Discriminación perceptiva y consciencia

Patrocinado por la British Academy: Newton Movility Grant NG150209

Jueves 14 de Abril de 2016
Sala de Seminarios Fernando Salmerón, IIFs

10:00-11:20

Juan González. UAEM

Arquitectura del campo visual y experiencia perceptiva noconceptual

El propósito de esta charla es doble. Por un lado, aclarar qué es la experiencia perceptiva noconceptual (EPNC), evocando primeramente las nociones de "experiencia antepredicativa" (Merleau-Ponty), de "visión no-epistémica" (Dretske), de "contenido no-conceptual" (Peacocke) y de "visión funcional", de mi autoría. Por otro lado, exponer ciertos datos empíricos sobre la arquitectura y dinámica del campo visual humano, enfatizando su carácter anisotrópico y de gradiente que permite entender la experiencia perceptiva en términos de un continuo analógico, cuyo contenido solo se digitaliza en visión foveal y con recursos atencionales, posibilitando así su conceptualización. Lo anterior nos permitirá entender la EPNC en dos sentidos muy distintos: a) como una matriz de proto-perceptos (i.e., un flujo o configuración de estímulos fenoménicamente indiscriminados), de valor eminentemente funcional y pragmático, fundamental para nuestro desempeño cognitivo cotidiano y para el de otros animales; b) como un percepto plenamente discriminado y fenoménicamente individuado con la ayuda de la atención, mas no conceptualizado ––y, por lo tanto, semántica y funcionalmente neutro.

 

11:20-11:30     Café

 

 

11:30-12:50

Denis Buehler. IIFs-UNAM

Warrant from Transsaccadic Vision

In this paper I argue that an important subset of our visual perceptions integrates information across saccades and shifts of attention. I argue that, therefore, explaining our warrant for an important subset of our basic visual perceptual beliefs requires appeals to visual attention. 

12:50-13:00 Café

 

 

13:00-14:20

James Stazicker. University of Reading

Partial Report, Consciousness and the Introspective Evidence

Does consciousness require cognition? Yes or no? Recent work has shown that either answer is consistent with the results of partial report experiments. Nonetheless, ongoing elaborations of the partial report paradigm are said to provide important defeasible evidence that consciousness is independent of cognition. I argue that this popular claim underestimates the challenge from alternative interpretations of the experiments. The experiments could in fact provide such evidence only given a controversial view about how we know our own conscious states – a view associated with the idea of ‘mental paint’. This view presupposes a contrast between consciousness and cognition, in terms of how we know them through introspection. What’s more, there are good introspective reasons to doubt that consciousness differs from cognition in the way presupposed. Partial report is the wrong place to look for evidence that consciousness is independent of cognition. 

Almuerzo

 

 

16:00-17:20

Germán Palafox. Facultad de Psicología-UNAM

Congruencia ínter modal en la construcción del espacio perceptual

17:20-17:30 Café

 

 

17:30-18:50

Miguel Ángel Sebastián. IIFs-UNAM

Cómo individual la Experiencia Perceptiva. Una defensa del Criterio Contrastivo

The non-transitivity of the relation looking the same as has been used to argue that the relation same phenomenal character as is non-transitive; a result that might jeopardize certain theories of consciousness. In this paper I will argue against this conclusion, granting the premise, by defending a contrastive criterion for individuation of phenomenal characters. If this contrastive criterion is true, then the fact that we can distinguish two objects that look the same with regard to certain property P when one of them but not the other does not look the same with regard to P than a third one can be easily explainedby appealing to experienes with different phenomenal character. This criterion forces one to dissociate lookings and phenomenology , which some might nd counterintuitive. However, this intuition is left unsupported once phenomenology and cognitive access are distinguished. A distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.


 

 

Actualizado Abr 14 de 2016
Ago 17 de 2017
© 2015 Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México