Otras actividades
Taller Percepción de Color y el Lenguaje de Color
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
Jueves 20 y viernes 21 de mayo, 2010
Organizador: Mario Gómez Torrente
Jueves 20 de mayo
10:00-11:30h
Jonathan Cohen (University of California, San Diego)
“Contextualism and Color Predication”
Comments by Edgar González Varela (UNAM)
11:45-13:15h
Mario Gómez-Torrente (UNAM)
“Perceptual Variation and the Reference of Color Words”
15:00-16:30h
Lenny Clapp (UNAM)
“It isn’t like ‘that’: Against Context-Sensitive Color-Predicates”
Comments by Eduardo García-Ramírez (University of Michigan)
16:45-18:15h
Adam Pautz (University of Texas at Austin)
“Disjunctivism and Knowledge of Color”
Comments by Philipp Keller (UNAM)
Viernes 21 de mayo
10:00-11:30h
Mark Eli Kalderon (University College London)
“Color Illusion”
Comments by Ignacio Vilaró (UNAM)
11:45-13:15h
Emiliano Boccardi (UNAM)
“It’s a Quasi-Colorful World”
Comments by Manuel Rodríguez (UNAM)
15:00-16:30h
Axel Barceló, (UNAM)
“A Contrastivist Account of Color”
Comments by Ignacio Cervieri (UNAM)
16:45-18:15h
David Hilbert (University of Illinois at Chicago)
“Adaptation, Brunescence and Language”
Encuentro Universidad de Texas (Austin) - UNAM
Communicative Practices / Prácticas Comunicativas
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
Viernes 2 y sábado 3 de octubre, 2009
Organizador: Miguel Ángel Fernández
Viernes 2 de octubre
10:00 -11:30
Mark Sainsbury (UT, Austin)
“Belief, Contradiction, Rationality”
Commentary: Maite Ezcurdia (IIFs-UNAM)
11:45 -13:15
Leonard Clapp (IIFs, UNAM)
“Unarticulated Tensions”
Commentary: Enrico Grube (UT, Austin)
15:00 -16:10
Maite Ezcurdia (IIFs, UNAM)
“Incomplete Predicates”
16:20 -17:30
Aidan McGlynn (UT, Austin)
“The Status of Evidential Norms of Assertion"
17:40 -19:10
Katherine Ritchie (UT, Austin)
“Externalism, Memory and Linguistic and Mental Content”
Commentary: Ignacio Cervieri (IIFs, UNAM )
Sábado 3 de octubre
10:00 – 11:30
Edgar González Varela (IIFs, UNAM)
“Belief in Necessity”
Commentary: Sinan Dogramaci (UT, Austin)
11:45 – 13:15
Ray Buchanan (UT, Austin)
“A Puzzle About Belief and Communication”
Commentary: Laura Duhau (IIFs, UNAM)
15:00 -16:10
Bryan Pickel (UT, Autin)
“Generalizing Soames’ Argument Against Rigidified Descriptivism”
16:20 -17:50
Cory Juhl (UT, Austin)
“Analyticity and Mathematics”
Commentary: Áxel Barceló (IIFs, UNAM)
IV Taller: Perspectivas Cognitivas de la Mente y del Lenguaje / IV Workshop on Cognitive Perspectives on Mind and Language
Sala Fernando Salmerón
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
12 a 14 de agosto, 2009
Miércoles 12 de agosto
10:00 - 11.45hrs.
Eduardo García (Universidad de Michigan)
“An Integrated Account of Substitution Failure”
Comentarista: Lenny Clapp (IIFs, UNAM)
12:00 - 13:45 hrs.
Isidora Stojanovic (Institut Jean Nicod)
“The Problem of De Se Assertion"
Comentarista: Maite Ezcurdia (IIFs, UNAM)
16:00 - 17:45 hrs.
Adrian Cussins (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)
“Affect-affordance and normative activity structures in a cognitive science simulation of the origins of communication”
Comentarista: Raymundo Morado (IIFs, UNAM)
Jueves 13 de agosto
10:00 - 11:45 hrs.
Claudia Lorena García (IIFs, UNAM)
"Functional Homology, Functional Variation and the Evolvability of Cognitive Capacities"
Comentarista: Francisco Vergara
12:00 - 13:45 hrs.
Edouard Machéry (Univerisdad de Pittsburgh)
"Three Neuroscientific Objections Against the Massive Modulatity Hypothesis"
Comentarista: Ángeles Eraña (IIFs, UNAM)
Viernes 14 de agosto
10:00 - 11.45hrs.
Laura Duhau (IIFs, UNAM)
"The Myth of the Publicity of Concepts"
Comentarista: Sílvio Pinto (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana)
12:00 - 13:45 hrs.
Axel Barceló y Ángeles Eraña (IIFs, UNAM)
“Modularity and Rules"
Comentarista: Miguel Ángel Fernández (IIFs, UNAM)
Taller sobre Relativismo / Relativism Workshop
Sala Fernando Salmerón
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
Viernes 27 de febrero, 2009
Organizador: Leonard J. Clapp
10:00 - 11:30 hrs.
Áxel Barceló (IIFs, UNAM)
“Radical Contrastivism”
Comentarista: Max Fernández (UAM-Iztapalapa)
11:30 - 13:00 hrs.
Leonard Clapp (IIFs, UNAM)
“How to Disagree About Nothing”
Comentarista: Eduardo García Ramírez (Universidad de Michigan)
15:00 - 16:30 hrs.
Peter Lasersohn (Universidad de Illinois)
"Manipulation of Perspectival Parameters in Relativist Semantics"
Comentarista: Federico Marulanda (IIFs, UNAM)
16:30 - 18:00 hrs.
Michael Glanzberg (Universidad de California, Davis)
“Implicit Arguments and Intentions”
Comentarista: Maite Ezcurdia (IIFs, UNAM)
Conferencias
Coordinadas por Maite Ezcurdia, Axel Barceló y Ángeles Eraña
Miércoles 21 de abril
Eleonora Cresto
Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero
"Una defensa de la transparencia epistémica"
16hrs
Sala Fernando Salmerón, IIFs
Ciclo
Dan Sperber
Cognition, Communication and Culture
24-26 de noviembre
Martes 24 de noviembre
“The evolution, development, and modular organisation of human cognition”
10:45 a 12:45 hrs
Sala Fernando Salmerón
Miércoles 25 de noviembre
“The evolution and development of metarepresentations, communication, and epistemic vigilance”
16:00 a 18:00 hrs
Sala José Gaos
Jueves 26 de noviembre
“Relevance in cognition, communication, and culture”
10:45 a 12:45 hrs
Sala José Gaos
ANTERIORES: 2009
Lunes 1 de junio
Diana Pérez
Universidad de Buenos Aires
"Los conceptos fenoménicos y el argumento del conocimiento"
12hrs
Aula 3, IIFs
Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la estrategia del concepto fenoménico como una respuesta al enigma de María. Defenderé la idea de que hay un poco de verdad detrás de la afirmación de que los conceptos fenoménicos se requieren para responder al enigma de María. Pero es difícil caracterizar a los conceptos fenoménicos; hay muchas maneras de entenderlos, y muchas de esas maneras son equivocadas. En la primera parte, explicaré los requisitos que los conceptos fenoménicos deben satisfacer para resolver el enigma de María. En la segunda parte, presentaré diferentes explicaciones de lo que es un concepto fenoménico y mostraré las dificultades que cada uno de ellos presenta. Finalmente, desarrollaré mi propia explicación de los conceptos fenoménicos. Mi tesis es que éstos no son meras etiquetas de nuestras experiencias fenoménicas como muchos defensores de estas nociones sostienen. Más bien, son conceptos complejos cuyas condiciones de posesión dependen de la competencia en otros conceptos, de hecho, de conceptos tan complejos como la distinción entre la apariencia y la realidad (la cual pertence a nuestro sistema de teoría de la mente), y conceptos de color (por lo menos en el caso de los conceptos fenoménicos necesarios para dar cuenta del caso de María). Y estos últimos conceptos tienen condiciones de posesión especiales: incluyen el uso de capacidades de reconocimiento no conceptuales.
Miércoles 3 de junio
Federico Penelas
Universidad de Buenos Aires
"Etnocentrismo, ironismo y liberalismo. Tensiones en el pensamiento de Richard Rorty"
12hrs
Sala Fernando Salmerón, IIFs
"El modelo creencia-duda y su articulación comunitarista"
16hrs
Aula Gaos, IIFs
FECHAS POR DETERMINAR:
Philip Robbins
Universidad de Missouri
Conferencia 1: "Minding the Gap"
12hrs
Sala Fernando Salmerón, IIFs
Abstract:
Human beings are ‘intuitive dualists’. Deep down, we all think that persons cannot be explained in causal-mechanistic terms. This intuition lies at the root of philosophical puzzlement over the ‘explanatory gap’ between the mental and the physical. The explanatory gap is psychologically real, and it calls for an explanation of its own. In this talk I set out to show how recent work in cognitive neuroscience, and the neuroscience of social cognition in particular, can contribute to such an explanation. The key idea is that thinking about something as a locus of conscious experience is architecturally opposed to thinking about that thing in causal-mechanical terms — and that this opposition helps to explain the origin and persistence of the explanatory gap.
Conferencia 2: "Consciousness and the Social Mind"
16hrs
Aula 6, IIFs
Abstract:
Phenomenal consciousness and social cognition are interlocking capacities, but the relations between them have yet to be systematically
investigated. In this paper, I begin to develop a theoretical and empirical framework for such an investigation. I begin by describing
the phenomenon known as social pain: the affect associated with the perception of actual or potential damage to one’s interpersonal
relations. I then adduce a related phenomenon known as affective contagion: the tendency for emotions, moods, and other affective states
to spread from person to person in social contexts. Experimental studies of these two phenomena suggest that affective consciousness
depends on perception of the social world in much the same way that it depends on perception of the body -- in short, that consciousness
is ‘socially embodied’. In the second part of the paper I argue that the distinctive sociality of our species, especially its moral dimension,
rests heavily on our ability to represent the conscious states of others. In closing, I put these ideas together and show how they point to a
circular causal-mechanistic nexus between consciousness and social mindedness.
Viernes 25 de septiembre
Jose Diez Calzada
Universidad de Barcelona
"¿Qué hay de no convencional en los enunciados cuantitativos?"
12hrs
Sala Fernando Salmerón, IIFs
Lunes 19 de octubre
Manuel Pérez Otero
Universidad de Barcelona
"Aseverar, conocer y prejuzgar"
16hrs, Aula 3, IIFs
Miércoles 21 de octubre
Manuel Pérez Otero
Universidad de Barcelona
"Dimensiones del escepticismo epistemológico"
12hrs
Sala Fernando Salmerón, IIFs
Andrea Iacona
Università dell'Aquila
"A Semantic View of Logical Form"
16 hrs
Aula 6, IIFs
Resumen: Logical form has always been a central concern of the analytic tradition in philosophy. From the very beginning of this tradition, the study of logical form has been privileged as a method of investigation, trusting to its capacity to reveal the structure of the thoughts we express, or the structure of the world those thoughts represent if they are true. Yet there are fundamental questions about logical form that, in spite of being still unanswered, have not received as much attention as one might expect from the credit given to that method. This talk focuses on such questions. According to the view that will be outlined and defended - the semantic view - logical form is essentially a property of the things we say, rather than a property of the sentences we utter to say them. Logical form is determined by truth-conditions, so it cannot be individuated in terms of the linguistic meaning of the words occurring in the sentence and the way they are combined. The rationale for the semantic view comes from ordinary practice of formalization, and in particular from the assumption that a translation of a set of sentences into a formal language must provide a representation of those sentences that displays the relations between their truth-conditions. The ascription of logical form is thus a substantive semantic affair, and in many cases we are not in a position to know what is the logical form of a sentence. This has interesting epistemological consequences, such as the consequence that there is no a priori knowledge of logical form.
Coordinados por Maite Ezcurdia
17 al 28 de agosto
"¿Cómo creer una verdad necesaria?"
Agustín Rayo
Massachussetts Institute of Technology
Lunes, martes, jueves y viernes
Aula 3,
12 a 14hrs
(Los martes en la Sala Fernando Salmerón)
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
3 al 11 de septiembre
"Tiempo y tiempos verbales"
Sven Rosenkranz
ICREA y Universidad de Barcelona
Lunes, martes, jueves y viernes
Aula 3,
11 a 14hrs
(Los martes en el Aula 4)
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
Semestre 2010-I
Seminario de Filosofía de la mente
"Conceptos, innatismo y modularidad"
Laura Duhau, Ángeles Eraña y Maite Ezcurdia
Martes 10 a 14hrs
Aula 3
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM
Miembros
Investigadores |
Estudiantes |
|---|---|
| Martín Abreu | |
Kirareset Barrera |
Laura Campos |
| Ignacio Cervieri | |
| David Fajardo | |
| Ana Laura Fonseca | |
| Javier García Salcedo | |
| Israel Grande García | |
| Cristian Gutiérrez | |
| Carlos Hernández | |
| Eduardo García | Armando Lavalle |
| José Edgar González Varela | Sabina Longhitano |
| Mario Gómez Torrente | Laura Pérez |
| Philipp Keller | Manuel Rodríguez |
| Ricardo Maldonado | Raúl Rodríguez |
| Maximiliano Martínez | Guillermo Torices |
| Luisa Puig | Ignacio Vilaró |
| Cecilia Rojas | |
| Salma Saab | |
Sitios de interés
Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía
Asociación Latinoamericana de Filosofía Analítica
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM