The Later Wittgenstein
& Ordinary Language Philosophy

When trying to understand the role of ordinary language in Wittgenstein later Philosophy, the first difficulty one faces is to understand the mere meaning of the expression "Ordinary Language". All through the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein uses a variety of terms like common, ordinary, everyday, etc. while presenting his view on the intimate relationship between Language and Philosophy. One can either assume that all those expressions are synonymous and that its multiplicity answers more to stylistic criteria than to actual philosophical ones, or take seriously Wittgenstein's own recommendation in §132 of not overlooking subtle distinctions which occur in ordinary language. The distinction between common, ordinary and everyday is certainly one of these. Therefore, it may prove to be fruitful to take a closer look at it.
On the postscript of On Rules and Private Language, Kripke asks us to "remember that Wittgenstein does not analyze a form of language in terms of its truth conditions, but rather asks under what circumstances the form is introduced into discourse, and what role, what utility, the practice of so introducing it has" [p.134]. Therefore, my analysis of the expression 'Ordinary Language' will not go through the traditional methods of argumentation and counterexamples, as if its goal were to find whether it is true that the later Wittgenstein is an ordinary language philosopher. On the contrary, and faithful to the methods of ordinary language philosophy, in the following few lines I will be drawing comparisons between Wittgenstein's use of these terms in The investigations, their use in ordinary German speech, their etymological senses, an their English translations. This way, this brief investigation will serve both as a discussion of Wittgenstein's position regarding Ordinary Language Philosophy, and an illustration of some of its methods.

The first thing Wittgenstein says of ordinary Language is that it is the language which we use in our ordinary life [§108]. Here, gewöhnliche, the German word for ordinary, literally means 'the way in which we live'. However, ­Wöhnen­the word for living which occurs in this word is neither the same that is used in general German expressions like "living being" [Lebewesen] , nor the one used by Wittgenstein in expressions like "form of life" [Lebensform] or "experience" [Erlebniss]; but the word used also to mean to reside or dwell. However, it is also noticeable that throughout his many architectonic metaphors and images all through the Investigations, he never uses the word Whönen again. Nevertheless, it may be better to translate ordinary as 'the way in which we dwell'. Therefore, ordinary language is the language we dwell by.

Wittgenstein uses the expression 'ordinary life' again in §156, where he distinguishes between the use of a term in our ordinary life, and its role in our life. The same word for ordinary appears in §132, and later in §402 applied not to ordinary life, but to ordinary language and ordinary linguistic forms. In these texts, Wittgenstein says that ordinary language is that which works (§108) adequately to do its duty (§402), which is to assist us in the satisfaction of certain needs (§132). In all three cases, Wittgenstein is talking about language as it works in our ordinary life, contrary to it remaining idle (§132), abstracted out of time and space (§108).

There is an easy distinction to draw between the terms common [allgemeinen] and everyday [alltäglich] . Sometimes, both terms are translated into English as 'common' in so far as they refer to certain unity in multiplicity. Allgemeinen literally means 'common to every person', while alltäglich means 'common to every day'. Wittgenstein uses them to assert the unity of language through the multiplicity of practices and practices. He uses the first term to compare common language against private language (§261), and the second to contrast everyday language versus metaphysical (§116). In this sense, all language is common (under the traditional interpretation of the private language argument), even though not all language is everyday language. The word 'common' never shows up again, but 'everyday' does, and many times. Mostly, as part of the expression everyday language. Furthermore, täglich, a slight variation of alltäglich, is also used to refer to everyday practice in §197. There, Wittgenstein says that it is everyday [täglich] practice which connects intentional actions with their intentions.

Finally, there is another interesting word in the same semantic circle that the aforementioned ones. It is Heimat, i.e. fatherland. In §116, Wittgenstein calls the everyday [alltägliche] use of words the way they are used in their fatherland. Notice that, in the next paragraph of this same fragment [ §116], there is a very engaging spatial metaphor about taking words back into their cotidianity, which, in this context, means back to their fatherland. Here, Wittgenstein is no longer talking about looking at language in its ordinary use, but about taking it back to its everyday use. This brief sentence marks very clearly the distinction between everyday and ordinary language in the Investigations. A distinction which is parallel to that of the two sense of the word 'object' in expressions like "the object of Philosophy". Sometimes, when we ask for the object of Philosophy, we ask what is the matter which is studied by Philosophy or, shortly, what is philosophized upon. Some other times, however, we ask for its end, that is, its aim or goal.

In the later Wittgenstein's view of Philosophy, Language is both its matter and its goal. On the one hand, ordinary [gewöhnlichen] language is the matter in Philosophy (§494). Remember that, for Wittgenstein, language is, foremost, ordinary language. Anything else is called a language only as an analogy or in comparison with ordinary language. Given this, other (non-everyday) languages, like logic, cannot correct or reform ordinary language. Much the less can they serve as ideals. On the other hand, if what we are asking is what is its goal, the answer, therefore, is to take Language (that is ordinary language) back to its everyday use. Wittgenstein believes that our ordinary language is no longer everyday language. It has been perverted out of cotidianity into the realm of metaphysics. Our work as philosophers is to take it back from the hands of the metaphysicians, and put it to work again in its everyday duties. When reading the Investigations, people commonly find it hard to understand whether Philosophy should take a passive or active stance towards Language. By drawing this later distinction we can now understand that both are required in different senses. When faced with metaphysical fancies, we should be active. Regarding what is ordinary in language, we must be more passive and descriptive.

If you ask me now what is my final assessment of the methods of Ordinary Language Philosophy, I have nothing to offer but this example. If you think it has provided a fruitful insight into the Philosophical Investigations, let those results be proof of its value as a philosophical method. However, remember Wittgenstein when he said that [§133] even if there are many methods in philosophy, [p.315] the results should not be judged with regards to the method, but the object. So, do not ask yourselves whether these results are good ordinary language philosophy, but whether they are good philosophy, period.

Autumn, 1996. Axel Barceló.