Background
(* = highly recommended)
General philosophical arguments for structured mental representations:
1. ∗ Fodor, J. A. (1987). Why there still has to be a language of thought. In Psychose-mantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, pages 135-154. The MIT Press.
Examples (old and new) of structural hypotheses in vision science:
2. *Palmer, S. E. (1977). Hierarchical structure in perceptual representation. Cognitive Psychology, 9(4):441-474.
3. Garrigan, P. and Kellman, P. (2011). The role of constant curvature in 2-d contour shape representations. Perception, 40(11):1290-1308.
Empirically oriented, philosophical arguments about the structure of visual object representations:
4. Green, E. and Quilty-Dunn, J. (2017). What is an object file?, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, axx055.
Classic argument that structural hypotheses cannot be evaluated independently of processing hypotheses:
5. Anderson, J. R. (1978). Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery. Psycho logical Review, 85(4):249-277.
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