the method,
but the object. So, do not ask yourselves whether these results are
good ordinary language philosophy, but whether they are good
philosophy, period.
Autumn, 1996. Axel Barceló.