Seminario de Investigadores (1er Semestre 2019)

Sala de Seminarios, Fernando Salmerón, IIFs - UNAM

 

Enero.2019

 

  23  

Eduardo García Ramírez (IIFs - UNAM)

"El Conocimiento Moral como Competencia Cognitiva"

  Texto

 

 

 

 

 

 

  30  

SWIP-Analytic-México 2019

Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (Centro de Lógica, Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia Universidad de Campinas, Brasil)

"Contradiction, consistency and the paraconsistent perspective in the Western thought: from Heraclitus of  Ephesus to Newton da Costa"

In this presentation I will outline a historical analysis on how a paraconsistent perspective was properly constituted in the Western thought and how principles, rules and logical systems begin to express distinct concepts of paraconsistency. By analyzing the historical precedents of paraconsistent logic before the 20th century, we can identify some unanswered questions: What ideas were proposed and debated with regard to consistency in that period of the history of formal logic? Did such ideas influence later logical theories? Was there knowledge of logical rules and principles which allowed, in some contexts, for  inconsistency to be dealt without trivialization? If such principles were known, how were these proto- principles stated, and in what way can they be related to the logical-paraconsistent results and rules known  today?

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

Febrero.2019

 

 

   6   

 

Sergio Martínez Muñoz (IIFs - UNAM)

La relación entre Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia como problema filosófico

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  13  

 Luis Estrada González (IIFs)

El Plan de Bochum y los fundamentos de las lógicas contraclásicas

Texto

     
 

 

 

 

 

  20  

Stacie Friend (Birkbeck College, Universidad de Londres)

Emotional Immersion in Fiction

 


Asesoría para mujeres investigadoras y estudiantes
Dra. Stacie Friend Birkbeck College
Lunes 18 de febrero de 2018
Aula Luis Villoro, 12:00 horas

 

 

 

 

 

  27  

Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University, New Brunswick)

Abstract 
Can there be a materialist explanation for conscious experience? I present a view—ground functionalism—which combines metaphysical grounding and functionalist perspectives on the mind, in claiming that conscious experience is grounded in functional role. According to ground functionalism, a subject experiences pain because she is in a state that plays the pain-role, and in general a subject has a given experience because she is in some state that plays the corresponding functional role. I first discuss what it would take to provide a materialist explanation for conscious experience, and then argue that ground functionalism delivers.

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

Actualizado Feb 13 de 2019
  Feb 20 de 2019
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