Semantics vs. Pragmatics in Impure Quotation[*]

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Abstract: I defend a semantic theory of quotation marks, according to which these are ambiguous, as they have several different acceptations involving corresponding different conventional indications. In particular, in allusion ("mixed") uses, the corresponding conventional indication is one with an adverbial or prepositional content, roughly equivalent to "using the quoted expression or an appropriate version of it". And in "scare" uses, the corresponding conventional indication is that the enclosed expression should be used not plainly but in some broadly speaking distanced way, or that it is being so used by the utterer. I also defend this view against some alternative views on which allusion and distance indications are to be seen as pragmatically conveyed. In particular, I consider several views that attempt to explain especially allusion and distance indications as pragmatic suggestions generated from a meager conventional basis, and I argue that they cannot accommodate a number of linguistic phenomena and reflectively supported theses about the use of quotation marks. I lay special emphasis on the fact that the main pragmatic theories fail to pass an extremely plausible test for challenges to polysemic accounts of an expression.

1 Introduction

Cases of impure quotation are those where the distinctive purpose of using quotation marks is not the purely referential purpose of referring to the expression enclosed within the marks.[1] Cases of pure or purely referential quotation include the utterance of the quotation[2] in normal utterances of (1):

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[1] "Impure" in my usage is thus a purely negative concept, largely free from theoretical presuppositions. Other terms used in the literature to cover the same range of phenomena seem to me to be inappropriately theory-laden. Thus, for example, "mixed" and "hybrid" as applied to a quotation mean that the quoted expression is being both "used and mentioned", but this seems to me already to load the dice in favor of particular accounts of the relevant uses of quotations.

[2] In the technical usage predominant in this paper, "quotation" is a term that applies to the result of enclosing an expression within quotation marks. In the few cases where "quotation" means something else, such as the act of forming a quotation, or the act or result of citing someone, I trust context will make this clear.

(1) “Socrates” has eight letters.[3]

Impure quotation (or at least standard impure quotation; see the discussion of “emphatic” and other possible non-standard uses of quotation in section 2 below) includes three kinds of uses of the quotation marks. Paradigmatic cases of the first kind include the utterances of the quotations in normal uses of (2) and (3); think of (3) as written in a biography of Henry Ford, in a passage where the author is explaining Ford’s opinions:

(2) Ford said that thinking is “the hardest work” there is.
(3) Thinking is “the hardest work” there is.

In these uses, the utterer’s distinctive purpose in using the quotation marks is not (or in any case not merely) to indicate that the quoted expression is being referred to, but to indicate that this expression was uttered by Ford. We may call uses of this kind “allusion” uses. Paradigmatic cases of the second kind of impure quotations include the utterances of the quotations in normal uses of the following sentences:

(4) The five thousand “smackers” are hidden in the house by the river.
(5) Smith’s “music” records are on the shelf.

In these cases, the utterers’ distinctive purpose in using the quotation marks is to indicate that “smackers” and “music” are somehow not entirely appropriate in the relevant contexts. We may call uses of this kind “distance” uses. Finally, the third and least interesting kind of cases of impure quotation include cases such as the utterances of the quotations in normal utterances of the following:

(6) I find Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” difficult.
(7) 1,517 lives were lost despite the efforts of the “Titanic” crew.

[3] They also include the utterance of the quotation in cases of so-called “direct quotation”, as in a normal utterance of *Ford said: “thinking is the hardest work there is”*. On referential uses, including a number of pragmatic aspects, see Gómez-Torrente (2001), (2011), (2013), and the bibliographical references therein.

Here the purpose is to indicate that "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and "Titanic" as they are being used name things of certain special kinds, in particular a paper and a ship, respectively. We may call uses of this kind "special name" uses.

In earlier work (Gómez-Torrente 2005), I defended the view that cases like normal uses of (2) and (3) exemplify an acceptation of the quotation marks on which these conventionally indicate that the enclosed expression (or at least a certain part of it[4]) is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered by some agent or agents who are contextually relevant, while cases like normal uses of (4) and (5) exemplify an acceptation of the quotation marks on which these conventionally indicate that the enclosed expression should be used not plainly but in some broadly speaking distanced way, or that it is being so used by the utterer; cases like normal uses of (6) and (7) exemplify an acceptation of the quotation marks on which they indicate that the enclosed expression, as well as the quotation itself, works as a name of one of certain special sorts—an article or ship or poem or movie or plane, etc. In this paper I will again defend a very similar view, modifying only slightly the postulated content of the conventional indication of the quotation marks in uses like those of (2) and (3); as explained in section 3 below, I no longer view this indication as a full propositional indication, and postulate instead that it is an indication with an adverbial or prepositional content, roughly equivalent in the case of (2) and (3) to "using 'the hardest work' or an appropriate version of it" or to "with a use of 'the hardest work' or an appropriate version of it". But my view was and is that, being conventional, all three kinds of impure indications—the (impure) "allusion", "distance" and "special name" indications, as I will call them—are parts of the semantics of the quotation marks in these uses. In this paper I will seek to defend this view against some alternative views of what is going on in normal uses of (2)-(5) and related cases of the same kinds, views on which impure allusion and distance indications are to be seen as pragmatically conveyed. (Cases such as (6) and (7) are hardly ever discussed (Saka 2005 being an exception), and to my knowledge never in great depth.)

[4] This qualification (already noted in Gómez-Torrente 2005) was meant to accommodate the fact that ellipsis points (and other devices, like clarifications in brackets), sometimes occur inside quotation marks but are not implied to have been uttered by the agent that is relevant in the context. These have been called "unquotation" devices in the recent literature. On this topic see Shan (2010), Maier (2014) and Saka (2017).

In particular, I will consider several views that attempt to explain especially allusion and distance indications as pragmatic suggestions generated from a meager conventional basis. In section 2, after motivating and introducing these views, I will seek to argue that they cannot accommodate a number of linguistic phenomena and reflectively supported theses about the use of quotations; I will lay special emphasis on the fact that the main pragmatic theories fail to pass an extremely plausible test for challenges to polysemic accounts of an expression. In section 3 I will describe in more detail my semantic view, introducing the mentioned slight revision of the content of the conventional indication of allusion uses, and I will explain how the view accommodates the phenomena and theses mentioned in section 2 as problematic for pragmatic views.

2 Pragmatic Theories and their Problems

Pragmatic theories of impure quotation have a number of motivations. The theories of this kind that I'm aware of (and perhaps all existing theories of this kind) have been thought to receive very strong support from considerations of theoretical economy, as indicated e.g. by pragmatic theorists such as Recanati (2010, 300f) and Saka (2005, 203).[5] On the view of mine stated in the Introduction, quotation marks have, besides their purely referential acceptation, three further conventional acceptations manifested in allusion, distance and special name uses. My view thus postulates that there are at least four conventional meanings of the quotation marks. On the other hand, pragmatic theories seek to explain the variety of distinctive purposes of uses of the quotation marks without postulating a corresponding variety of conventional meanings for them. They seek to explain the fact that a variety of kinds of indications can be conveyed with uses of quotation marks by assuming just one meaning for them and deriving the possibility of conveying the mentioned indications via pragmatic mechanisms.

[5] As an anonymous referee has pointed out to me, this need not mean that the main motivation for a pragmatic theory is always one of economy. In Recanati's case, for example, the main motivation for his theory is arguably what he takes to be the pictographic nature of quotations, which he believes to virtually necessitate a pragmatic view of most of what is normally conveyed by means of them. I myself, on the other hand, think that "distance" and "special name" uses of quotations, at the very least, cannot be said to be pictographic in any natural sense (see Gómez-Torrente 2005, 148, n. 6). In any case, the considerations in this paper will seek to discredit pragmatic views, and to defend a semantic view, independently of considerations concerning the alleged pictographic nature of all quotations, and exclusively by focusing on how the different theories handle the semantics/pragmatics interface in the case of the quotation marks.

It is indeed an uncontroversial fact that, provided there is such a thing as a literal meaning *m* of an expression *e*, the utterer of an utterance *u* of *e* often intends to convey—and often succeeds in conveying—more than that literal meaning *m* with her utterance of *u*; when successfully conveyed, such non-literal meanings are said to be pragmatically conveyed. A number of general mechanisms for pragmatically conveying content have been reasonably well described in the literature on pragmatics, and we may assume that these mechanisms are there, so to speak, independently of whatever views we may have about the conventional meaning or meanings of particular expressions. So if it could be successfully argued that, by assuming just one conventional meaning for the quotation marks, the other indications typically communicated by means of quotations could be effectively conveyed via pragmatic mechanisms, then one would have a strong methodological consideration of economy in favor of pragmatic theories as against semantic theories which, like mine, postulate several conventional meanings for the quotation marks: *ceteris paribus*, a more economical pragmatic theory should have an advantage over a less economical semantic theory. It must be emphasized, however, that this kind of consideration of economy will be decisive only if the *ceteris paribus* clause holds good: if some semantic theory can account for phenomena involving quotation that no pragmatic theory can account for, the consideration of economy will be defeated.

Aside from this general methodological consideration of economy, other more special facts have been mentioned in defenses of the superiority of a pragmatic account. Philippe De Brabanter, a champion of such accounts, helpfully collects some of these in his survey De Brabanter (2010). The first is the possibility (originally pointed out by Washington 1992) of "quoteless quotation", i.e. reference or allusion to expressions without the use of quotation marks, as in

(8) Socrates has eight letters.

(9) Winston Churchill actually read "Mein Kampf", understood what the plan was about, wanted to confront it early on, and it was his vision that won the day and ultimately defeated Hitler, with the help of America and a lot of blood, toil, sweat and tears. (www.unitedfamilies.org/hannity_article.asp; cited by De Brabanter 2010, 115)

(De Brabanter notes: "In his maiden speech to the Commons on 13 May 1940, Churchill declared 'I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat'. The context suggests that the writer is mentioning the (slightly modified) phrase as well as using it" (115).)

Typically, (8) would be used with the purpose of referring to "Socrates" and predicating of it that it has eight letters, and (9) would be used partly with the purpose of recalling (somewhat inexactly, as it turns out) that "blood, toil, sweat and tears" was uttered by Churchill. These cases are supposed to be problematic for semantic accounts because it is sometimes taken to be inherent to a semantic account to postulate that whenever there is reference or allusion to expressions in an utterance *u*, some element corresponding to the expression that is cited or referred to must be present in the truth conditions or the logical form of *u* (cf. De Brabanter 2010, 114). However, such postulation seems *ad hoc*, as there are no independent reasons to postulate the existence of such elements in the case of normal utterances of (8) or (9). By contrast, the possibility of offering a pragmatic explanation of what is going on in cases such as (8) and (9) suggests itself naturally, even at first sight. (See below, section 3, precisely for a pragmatic proposal made from the point of view of the theory defended in the present paper.)

A second fact sometimes mentioned in critiques of semantic theories of impure quotation is that, in cases where the utterer's distinctive purpose in using the quotation marks is an allusion purpose, the quotation need not be under the scope of a reporting verb. Thus, although in (2) the quotation is under the scope of such a verb, in (3) it is not, despite the fact that in context it will be clear that the speaker seeks to indicate that this expression was uttered by Ford. De Brabanter sees this as a sign that both in cases such as (2) and (3) the speech attribution results from a pragmatic process (De Brabanter 2010, 115-7).

Finally, a third special fact adduced in favor of pragmatic accounts is that in some cases of allusion uses of the quotation marks, the quoted expression is not a syntactic constituent:

(10) David said that he had donated "largish sums, to several benign institutions".
(Abbott 2005, 20; cited by De Brabanter 2010, 117-8)

Some semantic theories of allusion uses of quotation marks explicitly postulate that a quotation α in such uses has a certain compositional meaning, "something like 'what the echoed speaker calls α'" (De Brabanter 2010, 117; De Brabanter is alluding to Benbaji 2005 and Geurts and Maier 2005); however, expressions that are not self-standing syntactic constituents presumably have no independent corresponding meaning or truth-conditional element contributing compositionally to the meaning or truth

conditions of sentences in which they appear. De Brabanter again sees this as a sign that in cases such as (10) the speech attribution indication is pragmatically generated (De Brabanter 2010, 117).

As noted in the Introduction, the pragmatic views I will consider here propose to explain relevant instances of communication with typical impure uses of quotations as involving pragmatic suggestions generated from a meager conventional basis. The bases are different in the different theories, and the pragmatic mechanisms that generate the pragmatically conveyed content from the conventional bases are different as well. But it seems clear that the crucial aspect of the semantics/pragmatics interface for the quotation marks postulated by the different theories lies in the nature of the conventional basic indication they postulate, rather than on the generating mechanism: any particular view about the content of the conventional indication of the quotation marks could in principle be combined with any particular view about the specific pragmatic mechanism or mechanisms that generate the pragmatically conveyed content from that conventional indication. Accordingly, my main criticisms arise specifically from consideration of the nature of the contents of the meager conventional indications postulated by pragmatic theories. I will list the theories roughly in ascending order of strength of the postulated basic conventional indication.

On the first kind of pragmatic view to be considered, held by Paul Saka, quotation marks quite generally (not just in impure uses) "signal mentioning, that there is reference to something other than what is customary" (Saka 2005, 208), i.e. they carry only a minimal conventional indication that the user is referring to something other than the conventional reference of the quoted expression (and possibly to this conventional reference as well). When speaking of the "reference" of the quoted expression, quite clearly Saka means something looser, such as the meaning of the quoted expression, as he for example often speaks of propositional indications as "references"; and in fact he means something looser than what one might read in the above statement at first sight, for Saka does not mean to presuppose that there is always a "customary" reference or even a customary meaning for the expression that is being quoted (this expression might be nonsensical, for example). Perhaps a more accurate statement of what Saka means would be: quotation marks carry a minimal conventional indication that the user, in using the quoted expression, means something different from or additional to what the enclosed expression conventionally means, if it conventionally means anything at all. (That Saka does mean "different from *or* additional to" is evident from many of his

examples, as well as from his formulation in 2005, p. 187, according to which the relevant indication is that the speaker intends "to pick out something other than the customary referent (either instead of it or in addition to it).")[6] As for the kind of pragmatic mechanism via which non-conventional contents are conveyed, Saka seems reluctant to identify it with any mechanism described elsewhere, but he suggests some points of similarity with Grice's "exploitative" conversational implicatures, in particular by emphasizing that the pragmatically implicated content is in principle and typically in practice retrievable as a reasonable hypothesis about the speaker's meaning, when some conflict with conversational expectations triggers a "higher-level reasoning" process:

> when utterances impinge on audiences, audiences automatically attempt to execute the conventionally associated lexico-syntactic conceptual structure; quoted matter is defeasibly used as well as mentioned. The use interpretation is defeated, however, when it is ungrammatical, as in the case of most citations and titles; and when it is pragmatically contradicted by the mention interpretation, as in the case of loose-speech scare quotes. In short, standard quotation marks always direct the audience to the same panoply of material: to the concepts that are automatically associated with the quoted matter and to "something else". It is up to the interpreter to assemble a propositional model using higher-level reasoning not specifically provided by the particular words at hand. (2005, 208)

On the second pragmatic view we will examine, held by François Recanati, quotation marks, at least in allusion and distance uses, carry only a minimal conventional indication that the user is calling attention to the quoted expression, or

[6] Saka (2011), section 5, modifies his 2005 theory somewhat, reducing a bit the field of things that according to the theory could be pragmatically indicated by quotation marks. On Saka's most complete attempt to state the new theory, quotation marks carry a minimal conventional indication that the user, in using the quoted expression, means something different from or additional to what the enclosed expression conventionally means *and* different from or additional to what is or can be "cognitively generated therefrom" (311, n. 5). (What can be "cognitively generated" from the conventional meaning of the quoted expression includes, paradigmatically, metaphorical extensions of the conventional meaning.) I will present my criticisms of Saka's ideas below by reference to the old, simpler theory, as they will apply indifferently to it and to the more difficult to state (and in fact not fully stated by Saka) revised theory. The abstract reason why the criticisms apply to both theories is that the indications involved in the criticisms will at no point include indications "cognitively generated" specifically from the particular meanings of the quoted expressions. See notes 10 and 17 below for exemplifications of this point.

"demonstrating" it, in Recanati's terminology (Recanati 2001, 2010; the view is considered sympathetically by Abbott 2005 and Reimer 2005). The pragmatic mechanism by which other indications are generated from this minimal basis, according to Recanati, is the mechanism of "free enrichment". A free enrichment is a process by which the speaker adds a certain non-conventional indication *i* to the conventional content of an utterance *u* in such a way that *i* "does not remain external to the intuitive truth-conditions" of *u* (2001, 672), despite the fact that *i* can be canceled, because

> it takes some reflection to realize that that fact was not explicitly articulated in the sentence. From a psychological point of view, the pragmatic suggestion is incorporated into what is asserted: A single mental representation is constructed using both linguistic and contextual clues […]. In such cases I say that the truth-conditional content of the utterance is pragmatically enriched. ([footnote 22:] […] The extra element contextually provided […] does not correspond to anything in the sentence itself, hence it does not constitute a component of the compositionally articulated content of the utterance, yet it is part of its intuitive truth-conditional content.) (2001: 672)

"Free enrichment" is different from Grice's conversational implicatures in that conversationally implicated content is supposed to remain "external to the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance" and is in some psychological sense more clearly perceivable as "external" than "enriched content". (De Brabanter (2013a, 120-1), on the other hand, in his strongly sympathetic exposition of Recanati, expresses a preference for a mechanism similar to, but not identical with, that based on the generation of conversational implicatures.)

A third kind of pragmatic view proposes that quotation marks, at least in allusion and distance uses, carry a minimal conventional indication that the utterer is "echoing" someone else's use of the quoted expression, or at least a previous use by the utterer (Recanati 2010). Recanati views this as an alternative to the preferred view explained in the preceding paragraph, an alternative that he is not able to exclude on present evidence. (But his expositor and defender De Brabanter forcefully defends Recanati's original (2001) view that the echoic indication is not universal and hence not conventional, arguing that the echoic indication in some quotations is pragmatically conveyed; see De Brabanter (2013b).) Recanati would again supplement the echoic view (were this to turn out to be preferable) with his theory of "free enrichment" as providing the mechanism for generating pragmatically conveyed content.

There are three kinds of criticisms of pragmatic views that I wish to put forward. The first is that the conventional indications some of them postulate fail to be intuitive indications in many uses or potential uses of impure quotation; in this sense, those alleged conventional indications seem simply not to exist as general conventional indications. A second criticism is based on the observation that, if the alleged conventional indications postulated by some pragmatic theories really existed, it should be easy to construct cases in which they are conveyed, so to speak, "free" from any of their alleged pragmatic add-ons; but this appears to be difficult or impossible. The third and final kind of criticism, which I take to be the most significant, is that the assumption that those conventional indications do exist and are in fact as meager as postulated by some theories implies that many possible pragmatic indications could be naturally derived from them that are in fact not actually derivable in a natural way.

I will begin by presenting the first kind of criticism, which affects echoic views. The view that quotation marks, whether in impure or pure uses, carry always a conventional indication that the user is "echoing" some previous use of the quoted expression seems open to clear counterexamples in the case of pure quotation. If I sincerely utter

(11) Nobody has ever uttered "bigritwesertkil",

I am certainly not implying (nor will anyone take me to imply) that someone else or I myself have used "bigritwesertkil" before. Of course, the fact that the echoic view has clear counterexamples in the case of pure quotation makes it lose much of any attraction it may have had. For if there is at least one referential non-echoic acceptation of the quotation marks—as the direct counterexample based on (11) strongly suggests—then no unified pragmatic explanation of all uses of the marks can be given, while this would certainly be one important motivation for sympathizers of the echoic theory.

The weaker view that the echoic indication is a conventional indication of (only) impure uses (the view not excluded by Recanati 2010) is somewhat trickier, but seems pretty clearly false as well. In a typical utterance of (4) or (5), there need not be any intention on the part of a fully competent, careful speaker to communicate that the quoted expression has been used before. In fact, if an utterer of (5) "cancels" any possible suggestion that he is implying that the expression "music" has been used before by uttering *I don't mean to suggest that the expression "music" has been used before*,

he will not seem to me to be contradicting himself. But, since the expression in question *has* been used before, there will be an air of oddness in such a "cancelation", so it is perhaps open to the echoic theorist to claim that some use of the word is being echoed, perhaps some use by a conceivable or imaginary utterer or group, such as "the linguistic community". But there are other counterexamples. One kind of counterexamples involves impure allusion uses appearing in non-declarative environments, and where the quoted material is clearly being used for the first time ever. If I suddenly come up with the worry in (12),

(12) I wonder if anyone ever said that thoughtful armadillos "beautifully relinquish their numbers" in awe of the icosahedron,

there is no intuitive conventional indication that some utterance of "beautifully relinquish their numbers" by someone in particular (real or imaginary) is being echoed; on the contrary, I am precisely asking myself (in part) *if* there is someone (of any kind) who has used the expression before.[7]

A second kind of impure counterexample to the echoic view involves distance uses. My father enjoyed coming up with new words he had never heard before, usually by spontaneous combinations of metatheses and epentheses of existing words, using them playfully when talking to other people. He did not, as far as I know, use these in written language, but he clearly could have, and he could perfectly well have put quotation marks around the ensuing cacographies to indicate he was being playful, as for example in

(13) That kid was so "brutiful" and "aborradle".

Here we would have the purpose of indicating that the quoted expressions are somehow inappropriate, but certainly not that of indicating that they have been used before, let alone that someone else has used them before—in fact, I can perfectly well imagine my

[7] This would be a problem also for my earlier (2005) view of the conventional indication of allusion uses as a straightforward indication that the enclosed expression that the quoted expression is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered by some agent or agents who are contextually relevant (and for many other views; see note 20 below for an example). See section 3 for the announced modification of my view, which takes care of these counterexamples.

father taking pride in the originality of his inventions. He could have "canceled" any echoic suggestion of (13) without oddness, by uttering *I don't mean to suggest that any of the expressions "brutiful" and "aborradle" has been used before*; in fact this would have added to the fun.[8]

The view that quotation marks carry a conventional indication that the user is calling attention to the quoted expression and the view that they carry the indication that the user means something besides what the enclosed expression means (if it means anything)—the "attention" and "difference" views, as we may call them—postulate conventional indications which are perhaps too weak for the views to be susceptible of receiving direct counterexamples. Perhaps in some sufficiently vague sense all uses of quotation marks are meant to call attention to the quoted expression and/or to signal that something besides its usual meaning is meant. However, if this is so, it is natural to think that it should be easy to construct cases in which these conventional indications are conveyed without the addition of any of the standard allegedly pragmatic indications; but this appears to be difficult or impossible. This is my second kind of criticism.

When one uses quotation marks, some clues from the context (broadly understood so as to include information of all kinds provided by the utterance and its surrounding circumstances) generally make it clear which one of the four standard indications (the purely referential, allusion, distance and special name indications) is meant (or if some other non-standard indication is meant; see below the discussion of the "emphatic" interpretation of quotation marks, the frequent but still non-standard interpretation of the quotation marks as indicators of emphasis). Reading (5), the reader is likely to recall that people differ in their musical tastes to the point that many would refuse to call "music" certain compositions they consider not sufficiently meritorious; the reader will consequently typically interpret an utterance of (5) as indicating that the utterer thinks that the compositions in Smith's records are not music strictly speaking. Reading (3) in a biography of Henry Ford where Ford's opinions are being explained and discussed, the reader is likely not to think that the author is distancing himself from the quoted expression, but simply attributing it to Ford. Reading (1), the reader is likely to take implicitly the quotation as a name of "Socrates", for the predicate "has eight letters"

[8] Note that the echoic view is also open to counterexamples arising from the "special name" use of quotation marks, for surely there is no "echoing" when someone simply introduces a title, or the name of a ship, etc. And for even more against echoic views see Saka (2005), section 3.3.

makes a lot of sense as predicated of that expression. If we make an effort to construct examples in which all contextual clues of this kind have been removed, a pragmatic view presumably must predict that the standard indications that the view takes as pragmatically implicated (when they are) are not communicated (which seems correct) and that the conventionally indicated content is communicated without any expectation on the part of the audience that one of the standard indications is nevertheless in the mind of the utterer. But this last prediction seems incorrect. Suppose someone utters, out of the blue,

(14) “2”+2=“4”, “and” “there” are no “polyhedra” “of” seven faces; it’s easy to go on calling attention to expressions in this way,

or

(15) “2”+2=“4”, “and” “there” are no “polyhedra” “of” seven faces; it’s easy to go on signaling unusual meanings of expressions in this way.

A typical reader, when presented with (14), will not just think *The writer is calling attention to “2”, “4”, “and”, “there”, “polyhedra” and “of” all right, and says that it’s easy to go on doing this with other words (and perhaps is alluding to someone’s expressions or expressing “distance” toward them or emphasizing them, perhaps not)*. And a typical reader, when presented with (15), will not just think *The writer is definitely signaling that he is using “2”, “4”, “and”, “there”, “polyhedra” and “of” to mean something besides what these words mean, and says that it’s easy to go on doing this with other words (and perhaps alluding to someone’s expressions or expressing “distance” toward them or emphasizing them, perhaps not)*. The typical reader, when presented with (14) or (15), will be genuinely *puzzled* by these utterances. She will not consider the possibility of accepting them at face value, but will wonder which one of the standard indications is somehow meant.

Or, perhaps more clearly and significantly, suppose that (14) or (15) are uttered not out of the blue, but accompanied by suitable cancelations of any allusion and distance indications (and, if necessary, also of any non-standard “emphasis” indication)—a special name indication and a purely referential interpretation being quite

obviously excluded.[9] A pragmatic view presumably must predict that the standard indications that the view takes as pragmatically implicated (when they are) are not communicated (which seems correct) and that the conventionally indicated content is communicated without any uneasiness on the part of the audience caused by the fact that all the relevant standard (and if necessary the non-standard) indications have been canceled or preempted in some way. But this seems clearly wrong.

(14′) "2"+2="4", "and" "there" are no "polyhedra" "of" seven faces; watch out, I'm not alluding to anyone's expressions nor using the quotation marks to distance myself from the quoted expressions; I'm just calling attention to the quoted expressions.

(15′) "2"+2="4", "and" "there" are no "polyhedra" "of" seven faces; watch out, I'm not alluding to anyone's expressions nor using the quotation marks to distance myself from the quoted expressions; I'm just indicating that I'm using the words with a different meaning.

A reader of (14′) or (15′) will then be at least as puzzled as in the other case, and probably even more, for now the possibility that she might be missing one of the standard indications will have been explicitly excluded by the utterer, who will appear to be doing something pretty mad, if not downright contradictory.[10] I take all this to be a sign that the "attention" and "difference" views postulate conventional indications that are just too weak to recover the actual meaning or meanings of the quotation marks.[11]

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[9] On Recanati's "attention" theory, an indication that the quotation is being used to refer to the quoted expression is semantic whenever the quotation is pure, so it cannot be canceled when it's the intended indication. But on Saka's theory, that indication is always pragmatic when it exists.

[10] Note that the same could be said of a more complicated version of (15′) incorporating the conventional indication of the quotation marks postulated in Saka's (2011) revised theory, mentioned above in note 6. A reader of the following sentence will be at least as puzzled, and probably more, than a reader of (15′): *"2"+2="4", "and" "there" are no "polyhedra" "of" seven faces; watch out, I'm not alluding to anyone's expressions nor using the quotation marks to distance myself from the quoted expressions; I'm just indicating that I'm using the words with unusual meanings not "cognitively generated" from the conventional meanings of the quoted expressions in this way.*

[11] A referee suggests that the fact that (14′) and (15′) will appear puzzling is predicted at least by Recanati's theory, since it's part of the theory that utterances of quotations (or at least normal utterances, I suppose) always have a "quotational point", while (14′) and (15′) themselves deny that they have such a point. To this I would reply, first, that (14′) and (15′) do not deny that they have a "quotational point"; on the contrary, they state that their point is to communicate precisely the indication postulated as conventional by Recanati's theory and Saka's theory, respectively. And second, that if Recanati's

It might be suggested that this kind of criticism overlooks relevant differences between pragmatic mechanisms for conveying pragmatic suggestions from a meager semantic basis. The idea would be that while some pragmatic mechanisms make the pragmatically communicated content quite distinct psychologically from the semantic content of the utterance, others don't. Thus, while a theory that appeals to a mechanism similar to that of "exploitative" conversational implicatures (arguably favored by Saka) may be open to the criticism, a theory based on free enrichment (such as Recanati's) may not: in free enrichment, a non-conventional indication "does not remain external to the intuitive truth conditions" of the utterance, so it might be argued that in a use of (14), say,[12] a pragmatic allusion indication or a pragmatic distance indication is just bound to be a part of the relevant intuitive truth conditions. But I should then insist that part of the point is that the theories we are criticizing presumably predict that in some cases, such as the imagined utterance of (14), no such indication ought to be communicated, whether as a part of their intuitive truth conditions or as a part of any other aspect of their conveyed content. Note that sentences that are sometimes or even frequently used with free enrichments attached can be used "non-enriched": to use a modified version of Recanati's paradigm case, one can make an utterance of

(16) He took out the keys and opened the door

preceded by a discourse in which it has been emphasized that the male in question under no circumstance opens the door in question in any other way than by a kick of his left foot, after taking the keys in question out of the door lock where his poor wife put them; in such a case, the frequent enrichment that the door was opened with the taken out keys will be absent. Why should the quotation marks of (14) and (15) be difficult or

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theory were to include the claim that the "quotational point" of utterances of impure quotations must always go beyond the indication that attention is being called to the quoted expression, and thus presumably that it must include either an allusion or a distance or a special name indication, then the theory would not merely postulate a meager conventional indication from which other non-conventional indications can be derived pragmatically, but rather a rich conventional association with the quotation marks, from which specific quotational indications might be derived in context; it would in fact be a "contextualist" version of a semantic theory of the quotation marks.

[12] The same could be said of (15). As noted in the text above, different basic indications can presumably be combined with different pragmatic mechanisms, so Saka's basic indication could be combined with a mechanism of free enrichment; the point to be made will equally hold.

impossible to use in environments where the alleged allusion and distance enrichments are absent (e.g. because they have been preemptively canceled, as in utterances of (14′) and (15′))?

As I said, I have a third and final kind of criticism, which I take to be the most significant, and which applies again to the "attention" and "difference" theories. Suppose again, for a reductio, that some one of the conventional indications postulated by those theories does exist as a conventional indication. As noted above, these indications are notoriously weak, and for this reason it may well have to be granted that they are generally meant to be communicated by utterers of quotation marks, even as a matter of convention. But if so, many stronger non-standard indications should be conveyable from those weak conventional meanings via typical pragmatic mechanisms, without producing any sense in the audience that the utterer has made a mistake. However, such non-standard indications are only conveyed by producing a sense that something has gone wrong.

A way of illustrating this phenomenon that I find particularly striking involves the quite frequent but still notoriously non-standard use of "emphatic" quotes—called "mystery" quotes by Saka (2013) and "noncitational" quotes by Abbott (2005). Here are a couple of examples from the amusing Keeley (2010):

(17) "PARENTS", You are Responsible For your "Childrens" (SAFETY) Do not let them Run "Free" or "Leave" them "Unattended" "In Shopping Carts" While Shopping. Management Thank You, (Keeley 2010, 8; seen at a supermarket)

(18) "NO" Refunds Or Exchanges All Sales "Final" (Keeley 2010, 15; seen at a store).

The utterers of these examples appear to mean to emphasize the concepts expressed by the quoted expressions,[13] and knowledgeable (or presumably knowledgeable) speakers can easily figure this out, of course. But knowledgeable speakers find these uses incorrect, and in fact a source of somewhat perverse fun. Those utterers are manifestly doing something funny. Why? The natural answer is: because they are not competent users of the quotation marks, they are not using them as they should be used, i.e. in

[13] Saka (2013) questions the idea of this sort of quotation as emphatic on the grounds that "reading aloud examples of mystery quotation does not normally yield the stressed syllables that emphasis would demand" (938). But I myself, on the contrary, if forced to read aloud (17) and (18), would think that I would represent best the original utterers' intentions if I stressed the quoted items.

order either to name, cite, or express distance toward the quoted expression or to indicate a special name usage. However, there should be nothing odd about these utterances if the conventional meaning of the quotation marks was merely that postulated by the "attention" or "difference" theories. It is clear, for example, that *if* the quotation marks had just the "attention" meaning, then the "emphasis" indication could be communicated straightforwardly via some pragmatic mechanism, without generating an impression of error. First, the utterers of (17) and (18) in the examples are intentionally calling attention to the quoted expressions in their (successful) attempt to emphasize the corresponding concepts, so they are abiding by the meaning that the marks have on this hypothesis.[14] But second, the "emphasis" indications could then be communicated without oddness either as "free enrichments" or as "standard" conversational implicatures. Let me explain this a bit.

"Free enrichments", recall, are indications so well integrated into the intuitive truth conditions of the enriched utterances that they remain psychologically hidden; it takes some reflection to see that they are not semantically expressed. "Standard" conversational implicatures[15] are implicatures communicated without any apparent violation of the maxims of conversation; they are therefore psychologically hidden as well, as the audience will not typically actually have to reason their way out of an apparent violation of the maxims—but according to Recanati they, like all implicatures, will remain "external" to the intuitive truth conditions. Grice's main example, recall, is one in which a stranded driver tells a passer-by that he is out of gas, and the passer-by replies with an utterance of

(19) There is a garage round the corner,

the implicated indication being that the garage is open or believed to be open. Now, the distinction between "free enrichments" and standard conversational implicatures may not be completely clear-cut. It is somewhat unclear to me, for example, whether the indication in a typical utterance of (16) that the taken out keys were used to open the door is "internal" to the intuitive truth conditions of the utterance in a way in which the

[14] The criticism doesn't apply to the echoic theory because the echoic theorist could claim that the problem is that in (17) and (18) there is evidently no echo.

[15] The concept is Grice's (1975, 32), but the terminology "standard" is from Levinson (1983, 104).

indication that the garage is open is "external" to the intuitive truth conditions of the imagined utterance of (19). But regardless of whether the distinction is a precise but subtle one or just one of psychological degree, it seems clear that an audience for (17) and (18) that implicitly assumed an "attention" meaning for the quotation marks would implicitly grasp that the reason why the utterers are calling attention to the quoted expressions was in order to emphasize the corresponding concepts, without this indication being psychologically well-separated from the alleged basic conventional "attention" indication, without it being perceived as dissociated from this part of the alleged conventional meaning (or even the truth conditions) of the utterance.[16]

A way of seeing that the "emphasis" indications would be pragmatically communicated without oddness if the "attention" theory was right is to imagine that we introduce by stipulation a new kind of "attention" quotes. Let's introduce by stipulation the *attention* marks "►" and "◄", with the same grammar as the normal quotes, and with this explicit meaning: when an expression is enclosed within attention marks, the utterer is conventionally calling attention to the enclosed expression. Now imagine that you can assume normal speakers know this stipulation, and imagine that you encounter utterances of the following:

(17') ►PARENTS◄, You are Responsible For your ►Childrens◄ (SAFETY) Do not let them Run ►Free◄ or ►Leave◄ them ►Unattended◄ ►In Shopping Carts◄ While Shopping. Management Thank You.

(18') ►NO◄ Refunds Or Exchanges All Sales ►Final◄.

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[16] In any case, the emphasis indication can clearly be derived as a standard implicature, in the Gricean fashion, from a hypothetical "attention" or "difference" meaning. In the case of (18) and the "attention" hypothesis:

> We presume the writer to be following the plausible maxims regulatory of conversation identified by Grice when she literally expresses the content that *there will be no refunds or exchanges and all sales will be final, and attention is called to "no" and "final"*.
> But we must suppose that she is aware of or thinks that *the concepts expressed by "no" and "final" are being emphasized* if we are to hold on to this presumption. (For she must be observing the maxim of Relation directing her to say only things relevant in the context, and the hypothesis that the concepts expressed by "no" and "final" are being emphasized is necessary if she is to be supposed to be observing the maxim (while to suppose that she merely means to call attention to the expressions "no" and "final" amounts to attributing to her a failure to observe the maxim).)
> And surely she thinks that we can see this, so she thinks that we can see that she thinks that the concepts expressed by "no" and "final" are being emphasized.
> So she has conversationally implicated that the concepts expressed by "no" and "final" are being emphasized.

I think it's quite clear that you will understand the utterers as not only calling attention to the "attention-quoted" expressions, but as emphasizing the concepts corresponding to those expressions. But furthermore, I also think it's clear that you will grasp this indication without sensing any oddness in the utterances of (17′) and (18′). Again, there may be alternative explanations of the mechanism via which this indication would be communicated. Explanations in terms both of "free enrichment" and standard conversational implicatures seem feasible. As in paradigmatic cases of "free enrichment", the "emphasis" indication would not be neatly separated psychologically from the intuitive truth conditions of the imagined utterances of (17′) and (18′); it would certainly take some reflection even for people to whom the stipulated meaning of the attention marks was taught to see that the "emphasis" indication was not semantically expressed. And, as in standard implicatures, the "emphasis" indication would be communicated without any apparent violation of the maxims of conversation and without need of any reasoning excluding a real violation of the maxims. In any case, that the "emphasis" indication would be communicated without any sense that a mistake was being made is evident.

Mutatis mutandis for the "difference" theory. This says that the marks mean that the utterer is signaling that something beyond or different from the meaning of the quoted expression is being meant (and that further indications of the marks are pragmatic add-ons). And the utterers of (17) and (18) in the examples are signaling that something beyond or different from the meaning of the quoted expression is being meant—they are signaling that they want to emphasize the corresponding concepts. They are again abiding by this alleged meaning of the marks. The further indication that the utterer is emphasizing the concept expressed by the quoted expression ought then to be painlessly conveyable as a "free enrichment" or as a standard conversational implicature of the conventional "difference" indication, and no oddness or infelicity should be sensed by competent users of quotation marks. Further, if we repeat the thought experiment of introducing by stipulation a pair of "difference" marks, we will get results analogous to the ones we got for the "attention" marks.[17]

[17] And mutatis mutandis for Saka's (2011) revised theory, mentioned above in note 6. The theory says that the marks mean that the utterer is signaling that something beyond or different from the meaning of the quoted expression, though not something "cognitively generated" from it, is being meant. And the utterers of (17) and (18) in the examples are signaling that something beyond or different from the

The phenomenon we are describing can also be illustrated by thought-experimenting a bit with the actual quotation marks, rather than thought-experimenting with marks introduced by an imaginary stipulation. Suppose we encounter the following piece of written discourse:

(20) There are so many beautiful things in the world... There are so many ugly things in the world... Flowers are so beautiful... "Slush" is so ugly... Babies are so pretty... "Rust" is so hideous... I find sunsets, fawns and snow-capped Himalayan mountains so aesthetically pleasing, and "traffic jams", "spiders" and "tin roofs" so unpleasant... Recently I spent a week in gorgeous Vancouver Island, then I went back to "Mexico City", where I enjoyed the many enchanting streets of Coyoacán but I suffered the "circumvallation roads".

I trust the reader will have conjectured that the utterer means to indicate, whenever he speaks of something he thinks is ugly, that it *is* ugly, by putting quotation marks around the expression that names the thing. But the piece of discourse is manifestly odd; the utterer is doing something funny. Why? Again the natural answer is that he is not using the quotation marks as they should be used, because he is neither intending to name, nor to cite, nor to express distance toward the use of the quoted expression, nor of course to indicate special name usage. But there should be nothing odd about this discourse if either the "attention" or the "difference" theory was right. The utterer of (20) *is* calling attention to the quoted expressions, and the further indication that he thinks of the things named by the quoted expressions as ugly ought then to be straightforwardly conveyable from the conventional "attention" indication. No oddness or infelicity should appear. Mutatis mutandis for the "difference" theory: the utterer of (20) *is* signaling that something beyond or different from the meaning of the quoted expression is being meant—he is signaling that he means that the thing named by a quoted expression is ugly. This further indication ought to be conveyable without difficulty from the alleged conventional "difference" indication, and the utterance of (20) should not appear peculiar in any noteworthy way. But it does, and I take this phenomenon to provide strong evidence that these pragmatic theories are false.

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meaning of the quoted expression, though not "cognitively generated" from it, is being meant—they are signaling that they want to emphasize the corresponding concepts. The further indication that the utterer is emphasizing the concept expressed by the quoted expression ought then to be painlessly conveyable as a "free enrichment" or as a standard conversational implicature of that conventional indication. A thought experiment of introducing by stipulation a pair of marks with the mentioned meaning again reinforces the point.

The phenomenon we have just been examining in our third criticism suggests a more general point. Inspired by his own reactions to challenges to the univocity of the definite article stemming from Donnellan's seminal paper on the referential use of definite descriptions, Kripke (1977) devised a celebrated general test for challenges to the monosemy of an expression, that went roughly as follows. Suppose *i* is an indication of an utterance *u* of an expression *e*. In order to determine whether *i* is a manifestation of a conventional acceptation of *e* different from its alleged unique meaning *m*, imagine a circumstance in which *e* has *m* as its only meaning (perhaps because it has been so stipulated). If *i* would have been generated by *u* even in such a circumstance, then the hypothesis that *i* exemplifies a conventional acceptation of *e* different from *m* in the present circumstance is not warranted. Now, our third criticism of pragmatic theories suggests a certain kind of "reverse" general test for challenges to the ambiguity or polysemy of an expression. Suppose again that *i* is an indication generated by an utterance *u* of an expression *e*. In order to determine whether *i* is a manifestation of a conventional acceptation of *e*, and is not a pragmatic indication via *u* of an alleged more meager meaning *m* for *e*, imagine a circumstance in which *e* has *m* as its only meaning (perhaps because it has been so stipulated). *If a certain different indication* i *' would have been naturally generated by another utterance* u *' of* e *in such a circumstance but it would not be generated by* u *' in the present circumstance, then the hypothesis that* m *is the only meaning of* e *in the present circumstance and* i *is a pragmatic indication of utterance* u *of* e *is not warranted (and the hypothesis that* i *exemplifies a conventional acceptation of* e *in the present circumstance is supported)*.

Our third criticism can now be seen as involving applications of this general principle. Suppose *i* is the indication that "music" in a certain utterance *u* of the quotation marks, say one of (5), is being used or should be used in a distanced way. *i* is evidently generated by normal utterances of (5). Now imagine a circumstance in which the quotation marks have as their only meaning the "attention" indication, say. Then we also ascertain that another utterance of the marks, say one of (18), would naturally generate in such a circumstance the indication that the concepts corresponding to the quoted expressions are being stressed. But, at the same time, we realize that such an indication is not naturally generated by an utterance of (18) in the present circumstance. We therefore conclude that the hypothesis that the "attention" indication gives the only conventional acceptation of the marks is not warranted, and the hypothesis that the distance indication exemplifies a conventional acceptation of the marks is supported.

Existing tests for ambiguity or polysemy are notoriously problematic, and I don't want to claim that the test for a related purpose that I am proposing is necessarily water-tight. But I think that it is worth considering, and that it gives intuitively correct results in many cases. Take a traditionally uncontroversial example of polysemy, "chair". Suppose *i* is an indication generated by a certain utterance *u* of a sentence containing "chair", say the indication generated by an utterance of

(21) The chair will give us some money,

that the person referred to by the grammatical subject is the person in charge of some institution, the kind of person in charge that can give institutional money away. Now imagine a circumstance in which "chair" has as its only meaning some really meager indication, such as "thing closely related to an artifact designed for sitting". Then we also ascertain that another utterance of "chair", say the second and third ones in an appropriate utterance of

(22) I sat on the chair, resting my arms on its two comfortable adjustable chairs, one on each side; but I realized that the left chair had a nail sticking out from it, so I ended up resting my left arm on my lap,

would naturally generate in such a circumstance the indication that we are talking about armrests—after all, an armrest is related to an artifact designed for sitting in a very close way. But, at the same time, we realize that such an indication is not naturally generated by an utterance of (22) in the present situation. On the contrary, an utterance of (22) in the present circumstance would be *puzzling*. We therefore conclude that the hypothesis that the indication "thing closely related to an artifact designed for sitting" gives the (only) conventional acceptation of "chair" is not warranted, and the hypothesis that the "person in charge" indication naturally suggested by an utterance of (21) exemplifies a conventional acceptation of "chair" is supported. I invite the reader to apply the test to other examples.

When, thirty-odd years ago, Grice and Kripke among others criticized some philosophers' frequent appeals to ambiguity, it was indeed in fashion to postulate semantic ambiguities or polysemies whenever a newly discovered linguistic intuition involving some uses of an expression seemed not to be covered by a traditional unitary analysis of its meaning. Grice in fact devised his theory of implicatures to a large extent

in order to confront ambiguity theories of the logical particles and of the verb "to believe"; Kripke mentions proposals that the propositional "know" and the identity sign are ambiguous. To this fashion, Grice and Kripke opposed a healthy cautious attitude: first one should see if a pragmatic explanation of the newly discovered indication was available without postulating more conventional meanings than in the traditional analysis. Only after exhausting the pragmatic route should one postulate ambiguities or polysemies; among other considerations that favor this way of proceeding, considerations of economy like the ones reviewed at the beginning of this section played a prominent role.

Some four decades later, the fashion seems to be just the opposite of what it used to be. Now what is in vogue is to try to explain as many as possible of the indications that can be conveyed by the use of an expression as pragmatic add-ons to a meager meaning for it. If Cruse (2000, 197-8) is right, the currently prevalent view in lexical semantics is *monosemy*, the view that generally a word has a single highly abstract meaning rather than the traditional variety of dictionary meanings for it, an abstract meaning from which the other "meanings" can be derived in context as pragmatic add-ons (see especially Ruhl 1989). And in philosophical semantics, some of the significantly represented parties in fashionable disputes concerning "unarticulated constituents" postulate "minimal", "underspecific", and other kinds of meager meanings for sentences, assigning formidable roles to pragmatics in the determination or specification of "what is said" with utterances of those sentences, either via implicatures, or via "enrichment" processes, or whatever. Grice's "Modified Ockham's Razor" is sharper than ever! I myself think that Grice's and Kripke's "program", as well as some of the post-Gricean appeals to pragmatic supplementations in lexical semantics and philosophical semantics, have yielded a large number of correct insights. But if the fashion of forty years ago went awry in bloating one's semantic ontology, the new fashion definitely runs the risk of seeing fewer things in semantic reality than there actually are. I'm convinced that the semantics of quotation marks is a case in point, and I hope that the preceding considerations, including the proposal of the mentioned test for challenges to polysemic theories of an expression, may contribute a bit to showing this.

Even if pragmatic theories are not correct, it doesn't mean semantic theories must be. After all, pragmatic theories had apparently strong motivations behind them. Perhaps some kind of hybrid theory incorporating insights from both semantic and

pragmatic theories is needed. Or is there a semantic theory that can rise to the challenges of pragmatic theorists? It will be the task of the next and final section to argue that at least one semantic theory can.

3 A Semantic Theory and its Virtues

The theory I wish to propose and defend here, already put forward in a slightly different form in Gómez-Torrente (2005), can be stated as follows. The quotation marks have at least (probably exactly) four established acceptations, corresponding to four different conventions of use. One of these is the purely referential acceptation; when used under this acceptation, the quotation marks help create a new singular term that as a matter of convention semantically refers to the enclosed expression. In a normal utterance of (1) or (11), the quotation marks will be used under this acceptation. On a second acceptation, manifested in typical utterances of (6) and (7) and special name uses in general, the quotation marks again help create new singular terms that as a matter of convention semantically refer to things such as articles, poems, movies, ships, planes, etc., that are also named by the enclosed expressions.

On a third acceptation, manifested in typical utterances of (2) and (3) and allusion uses in general, the quotation marks conventionally add an adverbial or prepositional indication, typically to the verb "to say" or a related attitudinal verb (as in (2)). This will be an indication roughly (but probably not exactly) equivalent to an adverbial clause of the form of "using '—' or an appropriate version of it" or to a prepositional phrase of the form of "with a use of '—' or an appropriate version of it" (where the expression alluded to goes in each case in place of the dash,[18] inside purely referential quotation marks). Such a conventional adverbial or prepositional indication thus contributes

[18] The expression alluded to is understood here not to include parts which may be enclosed within the quotation marks but not for allusive purposes, such as ellipsis points, clarifications in brackets, etc. (See note 4 above.) The indications of these parts, when they appear, are probably to be understood, at least typically, as additional content inserted by the utterer, which doesn't contribute to truth conditions, which "projects" beyond scopal devices, etc. Thus, for example, if I say *Shaw said that there is no "sincerer [truer] love" than the love of food*, what I say is true just in case Shaw said that there is no sincerer love than the love of food, using the words "sincerer love"; the clarification that "sincerer" means "truer" is not part of the truth conditions of my utterance. And if I say *Maybe Shaw said that there is no "sincerer [truer] love" than the love of food*, what is said might be the case is that Shaw said that there is no sincerer love than the love of food, using the words "sincerer love"; the clarification that "sincerer" means "truer" is not part of what is said might be the case.

compositionally to the truth conditions of an utterance containing the allusion marks and containing a verb susceptible of being modified by the corresponding adverbial or prepositional clauses. When "to say" or a related verb do not appear in the sentence uttered, as in (3), the adverbial or prepositional indication carried by the allusion marks must modify some other verb if the result is to be grammatically proper; but the indication that a relevant proposition is in the scope of "to say" or a related verb will often be pragmatically conveyed even in the absence of a verb susceptible of being modified by the adverbial or prepositional clause, and whenever this happens, the quotation marks will be implicitly understood as adding their conventional adverbial or prepositional indication to the implicitly understood verb. In such cases, the conventional adverbial or prepositional indication cannot contribute compositionally to the truth conditions of the utterance containing the allusion marks.

On a fourth acceptation, manifested in typical utterances of (4) and (5) and in distance uses in general, the quotation marks conventionally add to the sentence without quotes an indication that the enclosed expression should be used not plainly but in some distanced way, or that it is being so used by the utterer. In these cases the marks work roughly as a parenthetical main clause paratactically added to the full sentence without quotes, and expressing the mentioned suggestion of the utterer's. Such a conventional indication does not contribute compositionally to the truth conditions of the utterance containing the distance marks.

Under any of these acceptations, the quotation marks can be put to the use of communicating non-literal contents, conveyed via any of the well-known pragmatic mechanisms invoked in pragmatic theories, or via other pragmatic mechanisms. But according to the theory, as confirmed by the considerations of section 2, there is no single, meager meaning of the quotation marks from which speakers and readers generate the indications that the theory postulates as literal and conventional.[19]

[19] In Gómez-Torrente (2005) I spoke of the existence of the various acceptations of the quotation marks as showing that the marks are *ambiguous*. Some readers have suggested that I should have said they are *polysemous* instead. This may be acceptable, provided we become convinced that the several acceptations of the marks are in fact closely related in some specific sense, as they probably are (see my own thoughts on this matter below). But my use of "ambiguous" was and is meant to be for a weak concept that subsumes both polysemy and homonymy, and I saw and see no reason not to frame the claims of my view in terms of ambiguity, as this highlights the fact that the view is not essentially committed to a stronger claim of either polysemy or homonymy.

As recalled in section 1, in Gómez-Torrente (2005) I proposed that the quotation marks in their allusion acceptation had a straightforward full propositional content as their conventional indication—namely the indication that the enclosed expression (or a certain part of it) is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered by some agent or agents who are contextually relevant. The present modification proposes that the marks in allusion uses don't add a full propositional content, but an adverbial or prepositional content designed in the most frequent case to modify the verb "to say" or a related attitudinal verb, a content which thus definitely contributes compositionally to the truth-conditional content of the utterance containing the allusion marks (and containing a verb susceptible of being modified by the corresponding clauses). This is meant to take care of the fact that impure allusion quotation marks can appear embedded in contexts where their conventional content cannot be thought of as being a full propositional indication. In an utterance of

(23) I wonder if Ford said that thinking is "the hardest work" there is,

there will typically be no conveyed indication that Ford did utter "the hardest work", while there is surely an indication that the speaker wonders if Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is, using the particular expression "the hardest work" (or a contextually appropriate version of it).[20] On the present theory, that utterance is roughly equivalent to an utterance of

(24) I wonder if Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it.

Note that, both intuitively and under the interpretation provided by (24), part of what I wonder is whether Ford used (an appropriate version of) certain words. Such a content

[20] This fact presents problems for many theories of allusive (or "mixed", or "hybrid") quotation. On Maier's (2014) important theory, for example, the use of an allusive quotation carries a presupposition that the quoted phrase was used in an earlier utterance, and *I wonder if Ford said that thinking is "the hardest work"* gets analyzed roughly as *I wonder if Ford said that thinking is whatever some salient speaker meant when they uttered "the hardest work"*. But this doesn't have the intuitively right truth conditions in cases where no one has uttered "the hardest work" before, and the utterer is just wondering out of the blue if Ford said that thinking is the hardest work by uttering "the hardest work".

thus does not intuitively "project" beyond the scope of "to wonder". Similarly for an utterance of

(25) Did Ford say that thinking is "the hardest work" there is?

which on the present theory is roughly equivalent to an utterance of

(26) Did Ford say that thinking is the hardest work there is, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it?

(note that part of what is asked is whether Ford used (an appropriate version of) certain words) and for an utterance of

(27) Maybe Ford said that thinking is "the hardest work" there is,

which on the present theory is roughly equivalent to an utterance of

(28) Maybe Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it.

(Note that part of what is said might be the case is that Ford used (an appropriate version of) certain words.) In an utterance of

(29) No one can have ever said that thinking is "the hardest work" there is,

there is intuitively a conventional indication that every speaker has failed to say that thinking is the hardest work there is, at least by uttering (an appropriate version of the expression) "the hardest work" when saying it. This is captured by the present theory with its postulation that the mentioned utterance is roughly equivalent with an utterance of

(30) No one can have ever said that thinking is the hardest work there is, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it.

The examples could be multiplied.

Note that the present theory implies that, when used with an allusion acceptation in sentences like (2), the quotation marks carry a conventional indication that turns out to imply a full propositional indication that the enclosed expression is a contextually appropriate version of expressions uttered by some agent or agents who are contextually relevant. Thus, (2)'s rough analysis,

(31) Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it,

implies

(32) Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is, and "the hardest work" is an appropriate version of expressions in Ford's utterance.

Thus the present theory subsumes the predictions of my earlier (2005) theory for cases relevantly similar to (2), which are presumably the most frequent cases of use of the allusion acceptation of the quotation marks.

According to the theory, the successful usability of utterances of sentences like (3) in order to communicate allusive contents is a sort of by-product of the intended use of the allusion marks with the verb "to say" or related verbs. Considered out of the blue, these utterances sound odd, and this oddness may even be traced to ungrammaticality in some cases if not in all. But when the context makes it clear that the sayings of some particular agent or agents are at stake, a pragmatic mechanism will typically convey that the relevant proposition can be understood as in the scope of "to say" or a related verb, which the marks can be pragmatically understood as modifying as well. Thus (3) does not in any case literally say the content of (31), but utterances of it can manage to convey that content. If this theory is right, one could expect that embeddings of sentences like (3) would be infrequent, for it would be more difficult to convey and process the multiplicity of (either explicit or pragmatically conveyed) scopal devices. Thus, an utterance of

(33) I wonder if thinking is "the hardest work" there is

will not typically be used to convey an indication that the speaker wonders if Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is, using the particular expression "the hardest

work" (or an appropriate version of it). To the extent that it could be so used, the present theory would suggest that this is because the utterance in question can be used to convey pragmatically a certain proposition expressible using "to say" or a related verb, such as a proposition expressed by an utterance of (24). Similarly for an utterance of

(34) Is thinking "the hardest work" there is?

which on the present theory could perhaps be used in order to pragmatically convey the same proposition as an utterance of (26), and for an utterance of

(35) Maybe thinking is "the hardest work" there is,

which on the present theory could perhaps be used in order to pragmatically convey the same proposition as an utterance of (28). On the present theory also, an utterance of

(36) Thinking is not "the hardest work" there is,

could perhaps be used to pragmatically convey the same proposition as an utterance of

(37) Ford did not say that thinking is the hardest work there is, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it.

The theory's differential account of (2) and (3) provides an explanation of a phenomenon I noted in Gómez-Torrente (2005), 139ff., but left as a puzzling case there. Compare the following two dialogues (thinking of the second as an e-mail exchange between Ford biographers, for example):

(2_D) –Ford said that thinking is "the hardest work" there is.
–That's false, because he didn't utter the word "hardest".
(3_D) –Thinking is "the hardest work" there is.
–That's false, because Ford didn't utter the word "hardest".

(2_D) (and relevantly similar exchanges) sounds like an appropriate exchange, while (3_D) (and relevantly similar exchanges) sounds odd. This led me in Gómez-Torrente (2005) to express doubts that the conventional indication of allusion marks is part of the truth-conditional content of the utterances where the marks appear (even though I inclined

toward the view that it is). If the present theory is right, a natural explanation of the felt difference here would be that while *Ford said that thinking is "the hardest work" there is* (=(2)) has the content of (31), and thus its truth conditions which involve directly in the main clause what Ford said or didn't say, *Thinking is "the hardest work" there is* (=(3)), if it has truth conditions of its own, has truth conditions involving the question of whether thinking is hard or not (and not involving the question of whether Ford made a use of "the hardest work" or not), even if the content of (31) can be pragmatically conveyed via an utterance of (3).

A fact worth noting about the impure allusion acceptation of quotation marks concerns an ambiguity of certain reports where the marks appear embedded under the scopes of several occurrences of "to say" or some related attitudinal verb. If Jones utters (2), I can report Jones' utterance, apparently accurately and completely, by means of

(38) Jones said that Ford said that thinking is "the hardest work" there is.

In this case, the content of my report is that of

(38A) Jones said that Ford said, using "the hardest work" or an appropriate version of it, that thinking is the hardest work there is.

But it is easy to think of cases where I could use (38) to report on a different utterance of Jones'. Suppose Jones uttered not (2) but

(39) Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is.

Then I could report Jones' utterance by means of (38), but clearly the allusion quotation marks in my utterance would not correspond to any element of the truth-conditional content of Jones' utterance of (39)—they would clearly be my own contribution, so to speak. This would be explained on the present theory by postulating that in this case (the adverbial or prepositional indications carried by) the quotation marks modify the first occurrence of "said" in (38), while in the previous case they modified its second occurrence. The content of my utterance of (38) when reporting on (39) would thus be the content of

(38B) Jones said, using “the hardest work” or an appropriate version of it, that Ford said that thinking is the hardest work there is.

By contrast with the quotation marks in their third, or allusion acceptation, the quotation marks in the fourth, distance acceptation do seem to provide a full propositional “distance” conventional indication that by default “projects” beyond scopal elements. Hence the present theory’s postulate that in distance uses the marks work as a parenthetical added to the full sentence without quotes, and not as an element susceptible of composing and contributing to truth conditions when embedded in more complex constructions. Thus, in an utterance of

(40) Jones wonders if the five thousand “smackers” are hidden in the house by the river,

it will typically be difficult if possible at all to convey an indication that Jones wonders if the *expression* “smackers” *is* somehow inappropriate; the natural indication (assuming it is contextually clear that the quotation marks are being used to express distance and not allusion) will be that the utterer thinks that it is inappropriate. Similarly, and perhaps even more clearly, for utterances of

(41) Are the five thousand “smackers” hidden in the house by the river?

and of

(42) Maybe the five thousand “smackers” are hidden in the house by the river.

In an utterance of

(43) The five thousand “smackers” are not hidden in the house by the river,

it will again be difficult if possible at all to communicate the proposition that the use of “smackers” is not inappropriate, and the default indication will surely be the indication proposed as conventional by the present theory, that “smackers” is thought to be inappropriate by the utterer. The examples could be multiplied.

This is not to say that there cannot be cases where the distance conventional indication is to be attributed to someone different from the utterer. Consider the following example, where we are to suppose that the utterer is Smith, the owner of the records despised by Jones, the utterer of (5):

(44) Jones doesn't make a secret of his disdain for my artistic tastes... Smith's fondness of Agatha Christie's novels is deplorable; these are so naïve compared to the great masterworks of the detective genre... Smith's "music" records are a torture; he listens to the Spice Girls!... I don't think I can get along with Jones.

Here the use of the quotation marks surely conveys an indication that Jones, not the utterer, thinks that the use of the word "music" as applied to Smith's records is somehow inappropriate. But in a case such as this it is pragmatically obvious that Smith is mimicking an utterance of Jones'. Since an audience will grasp this fact thanks to the text preceding the quotational sentence, it will consequently be pragmatically obvious to them that the distance indication is naturally attributable to the mimicked utterer (Jones) and not to the utterer (Smith). But cases such as this actually confirm rather than refute the idea that the default attribution of a quotational distance indication is to the utterer; for under this supposition it is easy to explain cases like the one we are considering as pragmatic by-products of the convention of default attribution to the utterer.[21]

This is one of many examples illustrating the fact that an indication conveyed by the use of an expression may be conventionally attached to it without necessarily contributing to truth conditions. In my earlier work, I left unanswered the question whether the impure allusion and distance indications of the quotation marks contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances of the quotational sentences that conventionally express them. In Gómez-Torrente (2005) I gave a detailed discussion of tests for whether such indications contribute to the truth conditions of the relevant quotational utterances (including a test based on exchanges relevantly similar to (2_D) and (3_D) above), and the upshot was that the tests did not yield a conclusive answer to this question. I also noted, however, that applications of the tests tended to suggest that the allusion indications do contribute to truth-conditional content, while distance

[21] Cases of essentially this kind are presented by Amaral, Roberts and Smith (2007) as counterexamples to the unqualified claim in Potts (2005) and in many other places that appositives and expressives are always "speaker-oriented". In Harris and Potts (2009), Potts accepts these counterexamples to his earlier general claim, but proposes a pragmatic explanation of the cases.

indications do not. In my present opinion, the projectability and unprojectability phenomena discussed in the preceding paragraphs make it overwhelmingly likely that the conventional impure allusion indications do, while the conventional distance indications do not, contribute to the truth conditions of the relevant utterances. For it is clear that conventional impure allusion indications regularly fall by default under the reach of scopal elements applied to sentences containing the relevant quotations, while conventional distance indications do not. This is perhaps not yet fully conclusive evidence that allusion indications do contribute to truth-conditional content and distance indications do not, but it seems to me that it may well be evidence as conclusive as we can get. The present theory therefore postulates that impure allusion indications generated by quotation marks do contribute to truth conditions (at the very least in cases where the quotation marks are explicitly under the scope of "to say" or a related verb) while distance indications do not.

Perhaps I ought to stress that, in saying that the distance indications of the quotation marks do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances that express them, I am of course not denying that those indications are themselves truth-conditional. Such indications do of course have truth values (at least when they are not affected by problems that might deprive them of such values, such as problems having to do with presupposition failures, vagueness and the like). My only claim is that the truth of those indications appears to be irrelevant to the truth of the quotational utterances that serve to make them. Thus, for example, the truth of the indication that an utterer of (4) thinks that "smackers" is inappropriate appears to be irrelevant to the truth of her utterance of (4), which hangs exclusively on whether the five thousand dollars in question are hidden in the house by the river. In my view, distance indications generated by the quotation marks closely resemble the indications characteristically generated by expressions like "confidentially", "in other words" and "to get back to the point", which, as Bach (1999) has forcefully argued, can be presumed not to contribute to the truth conditions of the (typical) utterances of the sentences that contain them, but qualify (some aspect of) the speech acts performed in uttering them.[22]

[22] Bach has also argued that "but", "still", "even" and other traditional alleged generators of conventional implicatures do contribute at least typically to the truth conditions of utterances of sentences that contain them; but I am hesitant to follow him here. In any case, I reject a view like Predelli's (2003), which, despite being semantic like the present view, largely assimilates impure allusion and distance quotation marks to "but", "still", etc. and sees no substantive difference between allusive indications of

One possible underlying motivation for pragmatic theories not mentioned in section 2 might be a vague intuition that the different uses of quotation marks would seem to have something in common; wouldn't it be natural then to expect that this thing in common was an aspect of the meaning of the marks? And isn't a semantic theory that postulates that they are ambiguous ill-equipped to account for this intuition? The answers are: it is natural to expect that the meanings of the marks will have something in common, but a semantic theory such as the one just stated accounts perfectly well for this expectation. As stressed in Gómez-Torrente (2005) for the essentially similar theory there, all the conventional indications postulated above for the different acceptations of the quotation marks share an obvious general feature: they all contain reference to the quoted expression. This is due to the fact that the general conventions that govern the different uses all mention the quoted expression: the general convention governing pure quotation says that "by enclosing *any expression* within quotation marks one gets a quotation that stands for *the enclosed expression*"; the general convention governing the special name acceptation of quotation marks says that "by enclosing *any expression already naming an article, poem, movie, ship, plane, etc.* within quotation marks one gets a quotation that stands for the thing named by *the enclosed expression*"; the general convention governing the allusion acceptation of quotation marks says that "by enclosing *any expression* within quotation marks one adds an adverbial or prepositional indication, roughly equivalent to the meanings of phrases of the form of 'using '—' or an appropriate version of it' or 'with a use of '—' or an appropriate version of it' (where the expression alluded to goes in each case in place of the dash)"; and finally, the distance acceptation is governed by a general convention such as "by enclosing *any expression* within quotation marks one indicates that *the enclosed expression* should be used not plainly but in some distanced way, or that it is being so used by the utterer". On the present theory, therefore, the intuition that all uses of the quotation marks have something in common receives a natural explanation, and in fact one that appeals to a common semantic feature, a feature shared by all the meanings of the marks. But the explanation in no way appeals to the idea that quotation marks in all their uses must share a single meaning.[23]

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the quotation marks and distance indications, assigning to both of them a truth-conditional role (in the case of at least many quotational utterances).

[23] Ludwig and Ray (2017) relatedly propose that quotation marks are polysemous and yet the semantic rules governing their different acceptations are unified by their common use of pure quotation.

In what remains, I will first explain why the present theory is not affected by the criticisms that I posed to pragmatic theories in section 2. After that, I will argue that the theory is also not affected by the objections, again from section 2, that pragmatic theorists have posed to semantic theories.

First, let's briefly review why the present theory is not vulnerable to the objections we pressed in section 2 against pragmatic theories, and in fact how it explains some of the audiences' reactions in the examples exploited in the criticisms. A decisive criticism of the strong echoic view was that if I sincerely utter (11) I am not implying that someone else used "bigritwesertkil" before. The present theory is not vulnerable to this objection because, in postulating a distinctive referential meaning of the quotation marks, it can ascribe just this meaning to the utterance of the marks in the utterance of that sentence. Since this meaning makes no mention of previous uses of the quoted expression ("bigritwesertkil", in this case), the intuition that no such indication is present is preserved, and in fact directly explained.

The weaker echoic view was vulnerable to two objections: (i) one can make allusive first uses of expressions in environments which by their very nature preclude any indication that those expressions have been used before, and (ii) one can spontaneously invent fully new playful words and make first uses of them when writing to other people, as for example in the imagined utterance of (13). Again the present theory is not vulnerable to these criticisms, because (i) the conventional indication of the allusive quotation marks postulated by the theory does not imply that the quoted expression has been used before, and in fact it's not even a full propositional indication; and (ii) the distinctive "distance" acceptation of the quotation marks postulated by the theory does not imply that there have been previous uses of "brutiful" and "aborradle"; in both cases the intuition that no such indication is present is directly explained.

Our next criticism, of the "attention" and "difference" theories, was that, while it should be easy to construct cases in which their postulated conventional indications are conveyed without inducing any expectation in the audience that at least one of the four standard indications (or possibly the non-standard "emphasis" indication) are being meant, doing this seems difficult or impossible. Thus, if someone utters (14) or (15) out of the blue, a typical reader will be puzzled by the utterances, will not interpret them by assigning to them a minimal meaning. And if (14) or (15) are uttered not out of the blue, but accompanied by cancelations of any allusion and distance indications (the only intuitively sensible ones), as in (14′) and (15′), the sense of puzzlement will be even

greater. But on the present theory, this puzzlement is perfectly foreseeable. We are trying to imagine a reader who can get content simply by retrieving the indication that the quoted expressions in (14) and (15) are being called attention to, or that they are being used in order to convey something beyond or different from their usual meaning. And on the present theory one cannot do just one of these things with the quotation marks; in linguistically acceptable uses, one must utilize them under one of their acceptations, presumably under one of the four acceptations described in the theory's statement above. In the uses of the examples, since it is thoroughly unclear which acceptation is at stake, or it has even been excluded that the only possible acceptations are at stake, a sense of thorough puzzlement will arise. The present theory thus explains the puzzlement, and is also obviously not subject to the criticism, as it directly implies that one cannot use the quotation marks just to convey a meager "attention" or "difference" indication.

Finally, let's turn to the third and most significant criticism. Recall that the utterers of (17) and (18) in the examples are presumably both calling attention to the quoted expressions and signaling that they intend to convey something beyond their usual meaning, so they have intentions in line with the meager meanings of the marks postulated by the "attention" and "difference" theories. And yet the clearly intended indication that the utterer is emphasizing the concepts expressed by the quoted expressions is only conveyed at the cost of inducing a sense of oddness in the reader, a sense that something is not quite right. Nothing like this should happen if either the "attention" or the "difference" theory was right. By contrast, the present theory is not subject to this criticism, for the utterers of (17) and (18) are *not* intending to use the quotation marks under any of the acceptations that they have according to the theory: this is evident, for the utterers manifestly do not mean to convey any of the conventional indications corresponding to those acceptations. Furthermore, the theory explains the feeling of oddness produced by the utterances of (17) and (18), also as an effect of the utterers' not using the quotation marks under any of the acceptations postulated by the theory.[24]

[24] These remarks leave open the exact nature of the mechanism that allows the communication of emphasis indications by means of quotations. But the mechanism is in all probability related to other mechanisms that make possible the communication of indications via the use of misnomers and catachreses. As noted above in the text, in all their acceptations the quotation marks conventionally indicate a content involving the quoted expression. It is therefore easy for new uses to arise that seek to

Let's now see how the present theory deals with the criticisms of semantic theories presented in section 2. First there was the criticism that semantic theories were uneconomical (while pragmatic theories were economical). That pragmatic theories are more economical than semantic theories is of course true. But recall that considerations of economy hold good only *ceteris paribus*, i.e. provided that both the pragmatic theory and the semantic theory we are comparing can explain the same phenomena, or explain them to the same degree of satisfactoriness. And as detailed in section 2 and in the preceding paragraphs, I don't think that the semantic theory presented here and the pragmatic theories of section 2 are tied with regard to explanatory success. We have seen that there are several phenomena that pragmatic theories cannot account for or are straighforwardly at odds with, and that the present theory explains perfectly well. In such a situation, considerations of economy are simply defeated.

Second, we had the idea that quoteless quotation is problematic for a semantic account because semantic accounts must postulate unmotivated, *ad hoc* elements in logical form corresponding to referential and impure allusion quotations. But this is simply based on a misunderstanding. Semantic accounts are just accounts of the semantics of the quotation *marks*, in the sense of what the *marks* can be used conventionally to express. They are fully compatible with any theory of quoteless quotation, and in particular with plausible theories that do not postulate any hidden quotational element in the logical form of quoteless utterances and explain the possibility of quoteless quotation via pragmatic effects. In fact, elsewhere (Gómez-Torrente 2001, 2011) I have proposed an explanation of the possibility of indicating reference to "Socrates" with "Socrates" (instead of " 'Socrates' ") in (8) in terms of the pragmatic mechanism of "speaker's reference"; such an account is evidently fully compatible with the present theory of the semantics of the quotation marks, which by itself does not postulate anything at all about what is going on in cases like a normal utterance of (8). A related account is clearly perfectly possible for cases where allusion indications are communicated without the help of quotation marks, as in (9). In such cases the allusion indication is presumably communicated in virtue of the fact that the expression alluded to is saliently known to speaker and audience to have been uttered by some contextually relevant agent or agents. If so, this occurs as a result of a fully

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indicate new contents involving the quoted expression, such as the content that the concept expressed by the quoted expression is being emphasized.

pragmatic mechanism, without need of postulating hidden elements in logical form, and is again fully compatible with the present theory of the quotation marks, which are of course fully explicit elements of the sentences in which they appear.

A third criticism of semantic views was that in some impure allusion cases, such as in typical utterances of (3), the quotation is not under the scope of an explicit reporting verb, which would seem to make it likely that the reporting indication is accomplished pragmatically. The idea here seems to be that since the reporting verb is absent, there cannot be a conventional indicator of the fact of reporting. The present theory simply rejects this inference. Both when an allusion quotation appears under the scope of an explicit reporting verb and when it does not, the quotation marks conventionally carry the allusion indication. What is presumably pragmatically accomplished, when the allusion quotation is not under the scope of an explicit reporting verb, is the suggestion that the reported content is tacitly under the scope of an implicit reporting verb, with its corresponding implicit subject, but this fact should not be confused with the pragmatic theorist's thesis that there is no conventional indicator of the fact of reporting. In any case, if the present proposal is to be rejected, it cannot be rejected through the fallacious inference from the absence of the reporting verb to the absence of a conventional allusion indication carried by the quotation marks.

The fourth and last criticism of semantic views attempted to exploit cases of impure allusion uses of the quotation marks in which the quoted expression is not a syntactic constituent, such as (10). In such cases the quotation presumably has no self-standing meaning contributing compositionally to utterance meaning or truth conditions, and yet some semantic theories (such as those in Benbaji 2005 and Geurts and Maier 2005) are committed to assigning some such meanings to quotations. However, the present theory is not such a theory. On the present theory, the allusive use of the quotation *marks* conventionally adds an adverbial or prepositional indication to the verb "to say" or a related attitudinal verb, but the *quotation* itself is not (and the *quoted expression* need not be) a syntactic constituent of the quotational sentence.

With this I finish the defense of my semantic view of impure quotation. Semantic views of quotation have lately suffered sustained criticism coming from the pragmatic theorist's corner, much of it fueled by the promise of comparatively economical pragmatic accounts of quotational phenomena. However, I hope to have shown both that pragmatic theories face inherent limitations that prevent them from explaining a

range of such phenomena, and that the present semantic theory accounts for these phenomena in a very natural way.

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