UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES FILOSÓFICAS

I completed my PhD in philosophy at the University of St. Andrews (Scotland), where I was also part of the Arché Research Centre. My supervisors were Herman Cappelen, Jessica Brown and Francois Recanati. During my PhD I have also been a visitor at Rutgers University and at the Institut Jean Nicod (Paris).

Most of my research focuses on the problem of mental representation and related issues in philosophy of mind and language. I am currently working on a project on ‘modes of presentation’ (MoPs): my goal is to criticise the leading conception of MoPs as internally inconsistent and to lay down the foundations for an alternative picture of cognition, one on which MoPs have no useful explanatory role to play. The project develops some of the central ideas from my doctoral dissertation, which concerned the problem of concept individuation.

In philosophy of language, I am interested in the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. In particular, I am developing a research project that will be centred on the following question: what are the problems and prospects for radical error theories about reports, i.e. theories that ‘explain away’ our intuitions about these sentences as incorrect?

I am also interested in the nature of verbal/substantial disagreement, and in the implications that a theory of disagreement would have for some current meta-philosophical debates.