Grupo de Lectura de Filosofía de la Ciencia

 

 

Grupo de Lectura de Filosofía de la Ciencia

12:00-14:15 hrs | Viernes quincenalmente
Sala de Investigadores, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM

Discutiendo An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism: Defending Realism Without Inference to the Best Explanation.

Wright, John (2018): An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism: Defending Realism without Inference to the Best Explanation, Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, Synthese Library. (https://www.springer.com/us/book/9783030022174)

 

C A L E N D A R I O

Viernes, marzo 29:

Cap. 1 Introduction: Realism and Reason.

Cap. 2 The Skeptical Arguments against Realism I: Inductive Skepticism.

Presenta: María del Rosario Martínez Ordaz

 

Viernes, abril 12:

Cap. 3 The Skeptical Arguments

 

Viernes, abril 26:

Cap. 4 Realism and Inference to the Best Explanation

 

Viernes, mayo 3:

Cap. 5 On the Inference to Unobservables

 

Viernes, mayo 17:

Cap. 6 Underdetermination and Theory Preference

 

Mayores informes: martinezordazm@gmail.com
https://www.mariamartinezordaz.com/phil-sc-reading-group.html

 

 

Actualizado Mar 21 de 2019
    Dic 01 de 2020
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